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UNITED STATES MILITARY TRIBUNAL V
SITTING IN THE PaLACE OP JUSTICE, NURNBERG, GERHUNY
27 and 28 OCTOBER 1948
THE UNITED STATES OF «.iv^ICA
vs,
ijiilLHELIvi VON LEi2j3
HUGO SPERRLE
GEORG KaRL FRiEDhlCH-VijILHELIvl
VON KUSCHLER
JOHaNNES BLaSKOA'ITZ
HERi'.jANN HOTH
H^NS REINHARDT
Hi^NS VON S-^LirJTH
r^.AL HOLLIDT
OTTO SCHNIEIVIND
iurfcii^L VON RO0,UES
HERIVANN REINEGlUii
'li!/ii,LTLifv vi/i-^iiLxiViONT
OTTO '."/OEHLER, and
RUDOLF LEHi.L.NN
Defendants
C&se No. 12
JUDGIvlENT OF THE TRIBUN0.L
John 0. Young, Presiding Judge
'ilVinfield B, Hale, Judge
Justin ii'j. Harding, Judge
'•"-•"ili'llii iTlfllllliliii
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Tribunal is composed of Presiding Judge John C.
Young (formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Colora
do), and Associate Judges Justin W» Harding (formerly U-S'.
Territorial Judge of Alaska) and V/infield B. Hale (Justice
Tennessee Court of Appeals, on leave of absence).
It was created under and by virtue of Military Govern
ment Ordinance No. 7, effective 18 October 1946, adopted
pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, enacted 20 December
1945, in order to give effect to the London Agreement of 8
August 1945, and the Charter Issued pursuant thereto for the
prosecution of war criminals.
In Nurnberg, on 28 November 1947, in accordance with
Ordinance No. 7 (Article Illa) supra, an Indictment was lodged
against the defendants by Telford Taylor, Brigadier General,
U.S.A., Chief of Counsel for War Grimes, acting in behalf of
the United States of America. A copy of the Indictment in
the German language was served upon each defendant at least
thirty days prior to arraignment on 30 December 1947, at
which time each, in the presence of counsel of his own selec
tion, entered a plea of "not ^ilty."
The Indictment named as defendants:
Generalfeldmarschall (General of the Array) Wllhelm von
Leeb, Generalfeldimirschall (General of the Army) Hugo Sperrlo,
Generalfeldmarschall (General of the Army) Georg Karl Fried-
rloh-'Wilhelm von Kuechler, Generaloberst (General) Johannes
Blaskowitz, Generaloberst (General) Hermann Both, General
oberst (General) Hans Relnhardt, Generaloberst (General) Hans
von Salmuth, Generaloberst (General) Karl Hollldt, General-
admiral (Admiral) Otto Schnlewlnd, General der Infanterie
(Lieutenant General, Infantry) Karl von Roquea, General der
Infanterie (Lieutenant General, Infantry) Hermann Reinecke,
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General der Artillerie (Lieutenant General, -^irtlllery)
VVclter Warlimont, General der Infanterie (Lieutenant General,
Infantry) Otto v^oohlcr, and Generaloberstabsrichter (Lieuten
ant General, Judge Advocate) Rudolf Lehraann.
The defendant General Johannes Blaskowitz committed
suicide in prison on 5 -c'cbruary 1948, and thereby the case
against him was terminated.
THE INDICTMEi^lT
Tho Indictment is in four counts charging (1) Crimes
against Peace; (2) War Crimes;. (3) Crimes against Humanity;
and (4) A Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit the crimes
charged in Counts One, Two and Three,
Count One - Crimes against Peace
Tho first count of tho Indictment, paragraphs 1 and 2,
is as follo'ws 2
"l. iill of the defendants, with divers
other persons, including tho co-participants
listed in Appendix A, during a period of years
preceding 8 May 1945, committed Crimes against
Peace as defined in Article II of Control
Council Law No. 10, in that they participated
in the initiation of invasions of other coun
tries and wars of aggression in violation of
•international laws and treaties, including
but not limited to the planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging of v/ars of aggression,
and wars in violation of international treaties,
cxgreoments and assurances.
"2. The defendants hold high military
positions in Geriminy and committed Crimes
against Peace in that they wore principals in,
accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a con
senting part in, were connected with plans
and enterprises involving, and wero members of
organizations ^vnd groups connected with, the
commission of Grimes against Peace."
Then follow paragre.phs 3 to 44, both inclusive, cover
ing plans of aggressions, and wars and invasions against
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain, France, Gen-
mark, Norway, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg,
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Yugoslavia, GroecG, the U,S.S.R,.and the United States of
America, and undertook to shov/ the unfolding of these plans
of aggression and to particularize the participation of the
defendants in the formulation, distribution, and execution
thereof.
Count Two - War Grimes and Crimes g.gainst Humanitys
Grimes against l«nemy hfelligerents and
frisoners of v^ar
Count Tv/o of the Indictment, paragraph 45, is as follows
"45. Betv/een September 1939 and May 1945
all of the defendants herein, with divers
other persons including the co-participants
listed in Appendix a, committed V/ar Crimes
and Crimes ;;igainst Humanity, as defined in
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in
that they participated in the commission of
atrocities and offenses against prisoners of
war and members of armed forces of nations then
at war with the 'Ihird Heich or under the belli
gerent control of or military occupation by
Germany, including but not limited to murder,
ill-treatment, denial of status and rights, re
fusal of quarter, employment under inhumane
conditions .md at prohibited labor of prisoners
of war and members of military forces, and
other inhumane acts and violations of the lav/s
and customs of war. The defendants committed
;Var Crimes and Crimes against Huiminity in that
they wore principals in, accessories to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in,
wore connected with plans and enterprises in
volving, and wore members of organizations
and groups connected with, the coraraission of
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity."
Then follows paragraph 46, which in general terms sets
out the unlawful acts as follows;
"46. Unlawful orders initiated, drafted,
distributed and executed by the defendants
directed that certain enemy troops be refused
quarter and be denied the sta.tus ^^nd rights of
prisoners of war, and that certain captured
members of the military forces of nations at
war Vi^ith Ucrmny be summarily executed. Such
orders further dli'^ectod that certain members
of enemy armed forces be designated and treated
by troops of the Gorman armed forces, subordi
nate to the defendants, either as ^partisans,
communists, bandits, terrorists' or by other
terras denying them the status and rights of
prisoners of war. Prisoners of war vjero com
pelled to work in war operations and in work
having a direct relation to war operations.
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including the manufacture, transport and
loading of arms and munitions, and the build
ing of fortifications. This work was ordered
v/ithin tho combat i^one as well as in rear
areas. Pursuant to a 'total v/ar' theory and
as part of a program to exploit all non-G-er-
man peoples, prisoners of war were denied
rights to which they were entitled under con
ventions and the laws and customs of war.
Soldiers were branded, denied adequate food,
shelter, clothing and care, subjected to
all typos of cruelties and unlawful reprisals,
tortured and murdered. Special screening
and extermination units, such as l.insatz
Groups of the Secui'^ity Police and Gichcr-
heitsdionst (commonly known as
operating with tho support and
jurisdiction of the Wehrnucht,
killed prisoners of v^ar for religious, poli
tical and racial reasons. I/Iany recaptured
prisoners were ordered executed. The crimes
described in paragraphs 45 and 46 included,
but were not limited to, those set forth
hereafter in this Count."
This is followed by paragraphs 47 to 58, both inclusive,
which particularize certain unlawful acts, such as the is
suance and execution of the "Commissar Order", tho "Commando
Order", etc., and tho participation of the defendants in the
formulation, distribution and execution of these unlav/ful
plans..
Count Thre^o - War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity:
"Crimes against Civilians
the "SD"),
under the
selected and
Count Three of tho Indictment, paragraph 59, is as
follows
"59. Between September 1939 and May
1945 all of the defendants herein, wltn divers
other persons including tho co-participants
listed in Appendix A, committed War Crimes and
Crimes agc^inst Humanity as defined- in Article
II of Control Council Law Number 10, in that
they participated in atrocities and offenses,
including murder, extermination, ill treatment,
torture, conscription to forced labor, deporta
tion to slavo labor or for other purposes, im
prisonment without cause, killing of hostages,
persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds, plunder of public and private property,
Wr.inton destruction of cities, towns and villages,
devastation not justified by military necessity,
and other inhumane and criminal acts against
German nationals and members of the civilian
populations of countries and territories under
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the bolligoront occupation of, or otherwise
controlled by Gormny. The defendants com-
inittcd War Crimes and Grimes against Huimn-
ity, in that they a-ere principals in, acces
sories to, ordered, abetted, took a consent
ing part in, v^ere connected with plans and
enterprises involving, and we're members of
organiautions and groups which wore connected
with, the commission of Wo.r Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity."
The following paragraphs 60 to 82 set forth generally
and particularly thc= enlavvful acts, such as enslavement of
the population, plunder of.public and private property,
murder, etc*, and the participation of the defendants in
the formulation, distribution and execution of those unlaw
ful plans.
Count Pour - Common Plan or Conspiracy
The Fourth Count, paragraphs 83 and 84, is as followsj
"83. All the defondants, with divers
other persons, during a period of years
preceding 8 May 1945, participated as loaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplioes in
the formulation and execution of a common
plan and conspiracy to commit, and which in
volved the comi.iission of. Crimes against
Fcacc (including the acts constituting War
Crimes and Grimes against Humanity, which
were committed as an integral part of such
Crimes against Peace) as defined in Control
Council Law Number 10, and are individually
responsible for their own acts and for all
acts cormnitted by any persons in the execu
tion of such common plan or conspiracy.
"84. The acts and conduct of the de
fendants sot forth in Counts One, Tv/o and
Three of this Indictment formed a part of
said common plom or conspiracy and all the
allegations made in said Counts are incor
porated in this Count."
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STATISTICS OP TRIAL
The trial began 5 February 1948, and the prosecution's
case v/as substantially completed on 5 March, at which time
a recess was taken until 12 April 1948 to enable counsel to
prepare their defense, then resumed and completed on 13
August 1948. Each defendant has been represented by German
lawyers of his own selection who have conducted the defense
with great ability, energy and zeal,
^ huge mass of evidence has been submitted in behalf
of the prosecution and defense. The trial was conducted
in two languages - English and German - and all documents
submitted were duly•translated and given counsel. The de
fense was also furnished with photostat copies of the ori
ginal captured documents.
The prosecution's case, including those introduced on
cross examination and rebuttal, was made in part by the in
troduction of 1778 documents, the vast majority of which
were taken from German records and documents captured by the
Allied Armies. The defendants complained that the context
of many of these documents was necessary to their proper
understanding and evaluation and that other documents would
tend to explain or refute any Inference of criminality that
might be drawn from the documents relied upon by the prose
cution. The defendants requested that they be supplied with
additional material for their defense specified by them in
their application. To this end the Tribunal ordered the
Secretary General to procure such thereof as it was possible
to procure and as a result of this order there were procured
from Vilashington 1503 document folders which filled 37 foot-
lookers. These the defense counsel and the defendants were
permitted to examine and they have used such thereof as
they deemed necessary in the presentation of their case
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either as new evidence, or to supplement and explain the docu
ments introduced by the prosecution.
The material used for such purpose by the defendants
was taken from 259 different document folders and comprised
2058 pages which were photostated and used as exhibits in
the case. Such material was received at different times.
The first shipment from Vi/ashington was received on 10
April and the last on 27 May 1948. The case was not closed
for the taking of testimony until 6 August 1948. In addi
tion, the defense counsel and tho defendants were allowed
access to all of tho captured records and documents not
yot sent over to tho United States and still stored in the
Court Archivos in Nurnberg for the purpose of using such
portions thereof as they might deem material. The defendants
introduced a total of 2130 documents and affidavits as ex
hibits in the presentation of their defense. The transcript
of the record contains 10,000 pages.
Insofar as lay wibhin its power, the Tribunal directed
and aided in procuring all the witnesses thp.t defense counsel
requested, that their testimony might be heard in open Court.
One hundred sixty-five witnesses were ordered summoned
for the defendants. One hundred five of those summoned it
was possible to procui'o and they v/ere brought to Nurnberg
and were available for the defendants to call to the witness •
stand. Of those only eighty in fact were called by the de
fendants. That so many of those requested were in fact
procured is a tribute to tho efficiency and to the co
operation that the administrative officers of the court house
have rendered in this trial.
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CLAIMED ERRORS IN TRANSLATIONS
At ni.?j:iy times during the progress of the case, counsel
for the dofendnnts insisted there "were many and damaging
errors made in the translations of the many documents pf--
fered in evidence by the prosecution. The Tribunf^l re
peatedly advised counsel th^t if any errors had been mnde and
were called to the Tribunal's attention, all efforts would
be made to obtain a correct translation.
In the closing statement of Dr. Surholt, counsel for
the defend nt Generrl Reineche, he said;
"The documents must be properly trans
lated, that is, the Araericcn translation
must convey to the Tribunal the sense of the
German text correctly and without omissions.
This cannot be s^id of any of the document
boohs. The English text in the hands of the
Tribunal contains such a vast number of mis-
t'^kes that to correct even the essential
points is a task, the Defense is unnble to
cope with.
"The reviewing of the document books
arranged by the Defense went as far as Docu
ment Books 1 - 9Q, which is about half of the
material. The number of mistakes so far
established amounts to 1,936."
And then he gave a few examples of the supposed erroneous
tr-nslations.
Before the trial ended, the Tribunal again pointed
out to counsel the -advisability of submitting lists of the
translations questioned. Dr. Frohwein, representing the
defendant General Reinhardt, submitted v. list consisting
of thirty-one documents in which there were claimed errors
of tr nsl-tion. This list was handed over to the prosecu
tion v/hich co.greed to all of the contentions with the ex
ception of three which were left to the decision of the
Tribunal. Dr. Mueller-Torgow, for the defendant Both,
submitted to the Tribunal a list of eighteen documents con
taining erroneous translations. All were agreed to by the
prosecution.
^ 8 -
3. '
Dr. Leverkuehn, representing the defendant Warlimont,
submitted one item which v^as agreed to by the prosecution.
Dr. von Keller, representing the defendant Dr. Lehmann, sub
mitted a list consisting of twelve documents containing al
leged errors, all of which were corrected by agreement with
the prosecution.
These were the only corrections submitted by any of the
counsel and many were of minor, if any, importance. For in
stance, we notice in one spot there were deleted the words:
"These prisoners were shot on the spot after short interroga
tion." And there was substituted: "These prisoners are shot
on the scene of action after short interrogation." At other
points, the word "partisan" is deleted and the word "fronc-
tireur" substituted. In other places, the word "officials"
w^s deleted and the word "functionaries" substituted in lieu
thereof. Other criticisms were of more importance but this
shows that many were more captious than material.
Such errors and ambiguities as were material and were
not cleared up by agreement of counsel were noted and in
FiccorclrJice with proper rules of criminal procedure, any
doubts and rjnbiguities are resolved in favor of the defen
dants.
.. 9 -
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THE BASIC USv'i Ai«ID LAW OP THE CASE
A• Control Council Law I>io» 10
The pre-amble to Control Council Law No. 10 reads as
follows ;
"In order to give effect to the
terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30
October 1943 and the London Agreement of
3 August 1945, and the Charter issued
•pursuant thereto and in order to establish
a uniform legal basis in Germany for the
prosecution of war criminals and other
similar offenders, other than those dealt
with by the International Military Tribunal,
the Control Council enacts as follows s
Article I
"The Moscow Declaration of 30 October
1943 'Concerning PLesponsibility of Hitlerites
for Committed Atrocities' and the London
Agreement of 8 August 1945 'Concerning Prose
cution and Punishment of Major War Criminals
of the Euroi^ean Axis ' are ma be integral parts
of tjils lav/. Adherence to the provisions of
the London Agreement by any of the United
ilctions, as provided for in Article V of that
Agreement, shall not entitle such Nation to
participate or interfere in the operation of
this Law within the Control Council area of
authority in Germany.
Article II
"1. Each of the follov/ing acts is recog
nized as a crime s
Crimes against Peace. Initiation of
invasions of other countries and v/ars of
aggression in violation of international laws
and treaties, including but not limited to
planning, preparation, initiation or waging a
war of aggression, or a war of viol a tion of
international treaties, agreements or assurances
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
"(b) War Crirries. Atrocities or offenses
against persons or property constituting vio
lations of the laws 'or' customs of v:ar, including
but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or
deportation to slave labour or for ary other
purpose, of civilian population from occupied
territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners
of v/ar or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of pxiblic or private property;
v/anton destruction of cities, towns or villages,
or devastation not justified by military
necessity.
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"(c) Crimes against Humanity, Atro
cities and offenses, including but not limited
to murder, extermination, enslavement, depor
tation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or
other inhumane acts *committed against any
civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious ground
v/hether or not in violation of the domestic
laws of the country v/here perpetrated,
"(d) Membership in categories of a criminal
group or organization declared criminal by
the International Military Tribunal,
"2, Any person without regard to nation
ality or the capacity in which he acted, is
deemed to have committed a crime as defined
in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he v/as
(a) a principal or (b) v/as an accessory to
the commission of any such crime or ordered
or abetted the same or (c) toolr a consenting
part therein or (d) was connected with plans
or enterprises involving Its comr.aission or
(e) was a member of any organization or group
connected v/ith the commission of any such
crime or (f) with reforonco to paragraph 1
(a), if he held a high political , civil or
military (including General Staff) position
in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-
belligerents or satellites or held high
position in the financial, industrial or
economic life of any such country."
In the judgment rendered by the International Military
Tribunal, it is saids
"The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is de
fined in the Agreement and Charter, and the
crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, for which there shall .be individual
responsibility, are set put in Article 6.
The^ lav; of the Charter is decisive, and
binding upon tho Tribunal,
"The making of the Charter was tho exorcise
of tho sovereign legislative power by the countries
to vdiich the German Reich unconditionally
Eurrandorod; and the undoLibted right^of these
countries to legislate for the occupied
territories has been recognized by tho civilized
world. The Charter is not an arbitrary
exercise of pov;er on the part of tho victorious
Kations, but in the viov; of the Tribunal,
as will be shov;n. It is tho expression of
international lav; existing at tho time, of
its creationi and to that extent is itself
a contribution to international lav/.
"The Signatory Pov/ers created this
Tribunal, defined tho law it was to administer,
and made regulations for tho proper conduct
of the Trial, In doing so, they have done
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together what any one of them might have done
singly^ for it is not to 'oe doubted that any
nation has the right thus to set up special
courts to administer law,- Y/ith regard to the
constitution of the Court, all that the defen
dants are entitled to ash is to receive a fair
trial on the facts and law.
•'The Charter makes the planning or v/aglng of
a v;ar of aggression or a war in violation of
International treaties a crimoj and it is there
fore not strictly necessary to consider v;hether
and to what extent aggressive v/ar v/as a crime
before the execution of the London Agreement,
But in viev/ of the great importance of the
questions of lav; involved, the Tribunal has
heard full argument from the Prosecution and the
Defense, and will express its view on the matter.
"It was urged on behalf of the defendants that
a fundamental principle of all law - International
and domestic - is that there can be no punishment
of crime without a pro-existing law,
sine lo^Q, nu^le- poopa sine logo, ^ It v;as submitted
tha^ ox post facto punishment is abhorrent to the
law o~all civilized nations, that no sovereign
power had'made aggressive war a crime at the time
that the alleged criminal acts v;ore committed, that
no statute had defined aggressive war, that no
eenalty had been fixed for its commission, and no
court had been created to try and punish offenders.
"In the first place, it is to be observed
that the maxim nullum crimon sine lege is not a
limitation of sovoreighty, but is in general
principle of justice. To assort that it is unjust
to pmish those who in defiance of treaties and
assurances have attacked neighboring states v;ith-
out warning is obviously lontrue, for in such
circumstances tho attacker must know that ho is
doing wrong, and so far from it being unjvist to
punish him, it would bo imjust if his -wrong wore
allov/od to go unpunished. Occupying the positions
they 'did In the GoverniTiont of Germany, the
defendants, or at least some of them must have
known of tho treaties signed by Germany, outlawing
recourse to war for tho settlement of international
disputes; they must have knovm that they wore
acting in defiance of all international law when
in complete doliboration they carried out their
designs of Invasion and aggression. On this view
of the case alone, it would appear that tho maxim
has no application to tho present facts.
"This view is strongly reinforced by a con-
siboration of the state of intornr;tional loyi in
1939 30 f^^ nessivo v;ar is concornod, Tho
General Treaty for tho rionunciation of V.'ar of
27 August 1928, more gonorally known as tho Pact
of panis or the ICellogg-Erland Pact, v;as binding
nn 63 nations, including Germany, Italy, andJapan at the outbreak of war In 1959. In tho preamble.
the signatories declared that they v;oro
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'Dooply sonsiblo of tlioir solomn duty
to promote tho v/olfaro of rnanlrind; per
suaded that tho time has come when a
frank renunciation of war as an instru
ment of national policy should ho mado
to tho ond that the peaceful and friendly
relations now existing botwoon thoir
peoples should bo porpotuatod ....
all changes in their relations with one
another should bo sought only by pacific
moans «.• thus uniting civilised nations
of tho world in a common renunciation of
war as an instrimiont of thoir national
policy •... '
Tho first two articles arc follows:
*Articlo I. Tho High Contracting Parties
solemnly declare in the names of thoir
respective peoples that they condemn re
course to war for the solution of inter
national controvorsies and renounce it as
an instrument of national policy in thoir
relations to ono another,'
'Article II. Tho High Contracting Parties
agree that tho sottlenont or solution of
all disputes or conflicts of v/hatovor'
nature or whatover origin thoy may bo,
which may arise among thorn, shall never be
sought except by pacific moans.'
Tho question is, what was tho legal effect of this
Pact? Tho nations v;ho signed tho Pact or adhered
to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war for
the future as an instrtmiont of policy, and expressly
.renounced it. lifter tho signing of tho Pact, any
nation resorting to war as an instrtimont of national
policy breaks tho Pact. In tho opinion of the
Tribunal, tho solomn renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy necessarily Involves
tho nroposition that such a war is illegal in
international lav;; and that those who plan and v/ago
such a war, with its inevitable and terrible con-
soquoncos, are committing a crime in so doing.
War for tho solution of international controvorsios
undertaken as an instrument of national policy
certainly includes a war of aggression, and such
a v;ar Is thoreforo outlawed by tho Pact. As J;ir•
Konry L. Stimson, then Socrotary of State of tho
United States, said in 1932s
'War botwoon nations was ronouncod by
tho signatorios of tho Kollogg-Brland
Treaty. This moans that it has bocomo
throughout practically tho entire world.,»
an illegal thing. Hereafter, when nations
engago in armed conflict, either ono or
both of them must be termed violators
of this general treaty law ..... Wo denounce
them as law breakers.'
- 13 -
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But it is argued that the Pact does not expressly
enact that such wars are crrjnes, or set up courts
to try those v-rho iiiake such wars. To that extent
the same is true wi.th re^iard to the laws of war
contained in the Hague Convention. The Hague
Convention of 190? prohibited resort to certain methods
of waging war. These included the inhui;^ane troat-
•lent of prisoners, the employment of poisoned
weapons, the improper use of flags of truce, and
similar matters. Many of ttese prohibitions had
boon enforced long before the date of the Con-
vention; but since 1907 they have certainly been
crimes punishable as offenses against the laws
of v^ari yot the Hague Convention nov/hero d.sig-
nates such practices as criminal, nor is any
sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a
court to try and punish ofienders. For many
years past, howevc-r, military tribunals have
tried and punished individuals guilty of violating
the rules oi iG-id "v-arfare laid dovm by this con
vention. In the opinion of the Tribunal those
who wage aggressive war ai'o doing that which is
equally illegal, and of jauch greater moment taan
a breach of one of the rules of th.e Hague Con
vention. In interpreting the words of the Pact,
it must be reraeribered that international law is
not the product of an international legislature,
and that such international agreements as the
Pact of Paris have to deal vjith general principles
of law,and not ivith administrative matters of
procedure# The lavir of war is to be foiind not
only in treaties, but in the customs and practices
of states which gradually obtained universal
recognition, and from the general principles of
justice applied by jurists and. practiced by
i^iilitary courts. This law is not static , but by
continual adaptation follov;s the needs of a
changing world. Indeed, I'.n -r-any cases treaties
do no more than express and define for :aore
accurate reference the principles of law already
existing.
"The view which the Tribunal takes of the
true interpretation of the Pact is supported by
the international nistor^/ which preceded it.
In thvj ;/ear 19^3 the draft of a Treaty of Mutual
Assistance was sponsored by thu League of Nations.
In Articlo I the Treaty declared •that aggressive
war is an internat5-onal crime*, and that the
parties \'rould • undertake that no one of them v/ill
be guilty of its commission*. The draft treaty
was submitted to 29 states, about half of whom
were in favor of accepting the text. The prin
ciple objection appeared to be In the difficulty
of defining the acts v/hich VJould constitute
'aggression*, rather thian any doubt as to tne
criminality of aggressive war. The preamble to
tho League of Nations 192U Protocol for thu
I^cific Settlement of International Disputes(IGeneva Protocol*), after 'recognising the
solidarity of the .no ibers of the international
community*, declared t:,:.at ta war of aggression
- m -
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constitutos a violation of this solidarity and
is an international crimo.' It wont on to doolaro
that tho contracting parties v/oro ^desirous of
facilitating tho conploto application of the
systoni provided in tho Covenant of the League
of nations for the pacific settloinont of disputes
botv/oon tho States and of ensuring the repression
of international crimes.' The Protocol v/as
rocommendod to the mombors of tho Loaguo of
nations by a unanimous resolution in tho assembly
of tho 48 members of the-League. Those members
included Italy and Jo.pan, but Germany was not
then a mombor of the League.
"Although the Protocol v/as novor ratified, it
v/as signed by tho loading statosraon of tho v/orld,
reproscnting tho vast majority of tho civilized
states and peoples, and may bo regarded a s strong
ovidoncG of the intention to brand aggressivo war
as an international crirao.
"At tho mooting of tho Assembly of tho League
of nations on 24 Soptember 1927, all tho delegations
thon present (including tho German, tho Italian,
and the Japanese), unanimously adopted a declaration
concerning wars of aggrosslon. Tho proatnblo to
tho declaration stated?
'The Assoublys
Recognizing tho solidarity v/hich unites
tho coDjmunlty of nations;
Being inspired by a firm desire for the
maintenancG of gonoral poaco;
Being convinced that a war of aggression can
novor servo as a moans of settling inter
national disputes, and is in consequence an
international crime
"The unanimous resolution of 18 February 1928
of 21 American republics at tho Sixth (Havana) Pan-
American Gonforonce, doclarod that »war of aggrosslon
constitutos an international crlmo against tho human
species ' •
All thesG oxprossions of opinion", and others
tha.t could bo cited, so solemnly ma.do, roinxorco
tho construction which tho Tribunal placod upon ^ho
pact of Paris, tha.t resort to a war of aggression is
not moroly illegal, but Is criminal. The prohibition
of aggrossivo war doma^ndod by tho conscionco of tho
world, finds its oxprosslon in tho series of paces
and treaties to which the Tribtuial has just roforrod.
"It is also important to romomber that Article
227 of the Treaty of Vorsaillos provided for tho
constitution of a spocial Tribunal, co'.eposod of
rOprosontativos of five of the Allied and i^-ssociatod
Powers v/hioh had boon bolligoronts in the first
V/orld V/ar opposed to Gorrjany, to try tho fox'mor
Gorman Emperor 'for a supromo offonse against
international morality and the sanctity of trioatios,'
Tho purpose of this trial was oxprossod to bo
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*to vindicato tho solonin obligations of inter
national -undertakings, .and tho validity of
intornational ciorality*. In Articlo 228 of
tho Treaty, tho Gorman Govornmont oxprossly
recognized tho right of tho /allied Powors *to
bring boforo military tribunals persons accused
of having committed acts m violation of tho
laws and customs of \7ar*.
"It v/as submitted that international lav; is
concerned with the actions of sovereign States,
and provides no pvinishriiont for individuals! and.
further,'that where tho act in question is an act
of State, those v;hO'carry it out arc not per
sonally rosponsiblo, but are protoctod by tho
doctrine of tho sovereignty of the State, In tho
opinion of tho Trib-unc.1, both those submissions
must be rojoctod. That international lav/ imposos
duties and liabilities upon individuals as well
as upon States has long been rocognisod. In the'
rocont case of Ex Parto Quirin (1942 317 XJ,S,'l),
boforo tho Supromo Court of tho United States,
persons v;ero charged during the v;ar with landing in
tho United States for purposes of spying and
sabotage. Tho late Chief Justlco Stone, speaking
for the Court, saids
•Prom tho ve3?y boginning of its history
this Court has applied tho law of war as
Including that part of the law of nations
which prescribes for the conduct of v;ar,
tho status, rights, and duties of enemy
nations as well as enemy individuals.*
11© wont on to glvo a list of cases tried by the
Courts, whore individual offenders were charged
with offenses against tho laws of nations, and
particularly the laws of war. Many other authorities
could bo cited, but enough has boon said to show
that individi-ials can bo punished for violations of
international law. Crimes against intornational
law are comnlttod by mon, not by abstract ontitios,
and only by punish5.ng individuals who commit sxich
crimes can tho provisions of intornational law
bo enforced.
"Tho provisions of /u?ticle 228 of the Treaty
of Versailles already roforrod to illustrato and
onforco this view of individual responsibility..
"Tho principle of international lav;, which
under certain circuiastaiicos, protects tho ropro-
sontativoa of a state, cannotbe applied to acts
which are condemned as criniinal by intornational
law. The authors of thoao acts cannot shelter
themselves behind tholr official position in
order to bo freed from punishraent in appropriate
proceedings, hrtlcle 7 of tho Charter expressly
doclaros s
•Tho official position of•Defendants,
whether as h60.da of State, or rosponsiblo
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officials in Govorni'.iGnt dopartrnonts,
shall not ho considoPGd as frooing
thom from responsibility, or mitigating
punisbmont.*
On the othor hand tho vory essonco of the Chartor
is that individuals have intornational duties
\7hich transcend tho national obligations of
obodionco imposed by tho individual stato. He
who violatos the laws of war cannot obtain ii-imunity
while acting in pursuance of tho authority of the
state if tho state in authorizing action moves
outside its computenco under intornational la.w.
"it was also submitted on behalf of most of
theso defendants that in doing v/hat they did they
were acting under the orders of Hitlor, and there
fore cannot bo held responsible for tho acts
comiiiitted by thorn in carrying out thoso orders.
The Chartor specifically provides in Article 8:
*Tho fact that tho Defendant acted pur
suant to order of his Government or of
a supox'ior shall not froo him from res
ponsibility, but naif considered in
mitigation of punishment. '
Tho provisions of this articlo arc in conformity with
tho law of all nations. That a soldier was ordered
to kill or torture in violation of tho international,
law of war has novor boon recognised as a dofcnso to
such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter hero
provides, the order may bo urged in mitigation of
tho pionishmont. Tho true tost, which is found ^
varying degrees in tho criminal law of most nations,
is not the existence of the order, but whether^moral
choice was in-fact possible," (Trial of the liajor
V/ar Criminals, Vol, I, pp, 218-224).
This reasoning applies also to Control Council Law
Ho, 10. Tho same authority creating the London ji.groor::ont
created this Control Council Law. As was said by
Tribunal m in tho Justice Case;
"it can scarcely bo argued that
Court which owes its oxlstonco and juris^
diction solely to tho provisions of a
given statute could assume to exorcise
that jurisdiction and then, in tho exorciso
thereof, doclaro Invalid the act to which
it owes its oxlstonco. Except as an aid
to construction wo cannot and need not go
behind the statute."
y Tho Chartor, supplomontod by Control Council Law TTo.
I'
10, is not an arbitrary exorcise of power, but "it is the
expression of intornational lav/ existing at tho tine of
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its croG-tion; and to that extent is itself a contribution
to international laviT." (Emphasis supplied. Judgment, HIT,
supra). As a matter of interest to students wo might
point out that this general principlo is sustained by
tho following extract from Grotius, written in 1625s
"It Is proper also to observe that
Kings and those who are possessed of sovereign
power have a right to exact punishment not
only for injuries affecting inmodiatoly them
selves or their own subjects, but for gross
violations of tho law of_nat\uy^ jmd_of natTonSj^
done to othor '"3'tat'6¥ \nd s~ubyQTt3~r'"~"r6V6'tius',''"
The RigvEF of V/ah"ahd" Peace', trans'lated from
the Latin by A, C, G mpboll, A.H. (1901) li.
Walter Dune, publisher, V/ashington and London,
Cap. XX, p. 247).
Wo also refer to an article from tho hanchoster
Guardian of 28 September 1946, containing a description of
the trial of Sir Peter of Hagenbach hold at hreisach in
1474. Tho charges against him wore analogous to "Crimes
against Humanity" in modern concept. Ho was convicted,
Ilowovor, those citations are of academic interest
only,- merely given to show tho soundness of tho Judgment
of the HIT. We thinlc it may bo said the basic law before
mentioned simply declared, developed, and implemented
international common law.
By so construing It, there is eliialnatod tho assault
made upon it as being an ox post facto onnctmont,
O^r view is fortified by the judgment rendered in
Case ITo, 7, TJ.S, vs. Wilholm List, ot al, whore (p. 10434)
it is said:
"V/o conclude that prooxisting intor-
natlonal law has declared tho acts con
stituting the crimes PIEREIH GI-L^PlGED and
included in-Control Council Lc-.vj Mo, 10 to
bo unlawful, both under tho convontijnal
law and tho practises and usages of land
warfare that had ripened into rocognlaod
customs which belligoronts wore bound to
obey. Anything in excess of existing
intornational law therein contained is a
utilisation of power and not of law. It
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is truG, of ccurso, that courts authorizod
to hoar such casos wore not ostablishod nor
the. ponaltios to be ir.iposod for tho
violations sot forth. But this is not fatal
to thoir validity. Tho acts prohibited are -
without dotorront effect unless they arc
punishable as crimes." (Emphasis supplied)
Then there Is quoted tho language of tho II,!T horotoforo
set out at page 14 of this opinion.
Hany of the questions in tho I?;IT Case are presented
in this case. Tho same unlawful orders, acts, and
practices are involved; only tho dofendants are different.
Hitler was the very center of vast expanding concentric
rings of influonce that touched ovory person in Goruany.
Tho dofendants in this case aro only one or tv;o steps
renovod fron Gooring, Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raoder,
dofendants in tho XI.1T Caso. Much of tho evidenco intro
duced In this case was introduced in tho II.IT hearing.
Consequently, tho great importance of tho judgnont of
that tria.1, as applyiug to tho issues of law involved m
this caso, is readily apparent.
Tho IIXT Judgment contains an olaborato s.ccount of
Hitler*s rise to powor, tno plans and acts of aggression,
and tho barbarities and crimes perpetrated upon the armed
forces and civilians of tho countries with which Gorma ny
was at war. In view of tho fact that those general
findings are svipportod by the record in tho Instant case,
wo shall make further liberal quotations fron and
references to it In this judgi:iont.
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B. International Treaties
In the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal
it is said:
"The Charter defines as a crime the planning
or vjrging of war that is a war of aggression or a
v;ar in violation of international treaties. The
Tribunal has decided th^t certain of the defendants
planned and waged aggressive wars against 12 nations,
and were therefore guilty of this series of crimes.
This makes it unnecessary to discuss the subject in
further detail, or even to consider at any length
the extent to which these aggressive wars were also
'wars in violation of international treaties, agree
ments, or assurances.'
"These treaties are set out in Appendix 0 of
the Indictment. Those of principal importance are
the following.
Hague Conventions
"In the 1899 Convention the signatory powers
agreed: 'before an appeal to arras ... to have
recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the
good offices or medhotion of one or more friendly
powers.' A similar clause was inserted in the Con
vention for P-^clfic Settlement of International
Disputes of 1907. In the accompanying Convention
Relative to Opening of Hostilities, Article I con
tains this frr more specific language: 'The Con
tracting Powers recognize that hostilities between
them must not commence without a previous nnd ex
plicit warning, in tiie form of either a declaration
of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a con
ditional decl'-r.ntion of war. ' Germany was a party
to these conventions.
Versailles Tre:>ty
"Breaches of cert-^ln provisions of the Ver
sailles Trenty are rlso relied on by the Prosecu
tion—Not to fortify the left bank of the Rhine(Articles 42-44); to 'respect strictly the Inde
pendence of Austrl!^' (Article 80); renunciation of
any rights in hemel (Article 99) and the Free
City of Danzig (Article 100); the recognition of
the independence of the Czechoslovak St^^te; and the
military, naval, and air clauses o.gainst German re
armament found in Part V. There is no doubt that
action w'-'S taken by the German Government contrary
to all these provisions, the details of which are
set out in Appendix C. With reg'^rd to the Treaty
of Versailles, the matters relied on are:
1. The violation of Articles 42 to 44 in
respect of the demilitarized zone of the Rhine-
land;
2. The annexation of Austria on 13 M^rch
1938, in violation of Article 80;
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3. The incorporation of the district of Kernel
on 22 March 1939, in violation of Article 99;
4. The Incorporation of the Free City of
Danzig on 1 September 1939, in violation of Article
iOOj — - .
5. The incorporation of the provinces of Bo
hemia and Moravia on 16 March 1939, in violation
of Article 81;
6. The repudiation of the military, naval, and
air clauses of the Treaty, in or about March of 1935.
"On 21 May 1935 Germany announced that, whilst
renouncing the disarmrment clauses of the Treaty,
she would still respect the territorial limitations,
and would comply with the Locarno Pact. (With re
gard to the first five breaches alleged, therefore,
the Tribunal finds the allegation proved.)
Treaties of Mutual Guarantee.
Arbitration, and Non-Aggression
"It is unnecessary to discuss in any detail
the various treaties entered into by Germany with
other Powers. Treaties of.mutual guarantee were
signed by Germany at Locarno in 1925, with Belgium,
France, Great Britain, and Italy, assuring the main
tenance of the territorial status quo. Arbitration
treaties were also executed by Germany at Locarno
with Czechoslovakia,'"Belgium, and Poland.
"Article I "Of the latter treaty is typical,
providing: 'All disputes of every kind between
Germany and Poland . . . which it ma.y not be pos
sible to settle amicably by the normal methods of
diplomacy, shnll be submitted for decision to an
arbitral tribunal . ^ ^
"Conventions of Arbitration and Conciliation
were entered into between Germany, the Netherlands,
and Denmark in 1926; and between Germany and Luxem
bourg in 1929. Mon-aggression treaties were executed
by Germany with Denmark and Russia in 1959.
Kellogg-Brignd Pact
"The Pact of P^irie was signed on 27 August 1928
by Germany, the United States, Belgium, France,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and other coun
tries; and subsequently by other Powers. The Tri
bunal Mrs made full reference to the nature of this
Pact and its legal effect in another part of thisjudgment. It is therefore not necessary to discuss
the matter further here, save to state that in the
opinion of the Tribunal this Pact was violated by
Germany in all the cases of aggressive war charged
in the Indictment. It is to be noted that on 26
January 1934 Germany signed a Declaration for the
Maintenance of Permanent Peace with Poland, which
was explicitly based on the Pact of Paris, and in
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which the use of force was outlawed for a period
of 10 years.
^^The Tribunal does not find it necessery to
consider eny of the other treaties referred to in
the Appendix, or the pepeated agreements and as
surances of her peaceful intentions entered into
by G-erm.rny."
03JECTI0ITS DURIHG Tim TRIAL
The objection has boon raised that this Tribvinal is not
a proper forum in which to try the dofondants for tho crimes
charged. It Is said that they wore prisoners of war and
that they arc subject to trial only by a goneral court-
martial. V/e find no merit in such contention.
Thoro is no doubt of the criminality of tho acts with
which tho dofondants are charged. They are based on vio
lations of International Law woll rocognized and existing
at tho tiiuo of their commission. True no court had boon sot
up for tho trial of-violations of International Law. A
state having enacted a criminal law ma y set up ono or any
numbor of courts and vost oach v/ith jurisdiction to try an
offondor against its internal Ir.ws, Evon after tho crimo is
charged to have been corxiittod v/o know of no principle, of
justico that would give tho defendant a vested right to a
trial only in an existing forum. In tho exorcise of its
I
sovereignty tho state has tho ri^t to sot up a Tribunal at
any timo it sees fit and confer jurisdiction on it to try
violators of its criminal law s. The only obligation .a
sovereign state owes to tho violator of one of its laws
Is to give him a fair trial In a forum whore ho may have
counsel to represent him - where ho may produce witnesses
in his behalf and where he may speak in his own defense-.
Similarly, a defendant charged with a violation of Inter
national Law la in no sense done an injustice if ho is
accorded tho same rights and privllogos. Tho defendants in
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this caso havo boon aocordod those rights and privileges,
is regards the contontirin that the defendants are
prisoners of v;ar and that the Geneva Convention, Article
y
63, reciniros that a prisoner of war bo tried by a general
court-nartial we call attention to the fact that this pro-
vision referred to is found in an international agroenont,
that ?/as entered into dnd to which both the United States
and Gernany wore signatories, to protect prisoners of war
after they acquiro such status and not to extend to then
any special rights or prerogatives v;ith respect to crines they
nay havo connittod before acquiring a prisoner of v/ar status.
Such is the reasoning of the Yanashita Case 327 U, S, 1:66 Sup
Ct 348, ViTo think tho reasoning sound,
Articlo 63 of tho Geneva Convention provides:
"Sentence nay bo pronounced against
a prisoner of v;ar only by tho sane courts and
according to tho sane procedure as in tho
caso of persons belonging to the arned forces
of tho detaining power,"
Therefore, say defense counsel, the defendants nust bo tried
by a general court-nartial since tho defendants were prisoners
of v/ar taken by the United States and nonbers in tho amed
forces of the United States conjiitting crines are tryable
by court-nartial. But tho trial of nen in the r.iilitary
forces of the United States by court-nartial can be only for
crines connittod after tho accused acquires and during the
tine he possesses tho status of a nonber of the arr.iod forces
of the United States, One v;ho connltted nurdor and thereby
violated tho lav; of tho state before ho was inducted into
tho nilltary service clearly could not bo trlod for that
crine by a court-nartial for violating articles of war which
did not apply to hin v;hon ho connltted tho nurdor,
llor do wo think it necessary that defendants be discharged
as prisoners of war before being brought to trial. Certainly
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if a nan is arrostcd for violating a municipal traffic
ordinancG v/hich subjocts him only to a civil penalty in a
magistrate's court and while he is in custody it is dis
covered that the day before he comnittod a nurdor, there
is no violation of any principle of justice in holding him
in custody and surrendering hin to the officers of a court
that has competency to try him for murder.
Wo arc not deciding whether the United States or Franco
or any other nation lawfully could or could
not try the defendants in a court-martial for a violation
of international law. That is not before us. If that may -
be done, a court-martial has not exclusive jurisdiction.
The crimes including the v/ar crimes charged against the
defendants are for violations of intornational criminal law.
This Tribunal by Control Goiancil Law No. 10 is vested v/ith
authority to try defendants for the crimes charged. That
such jurisdiction possibly ma^r bo exorcised by another military
court also is of no consequence. If two courts have conciurent
jurisdiction to try the same case the first court that
exorcises jurisdiction may properly dispose of the case.
The II.IT said:
"The jixrisdictlon of the Tribunal is defined
in the /-tgroomont and Charter, and the crimes
coning within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
for which there shall bo individual res
ponsibility, are sot out in i^rtlcle 6. The
lav; of the Charter is doclslvo, and binding
upon the Tribunal ...
"The Tribunal is of course bound by the
Charter and the definition which it gives of
war crimes and crimes against humanity (Trial
of the Major V/ar Criminals, Vol, I, pp. 218,
253).
What was held by the iJtiT with respect to the London
% ^
Agreement and Charter, the basic lav;s under which it ftinctlonod,
Is authority for a similar holding by this Tribunal with
respect to the basic law under which It was sot up and under
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whicii it functions,
/Je deem it unnecessary to discuss the objection that
Control Council Law No, 10 is in violation of the maxim
nullum crlmen sine lege: nulla ooena sine lege. VJe find it
without merit. It has been passed upon so many times by the
Nurnberg Tribunals and held without merit, that further com
ment here is unnecessary.
The further objection was made that one of the nations,
namely the USSR, cooperated in the promulgation of Control
Council Lrvj No. 10 after it had engaged in a war of aggression
which is made criminal under the law; this objection also is
without merit. The London Agreement and Charter from which
Control Council Law No, 10 stems has been approved by 19
nations other than the four signatories thereto. need not
and do not determine whether the charge that one of the signa
tories of the London Agreement and Charter and Control Council
Law No. 10 is guilty of aggressive war for such determination
could avail the defendants nothing. Under general principles
of law, an accused does not exculpate himself from a crime
by showing that another committed a similar crime, either
before or after the alleged commission of the crime by the ac
cused.
Various of the defendants by v^ay of objection or motions
have raised the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
on the part of the prosecution to mshe out a prima facie
case of the guilt of the respective defendants. Numbers of
these motions were ruled uoon during the course of the
trial, such motions not heretofore ruled upon, . the
same are denied, inasmuch as the questions raised by such
motions are involved in the final determination of the guilt
or the innocence of the defendants.
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CONSPIR.\CY COUNT
In view of tho conclusions presently to be announced,
wo think it proper now to dispose of this count.
Wo have horotoforQ sot out pai:agra^h 2 of Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10, which provides that any
person who was an accessory to tho ooinoission of Crinos
against Poaco, War Crimes, or Crinos against Humanity, as
, ✓
defined in said law by Lrticlo II, Soc. 1, paragraphs (a),
(b), and (c), or who ordorod or abottod such of Tonso, or
took a consonting part thoroin, or who was cohnoctod with
any plans or ontorprlsos involving its connission should
bo doonod guilty of tho connission of said offonsos. It
is difficult to soe, as tho facts have dovolopod in this
case, how a conspiracy chargo can be of tho sllghtost aid
to the prosocutlon. IH tho dofondants couirdttod tho acts
charged in this conspiracy count, they arc guilty of crinos
charged under Counts Ono, Two, and Three and are punishable
as principals.
Tho conspiracy count has not resulted in tho introduction
of any ovldonco that is not adnissiblo undor tho othor
coijints, nor docs it,'as tho ovidohce has dovolopod ih'
this case,. Inposo any crinlnality net attached to a
violation undor such procoding counts.
Inasnuch as wo hold that undor tho facts of this
case no soparato substantive offonso is shown undor Count
Four, wo strike it as tondoring no issue not contained in
tho procoding counts, and procood to dotornino tho guilt
or innoconco of tho dofondants undor Counts Ono, Two, and
Throe of the Indlctnont.
In so striking Count Pour, we havo roforonco only to
tho facts as thoy havo boon prosontod in this case and
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oxprosa no opinion as to whothor in all casos ..and under
all factual dovolopnonts tho chargo of conspiracy should
bo disrogardod. Such dotornination should depend upon
the proof adduced in oach case.
In this connection wo dosiro to advort to the last
pa ragraph of Soction 2, Article II, Control Council Law
Uo. 10, viz "or (f) with roforonco to paragraph 1(a) if
ho hold a high political, civil, or military (Including
Gonoral Staff) position or held high position in the
financial, industrial or ccononic lifo" in Germany, such
person would bo guilty imdor paragraph 1(a) defining
Grlmos against Poaco.
The prosecution doos not undortako to fix liability
upon this basis and wo need not notice it further than to
observe that wo nay draw from any known facts such infer
ences as wo deen they warrant»
• •.
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CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES IN TRIAL
The proper attitude to he observed in approaching a
case of the character of the one before the Tribunal is so
well stated by Judge Anderson in his concurring opinion in
Case No. 10, the U". S, vs. JlRUPP that we sef; it forth, omit
ting only such portions as had particular application to
that case, as a statement of the principles that we deem con
trolling in the approach to the instant case. Therein he
said;
"There are certain matters of general ap
plication which must be stated in the outset of
this investigation. They must be borne in mind
throughout the discussion. The first is that
this Tribunal was created to administer the law.
It is not a manifestation of the political power
of the victorious belligerents which is quite a
different thing. The second is that the fact
that the defendants are alien enemies is to be
resolutely kept out of minci. The third is that
considerations of policy are not to influence a
disposition of the questions presented. Of these
there are but two: (a) what was the law at the
time in question and, (b) does the evidence show
prima facie that the defendants or any of them
violated it. The fourth is that the defendants
tlrir oughout are presumed to be innocent and be
fore they can be put to their defense, the pros
ecution must make out a prima facie case of
guilt by competent and relevant evidence. It
is true that the procedural ordinance of the
Military Government for Germany (US) provides
that *they (the Tribunals) shall adopt and apply
to the greatest possible extent . . . non-tech
nical procedure.' But neither the members of
this Tribunal nor the people of the nation
prosecuting this case regard the presumption
of innocence as nothing more than a technical
rule of procedure. Nor do they, or we, think
it a mere rhetorical abstraction to which lip
service will suffice. Upon the contrary, in
addition to its procedural consequences, it is
a substantive right which stands as a witness
for every defendant from the beginning to the
end of his trial. . . . The sixth is that it
is a fundamental principle of criminal justice
that criminal statutes are to be interpreted
restriotively; that criminal responsibility
is an Individual matter; that criminal guilt
must be personal. The seventh is that the
application of ex post facto laws in criminal
cases constitutes a denial of justice under
international law (Quincy V/right: "The Law
of the wurnberg Trial," American Journal of
International Law, Volume 41, January 1947,
page 53).
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Hence, if it be conceded that Control Council
Law No. 10 is binding on the Tribunal, it
nevertheless must be construed and applied
to the facts in a way which will not con
flict with this view." (Case No. 10, Con
curring Opinion, pps.fi - 7)
To the above we add that the burden rests upon the
prosecution to present evidence that satisfies the Tribunal
of the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.
This rule also we have adhered to in arriving at our Judg
ment. iilfhere there was ambiguity in the testimony or un
certainty as to the defendant's connection with the trans
actions relied upon to establish their guilt, we have fol
lowed the well recognized principle of criminal law and have
accorded to the defendants the benefit of the doubt.
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COUI^'T 01^5 OF TH5 IImDICThEIvT •• AOaH^SSlVE wAR
Count One of the Indictment, heretofore set out, charges
the defendants with Crimes against Peace,
Before seehlng to determine the law applicable It la
necessary to determine with certainty the action which the
defendants are alleged to have taken that constitutes the
crime. As a preliminary to that we deem it necessary to
give a brief consideration to the nature and characteristics
of war, We need not attempt a definition that is all in
clusive and all exclusive. It is sufficient to say that war
is the exerting of violence by one state or politically
organised body against another. In other vjords, it is the
implementation of a political policy by means of violence,
v^srs are contests by force between political units but the
policy tha.t brings about their initiation is made and the
actual waging of them is done by individuals, ".'daat we have
sifcid thus fcx is equally as applicable to a just ps to an
unjust war, to the initiation of an aggressive and, there
fore, criminal war as to the waging of defensive and,
therefore,legitimate war against criminal aggression. The
point we stress is that war activity is the implementation
of s predetermined national policy.
Likewise, an invasion of one state by another is the
implementation of the national policy of the invading state
by force even though the invfded state, due to fear or a
sense of the futility of resistance in the face of superior
force, adopts a policy of non-resistance and thus prevents
the occurrence of any actual combat,
Xn the ll^ht of this general characterization and
definition of war and invasions we now consider the charge
contained in the Indictment, The essence of the charge Is
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participation in_the_init.iation of„agfe'ressiv^ invasions and
in_the_jpla^ning,_preparaiion_and_wagin£ of^aggrepsivje wars.
The remaining parts of paragraph 1 are merely a statement of
particular actions which are sufficient to constitute a com
mission of the crime charged. Paragraph 2 charges that the
defend?jits vjere principals, or accessories, to,• or were in
other ways involved in, the commission of the previously
charged Crimes against Peace. These are charges as to the
nature of their relationship to the crime otherwise chorged
in the Indictment, and add no new element to the criminality
* charged in paragraph 1. The reference in paragraph 2 to the
high military positions formerly held by the defendants has
relevarce in the Indictment and in the law (Control Council
Law No. 10, Art. II, Sec. 2), not to show or charge addi
tional Crimes against Peace, but to show what persons may
be included and what persons may not be excluded from being
charged and convicted of the offense set forth in Sec. la.
The prosecution does not seeh, or contend that the la^^
authorizes, a conviction of the defendants simply by reason
* of their positions as shown by the evidence, but it con
tends only that such positions may be considered by the fri-
A bunal with all other evidence in the case for such light as
they may shed on the personal guilt or innocence of the in- ,
dividual defendants. The prosecution does contend, and we
think the contention sound, that the defendants are not re
lieved of responsibility for .notion which would be criminal
in one who held no military position, simply by reason of
their military positions. This is the clear holding of the
Judgment of the IMT, and is so provided in Control Council
Law No. 10, Art, II, Sec. 4a.
The initiation of war or an invasion is a unilateral
operation. 'When war is formally declared or the first shot
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Is fired the initiation of the war has ended and from then
on there is a waging of war between the two adversaries,
Whether a v/ar be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful
under international law, is and can be determined only from a
consideration of the factors that entered into its initiation.
In the intent and purpose for which it is planned, prepared,
initiated and waged is to be found its lawfulness or unlawful
ness.
As we have pointed out, war whether it be lawful or un-
lavjful is the implementation of a national policy. If the
policy under which it is initiated Is criminal in its intent
and purpose it is so because the individuals at the policy
making level had a criminal intent and purpose In determining
the policy. If war is the means by which the criminal ob
jective Is to be attained then the waging of the v;ar Is but an
implementation of the policy, and the criminality which at
taches to the waging of an aggressive war should be confined
to those who pa-rtioipate in it at the policy level.
Ihis does not mean that the Tribunal subscribes to the
contention made in this trial that since Hitler was the
Dictator of the Third Reich and that he was supreme in both
the civil and military fields he alone must bear criminal re
sponsibility for political and military policies. No matter
how absolute his authority Hitler alone could not formulate
a policy of aggressive war and alone implement that policy
by preparing, planning, and waging such a war. Somewhere
between the Dictator and Supreme Commander of the Military
Forces of the nation and the common soldier is the boundary
between the criminal and the excusable participation in the
waging of an aggressive war by an individual eng-ged in it.
Control Council Law No. 10 does not definitely draw such a
line. I't points out in Sec. 2 of Article II certain fact
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situations and estSlished relations that are or may be
sufficient to constitute guilt and sets forth certain
categories of activity that do not establish immunity from
criminality. Since there has been no other prosecution under
Control Council Law No. 10 with defendants in the same
category as those in this case, no such definite line has
been Judicially drawn. This Tribunal is not required to fix
a general rule but only to determine the guilt or innocence
of tiie present defendants.
The Judgment of the IMT held that: (page 48)
"The Charter is not an arbitrary exer-
cise of power on the part oT victorious
mtions but in view of the Tribunal, as
vrui be'shown, it is the expression of in
ternational law existing at ohe time of its
creation; and to that extent is itself a
contribution to international law.
We hold that Control Council Law No. 10 likewise is
but an expression of international law existing at the time
of its creation. We cannot therefore construe it as extend
ing the International Common Law as it existed at the time
of the Charter to, add thereto any new element of criminality,
for so to do would give it an ex post facto effect which
do not construe it to have intended. Koreover, that this
vas not intended is indicated by the fact that the London
Charter of 10 August 1945 is made an integral part of tne
Control Council Law,
since International Common Law grows out of the common
reactions and the composite thinking with respect to recur
ring situations by the various states composing the family
of nations, it is pertinent to consider the general attitude
tL citizens of states with respect to their military com-
Lnders siid their obligations when their nations clan, pre
pare for ahd initiate or engage in war.
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Vtolle it is undoubtedly true thst International Common
Law in case of conflict with State Law takes precedence
over it and while it is equally true that absolute unanxmity
amons all the states in the fajnily of nations-is not required
to bring an International Common Law into being, it is
scarcely a tenable proposition that International Common Law
will run counter to the consensus within any considerable
number of nations.
Furthermore, we must not confuse idealistic oojeotives
with realities. The world has not arrived at a state of
civilization such that it can dispense with fleets, armies,
air forces, nor has it arrived at a point where it c.an
safely outlaw war under any and all circumst-^nces and situa
tions. Inasmuch as all war cannot be oonsioered outlawed
then armed forces are lawful instrumentalities of st^te,
which have internationally legitimate functions. An unlc.w
ful vtar of aggression connotes of necessity a lawful war of
defense against aggression. There is no general criterion
under International Common Low for determining the extent
which a nation may arm and prepare for war. As long as there
is no aggressive intent, there is no evil inherent in a
nation making itself militarily strong. An example Is
Switzerland which for her geographical extent, her population
and resources is proportionally stronger militarily than many
nations of the world. She uses her military strength to
implement a national policy that seeks peace and to maintain
her borders against aggression.
There have been nations thst have initiated and waged
aggressive wars through long periods of history; doubtless
there are nations still disposed to do so; and if not, judg
ing in' the light of history, there may be nations which to
morrow will be disposed so to do. Furthermore, situations
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may arise in which the question whether the war is or is
not aggressive is doubtful and uncertain. Vie may safely as
sume that the general and considered opinions of tne people v/itV}-
in ctatos- the courco frcr; ^yhich Intornatiinal Couinon Lawsprings-
ara not' such as to hamper or render them impotent to do
the things they deem necessary for their
are of the opinion that as in ordinary/cases, so in
the crime denominated aggressive war, the same elements must
all be present to constitute criminality. There first must
be actual knowledge that an aggressive war is intended and
that if launched it will be an aggressive war. But mere
knowledge is not sufficient to make participation even by
high-ranking military officers in the war criminal. It re
quires in addition that the possessor of such knotvledge,
after he acquires it shall be in a position to shape or
influence the policy that brings about its initiation or its
continuance after initiation, either by furthering, or by
hindering or preventing it. If he then does the former,
he becomes criminally responsible; if he does the latter to
the extent of his ability, then his action shows the lack
of crimina-1 intent with respect to such policy.
If a defendant did not know that the planning and prep
aration for invasions and wars in which he was involved were
concrete plans and preparations for aggressive wars and for
wars otherwise in violation of international laws and
treaties, then he cannot be guilty of an offense. If, however,
after the policy to initiate and wage agfiTesslve wars was
formulated, a defendant came into possession of knoviledge
that the invaeions and wars to be weged, were aggressive and
unlawful, then he will be criminally responsible if he, being
on the policy level, could have influenced such policy and
failed to do so.
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If and as long as a member of the armed forces does not
participate in the preparation, planning, initiating or xmg-
Ing of ag^^ressive war on a policy level, his war activities
do not fall under the definition of Grimes against Peace.
It is not a person's rank or status, but his power to shape
or influence the policy of his State, which is the relevant
issue for determining his criminality under the charge of
Crimes against Peace.
International law condemns those who, due to their
actual power to shape and influence the policy of their
nation, prepare for, or lead their country into or in an ag
gressive war. But we do not find that, at the present stage
of development, international law declares as criminals those
below that level who, in the execution of this war policy,
act as the Instruments of the policy makers. Anybody who is
on the policy level and participates in the war policy is
liable to punishment. But those under them cannot be
pxmlshed for the crimes of others. The misdeed of the policy
makers is all the greater in as much as they use the great
mass of the soldiers and officers to carry out an internation
al crime; however, the individual soldier or officer below
the policy level is but the policy makers' instrument, find
ing himself, as he does, under the rigid discipline which is
necessary for and peculiar to military organization.
We do not hesitate to state that it would have been
eminently desirable had the Commanders of the German Armed
Forces refused to implement the policy of the Third Reich by
means of aggressive war. It would have been creditable to
them not to contribute to the cataclysmic catastrophe. This
would have been the honorable and righteous thing to do; it
would have been in the interest of their State. Had they done
80 they would have served their fatherland and humanity also.
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But however much their failure is morally reprimandable, we
are of the opinion and hold that International common Law,
at the time they so acted, had not developed to the point
of making the participation of military officers below the
policy making or policy influencing level into a criminal
offense in and of itself.
International lavj operates as a restriction and limita-
tion on the sovereignty of nations. It may also limit the
obligations which individuals owe to their states, and create
for them international obligations which are binding upon them
to an extent that they must be carried out even if to do so
violates a positive law or directive of state. But the
limitation which International Common Law imposes on national
sovereignty, of on individual obligations, is a limitation
self-imposed or imposed by the oomposite thinking in the in
ternational community, for it is by such democratic proces
ses that Common Law comes into being. If there is no
generality of opinion among the nations of the world as to a
particular restriction on national sovereignty or on the
obligations of individuals toward their own State, tnen taere
is no International Common Law on such matter.
By the Kellogg-Briand Pact the sixty-three signatory
nations including Germany, renounced war as an instrument
of National Policy. If this, as we believe it is, is
evidence of s sufficient crystallization of world opinion
to authorize a judicial finding that there exist Crimes
against Peace under International Common Law, we cannot find
that law to extend further than such evidence indicates.
The nations that entered into the Kellogg-Briand Pact con
sidered it imperative that existing international relation
ships should not be changed by force. In the preamble they
state tliat tb.ey are.
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''persuft'3.ed that the time has come vhen . . ,
all changes in their relationships with one
another should be sought only by pacific
means*" # # «
This is a declaration that from that time forv/ard each
I
of the signatory nations should be deemed to possess and to
have the right to exercise ell the privileges and powers of-a
sovereign nation within the limitations of international
law, free from all Interference by force on the part of any
other nation. As a corollary to this, the changing or at
tempting to change the international relationships by force
of arms is an act of aggression and if the aggression results
in war, the war Is an aggressive war. It is, therefore, ag
gressive vjar that is renounced by the pact. It is aggressive
war that is criminal under International law.
The crime denounced by the law is the use of war as an
instrument of national policy. Those who commit the crime
are those who participate at the policy mahlng level in
planning, preparing, or In initiating vjar. After war is
initiated, and is being waged, the policy question then in
volved becomes one of extending, continuing or discontinuing
the war. The crime at this stage likewise must be committed
at the policy making level.
The making of a national policy is essentially political,
though it may require, and of necessity does require if war
is to be one element of that policy, a consideration of mat
ters military as well as matters political.
It is self evident that n^itional policies are mode by
men. liVben men make a policy that is criminal under interna-
tlona.l law, they are criminally responsible for so doing. Tliis
is the logical and inescapable conclusion.
The acts of Commanders and Staff Officers below the
policy level, in planning campaigns, preparing means for car
rying them out,, moving against a country on orders and
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fighting a war after it has been instituted,do not constitute
the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of war or the
initiation of invasion that international law denounces as
criminal.
Under the record we find the defendants were not on the
policy level, and are not guilty under Count One of the Indieu-
ment. With crimes charged "to have been committed by them in
the manner in which they behaved in the waging of war, we deal
in other parts of this Judgment.
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WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HITMANITY
In the Judgment of the internstional Military Tribunal at
pages 226 - 232, et seq., is a statement of the v^ar crimes com
mitted by the yehrmacht. Extracts from this are as follows:
"The evidence relating to War Crimes has been
overwhelming, in its volume and its detail. It is
impossible for this Judgment- adequately to review it,
or to record the m^se of documentary and oral evi
dence that has been presented. The truth remains
that War Crimes were committed -on a vast scale, never
before seen in the history of w:r. They were perpe
trated in all the countries occupied by Germany, and
on the High Seas, and were attended by every conceiv
able circumstance of cruelty and horror. There can be
no doubt that the majority of them arose from the Nazi
conception of 'total war', vath which the aggressive
Miprs were waged. For in this conception of 'tota.! T-far *
tne moral ideas underlying the conventions which seek
to war more humane are no longer regarded as hav
ing force or validity. Everything is made subordinate
to tne overmastering dictates of war. Rules, regula—
cions^ assurances, and treaties all alike are of no
moment; and so, freed from the restraining influence
of international law, the aggressive war is conducted
by tiie Nazi leaders in the most barbaric way. Accord-
ingly, y-ar Crimes, were committed xvhen and wherever the
Fuehrer and his^close associates thought them to be
advantageous. -J-hey were for the most part the result
of cold and criminal calculation.
"Other War Crimes, such as the murder of pri
soners of war who had escaped and been recaptured, or
tne murder of Commandos or captured airmen, or the
destruction of the Soviet Commissars, were the result
of direct orders circulated through the highest of
ficial channels.
"Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and
murdered, not only in defiance of the vjell—established
rules of international law, but in complete disregard
of the elementary dictates of humanity.
* * * * ♦
' In tne course of the war, many Allied soldiers who
ha.d surrendered to the Germans were siiot Immediately,
often as a_ matter of deliberate, calculated policy.
On 18 October 1942, the Defendant Keitel circulated adirective authorized by Hitler, v/hich ordered that all
members of Allied 'Commando' units, often when in uni
form and whether armed or not, were to be 'slaughtered
to the last man , even if they attempted to surrender
It was further provided that if such Allied troops
came into the hands of the military authorities after
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being first captured by the local police, or in any
other way, they should be handed over immediately
to the SD. This order wrs supplemented from time
to time, and vjs.s effective throughout the remainder
of the war, although after the Allied landings in
Normandy in 1944 it was made clear that the order
did not npply to 'Commandos' captured within the im
mediate battle area. Under the provisions of this
order, Allied 'Commando' troops, and other military
units operating independently, lost their lives in
Norv'ay, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Hany of
them were killed on the spot, and in no case were
tho'se who were executed later in concentration cajaps
ever given a trial of any kind.
« -it- ^ ^ «
"In harch 1944 the OKH issued the 'Kugel' or
'Bullet' decree, which directed that every escaped
officer and NCO prisoner of war who had not teen
put to work, with the exception of British and Amer
ican prisoners -of war, should on recapture be hand
ed over to the SIPO and SD. This order was distri
buted by the SIPO and SD to their regional offices.
These esc^^ped officers and KCO's were to be sent to
the concentration camp at Kauthausen, to be executed
upon arrival, by means of a bullet shot in the neck.-
"In Manch 1944 fifty officers of the British
Royal Air Force, who escaped from the camp at Sagan
where they were confined as prisoners, were shot on
recapture, on the direct orders of Hitler. Their
bodies were immediately cremated, and the urns con-
ta-inlng their ashes v^ere returned to the camp. It
was not contended by the defendants that this was
other than plain murder, in complete violation of
intern'^tional law.
"vVhen Allied airmen were forced to land in Ger
many, they were sometimes killed at once by the "
civilian population. The police x^rere Instructed not
to interfere with these killings, and the Ministry
of Justice v/as informed that no one should be prose
cuted for taking part in them.
"The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was
characterized by p-'^rticular irihumanity. The death
of so many of them was not due merely to the action
of individual guards, or to the exigencies of life
in the camps. It was the result of systematic
plans to murder. More than a month before the Ger
man invasion of the Soviet Union, the OK^vV were mak
ing special plans for dealing with political re
presentatives serving with the Soviet Armed Forces
who might be captured. One proposal was that
'political Comrnies-^rs of the Army are not recognized
as Prisoners of h'ar. and are to be liquidated at
the latest in the transient prisoner of viar camps. '
The Defendant Keltel gave evidence that instructions
incorporating this proposal were Issued to the Ger
man Array.
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"On 8 Seotember 1941 regulations for the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war In all pri
soner of war c?mps were issued, signed by General
Reineohe, the hend of the prisoner of wrr depart
ment of the High Command. Those orders stated:
^The Bolshevist soldier has therefore
lost all claim to treatment as an
honorable opponent, in accordahce with
the Geneva Convention. . . . The order
for ruthless and energetic action must
be given at the slightest Indication
of insubordination, especially in the
case of Bolshevist fanatics. Insub
ordination, active or passive resis
tance, must be broken immediately by
force of arras (bayonets, butts, and
firearms) ... Anyone carrying out
the'order who does not use his weapons,
or does so with Insufficient energy,
is punishable. . . . Prisoners of war
attempting esc-^pe are to be fired on
v;ithout previous challenge. No warning
shot must ever be fired. . . . The use
^ of arms against prisoners of wer is as
a rule legal,'
The Soviet prisoners of war were left without suit
able clothing; the wounded without medical care;
?• they were starved, and in many cases left to die.
"On 17 July 1941, the Gestapo Issued an order
providing for the killing of all Soviet prisoners
of w;r who were or might be dangerous to National
Socialism. The order recited:
'The mission of the Coramanders of the
SIPO and SD strtioned in Stnla.' s is the
political investigation of all camp in
mates, the elimination and further
'treatment' (a) of all political, crimi
nal, or in some other way unbearable
elements among them, (i.) of those per
sons who could be used for the recon
struction of the occupied territories, , •
, Further, the commanders must make ef
forts from the beginning to seek out
among the prisoners elements which appear
reliable, regardless of whether there are
Communists concerned or not, in order to
use them for intelligence purposes inside
of the camp, and if advisable, later in
the occupied territories also. By use of
such informers, and by use of all other
existing possibilities, the discovery of all
elements to be eliminated among the prison
ers must proceed step by step at once. .
'Above all, the following must be
discovered: all important functionaries of
State and Party, especially professional
revolutionaries. . all People's Ccmmls-
sars in the Red Army, leading person'lities
of the St' te , , , le ding person'^litiee of
the business world, membcr.s of the Soviet
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, Russian Intelligence, all Jews, all per
sons who are found to be agitators or
fi-natical Communists. Executions are not
to be held in the cojnp or in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. . . , The prisoners
are to be taken for special treatment if
possible into the former Soviet Russian
territory.^
The affidavit of Warliraont, Deputy Chief of Staff
of the'-Wehrmacht, and the testimony of Ohlendorf,
former Chief of Amt III of the RSKA, and of La-
housen, the head of one of the sections of the
Abwehr, the Wehrmocht's Intelligence Service, all
indicate the thoroughness with which this order
wa.s carried out.
*****
"In some cases Soviet prisoners of war were brand
ed with a special permanent mark. There was put
in evidence the OKW order dated 20 July 1942 which
^ laid down that:
'The brand is to take the shape of an
acute angle of about 45 degrees, with
the long side to be 1 cm. in length,
pointing upwards and burnt on the left
buttock. . , . This brand is made with
the aid of a lancet avoliable in any
military unit. The coloring used is
Chin ese ink,'
The carrying out of this order was the responsibil
ity of the military authorities, though it was
widely circulated by the Chief of the SIPO and SD
to G-erman police officials for information,
"Soviet prisoners of wrr were also made the
subject of medical experiments of the most cruel
and inhuman kind. In July 1943 experimental work
^ w s begun in preparation for a camp-ign of bacte
riological warfare; Soviet prisoners of war were
used in these medical experiments, which more often
than not proved fatal.
\ *****
"The argument in defense of the charge with
. regard to the murder and ill-treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war, that the U.S.S.R, was not a
party to the G-eneva Convention, is quite without
foundation. On 15 September 1941 Admiral Canarie
protested against the regulations for the treat
ment of Soviet prisoners of war, signed by Gener?^l
Reinecke on 8 September 1941. He then st-ted:
'The GeneVcO Convention for the treatment
of prisoners of w?r is not binding in the
relationship between Germany and the
U.S.S.R. Therefore only the principles of
general international law on the treatment
of prisoners of war apply. Since the l&th
century these have gradually been established
along the lines that war captivity is neither
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' t revenge nor punishment, but solely pro
tective custody, the only purpose of
which is to prevent the prisoners of war
from further p^^rticipcntion in the war.
This principle wrs developed in accord
ance with the view held by all armies
thst it is contrary to military tra
dition to kill or injure helpless people.
. . , The decrees for the treatment of
Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are
based on a fundajnentally different view
point, '
This protest, which correctly stated the legal po
sition, was ignored. The Defendant Keltel made a
note on this memorandum:
'The objections arise from the military
concept of chivalrous warfare. This is
the destruction of an ideology. There
fore I approve and back the measures. ' ''
All of these unlawful acts, as vjell as employment under in
humane conditions and at prohibited labor, is shown by the
record In this case. They were deliberate, gross and con
tinued violations of the customs and usages of war as well
as of the Hague Regulntlons (1907) and the Geneva Conven
tion (1929) and of International Common Law.
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GRiiias civilians
Tho rocord in tho instant case is replete with horror.
Never in the history of tian^s inlivirianity to man have so
nany innocent people suffered, so much.
.Millions of people whoso only offense was that they
wore of Jey/ish blood, or Soviet Nationals, or gypsies, or •
Polos, designated as social inferiors, sub-hur.ians, and
boasts, received what the Hitlerites called "special treat
ment" or "liquidation" or "final solution" and woro ex-
terDinatod regardless of ago or sex. No nation, no army
and its loaders, of any time, civilized or uncivilized,
labor under so great a load of guilt as do Hitler's Germany,
its army and its leaders, in their troatr.iont of these im-
fortunate people•
In addition, the civilian population of tho countries
over-run by Gorman arms were enslaved, deported for forced
labor, starved, tortured, murdered, oxocutod as hostages
and, by way of reprisal, were coi;ipollod to erect fortifi
cations and remove live minesj their property, public and •
private, plundered and destroyed, and they suffered other
crimes at tho hands of their conquerors.
In the I.M.T. Judgment it is saids
"Article 6(b) of tho Charter provides
that 'ill-treatnent,.,of civilian population
of or in occupied territory, ... killing of
hostages,wanton destruction of cities,
towns, or villages' shall be a war crime.
In tho main, those provisions are merely
declaratory of tho existing laws of war
as expressed by tho Hague Convention,
Article 46, which stated: 'Family honor
and rights, the lives of persons^and
private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice must bo res
pected, '
'"The torritorlos occupied by Gen.iany
v^ero administerod in violation of the laws
of v/ar, Tho evidence is quite overwhelming'
of a systematic rule of violonce, brutality,
and terror, Gn V Dooombor 1941 Hitler
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issuod tho diroctivo sinco known as the ^Nacht
und ITobol Erlass ^ (Ilirhu and Fog DocrGo), undor
which persons v;ho coaijitfcod offonsos against-tho Roich
or tho Gornan forces in occiipiod torritorios, oxcopt
whoro tho doath sontonco v/n.s cortain, wore to bo
takon secretly to Germany and handed over to tho
SIPO and SB for trial or punlshnjcnt in Germany,
Thi^ docroo was signed by tho Defendant Koitol.
hftor thesG civilians arrived in Germany, no v/ord
of thorn wns pormitted to roach tho country from
v/hich thoy caivio, or their rolativos? oven in casos
whon they died aavalting trial tho families v/oro not
informed, tho purpose being to croat anxiety in tho
minds of tho family of the arrested person,
purpose in issuing this decree was stated by
Defendant Koitol in a covering letter, dated
1941, to bo as follows:
^Efficient and enduring
only bo achieved either
Hitler *3
tho
12 Doconbor
intimidation can
by capital punisli-
mont or by measures by which tho relatives
of tho crii.iinal and tho population do not
knov/ tho fate of the criminal. This aim
is achiovod v/hon tho crneinal is transforrod
to Germany.*
Even persons v/ho wore only suspected of ooposing any
of tho policies.of the Gorman occupation authorities
woro arrostod, and on arrest woro intorrogatod by tho
Gostano and tho SD in tho i.;ost shameful manner. On IJ
Juno 1942 tho Chief of the SIPO and SD published, through
Mueller, tho Gostapo Chief, an ordor authorizing
tho use of *thlrd dogreo^methods of interrogation, whoro
prollminary investigation had Indicatod that bho
person could give information on Imiportant matters,
such 0.3 subversive activitios, though not for tho
;ions of the prisoner's
•orovldods
purpose of oxtorting confos
own crimes This ordor
Third dogroo i-iay, under this supposition',
only bo omployod against Gormnin sts, Mo.rxists,iM'i.i.J.J J.1J.O L> u W... V a. L O UO , 1 JVJ-O
Johovah 's Y/ltnossos , saboteurs,' torroris ts,
mombors of rosistanco novononts, o-.raohuto
agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet
Russian loafors or tramps; in all othor casos
my permission must first bo obtainod,.,.
Third dogroo can, according to circuristancos,
consist amongst othor methods of very simple
diet (broad and water), hard bunk, dork cell,
doprivation of sloop, exhaustive drilling,
also in flogging (for moro than tvi^onty strokes
a doctor must bo consultod),'
Tho brutal suppression of all opposition to tho Gorman
occupation v/as not confined to sovoro moasuros against
suapoctod mombers of rosistanco movononts thomsolvos,
but v/as also oxtondod to thoir famllios. On 19 July
X944 the Commandor of the SIPO and SD in tho district
of Radon, in Poland, piiblishod an order, transmittod
through tho Higher 3S and Police Leaders, to tho
offoot that in all cases of assassination or attempted
gsination of Gormans, or whoro saboteurs had
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dostroyocT vitnl .Installations, not only tho
person, bnt also r-l?. his or hor nalo rolrtivos
should ho shot, and for.io.lo relatives over 15 years
of nco put into a concentration carip.
"Tho practice of hooping hostages to prevent
and to punish any form of civil disorder was
resorted to by tho Germans 5 an order issued by tho
Defendant Keitel on 15 September 1941 spoke in
terms of fifty or a hundred lives from tho occupied
areas of tho Soviet Union for ono German life taken.
Tho order stated that ^it should bo romoDborod that
a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts
for nothing, and a dotorront effect can bo obtained
only by unusual severity-, * Tho exact nuifoor of
persons killed as a result of this policy is not
known, but largo nuiabors wore killed in Itranco and
tho other occupied territories in tho V/ost, while
in tho East tho slaughter was on an oven moro ex
tensive scale. In addition to tho killing of
hostages, entire tov:ns v/ero destroyed in some cases;
such massacres as those of Oradour-sur-Glano in
franco and Lidice in Czechoslovakia, both o.f which
V7oro doscribod to tho Tribunal in detail, a.ro ex
amples of the organised use of terror by the occupying
forces to boat down and destroy all opposition to
their rule.
"One of the riost notorious means of terrorizing
the people in occupied torritorios v/as tho use of
concentration canrjs. They v/oro first established In
Germany at the moment of tho seizure of power by tho
Nazi Government, Their original purpose was to
imprison without trial all those persons who were
opposed to tho Govornioont, or v/ho were in any way
obnoxious to Gorman authority. V/lth tho aid of a
secret police force, this practice was v/ldoly ex
tended, and in course of time concentration camps
bocamo places of organized and systematic murder,
where millions of people wore destroyed.
"In the administration of tho occupied
torrltories tho concentration camps wore used to
destroy all opposition groups, Tho persons arrested
by the Gestapo wore as a rule sent to concentration
camps, Thoy wore convoyed to the camps in many
casos without any care whatever being taken for
them, and groat numbers died on tho v/ay. Those
who arrived at the cai.ip wore subject to systematic
cruelty, Thoy wore given hard physical labor, in-
adoquo.to food, clothes and shelter, and woro
subject at all times to tho rigors of a soulloss
rogii:]o, and tho private whins of individual guards.
"A certain nur.ibor of tho concontration camps
v/oro equipped v/ith gas chambers for tho wholesalo
dostruotion of tho Inmatos, and with furnacos for
the burning of tho bodies. Some of thorn woro in
^ 47 -
w:
fact used for tlio Gxtcr-iin'-tioii of Jews as part of
the 'final solution' of the Jewish problGr.i, Most
of the non-Jewish ini'.iatos wore used for labor, al
though the conditions under v/hich they worked loado
labor and death almost synonynous terms. Those
inr.ia.too v/ho became ill and were unable to work wore
either destroyed In the gas chambers or sent to
special infirmaries, v/hero they were given entirely
inadequate medical treatment, worse food if possible
than the v/orking inmates, and loft to die.
"The murder and ill-troati:iont of civilian popu
lations reached its height in the treatment of the
citizens of• the Soviet Union and Poland, "Somo four
v/ocks before the invasion of Russia began, special
task forces of tho SIPO and SD, called Sinsatz
Groups, v/ero formed on the orders of Himmler for
tho purpose of following the Goinnan Armies into
Russia, combating partisans, and members of Rosistanco
Groups, and oo: tormina ting the Jews and communist
loaders- and other sections of tho x^op^^l^'-tion. In
tho beginning, four such Einsatz Groups wore formod,
one operating in tho Baltic States, one towards
Moscow, one tov/ards liiov, and -ono operating in tho
south of Russia. Ohlondorf, formor Chief'of .luot
III of the RSIAt, who led tho fourth group, stated
in his aff idavi'b ?
'When tho German army invaded Russia, I
was loader of'Einsatzgruppo D, in tho
southern sector, and in tho course of tho
year during which I was loader of the
Einsatzgruppo D it liquidated approxi-
natoly 90,000 men, women, and children.
The majority of those liquidated were
Jov«rs, but there wore a]so among thorn
some communist functi:)iiarios, '
In an ordor issued by tho Dofondant Roltol on 23
July 1941, and drafted by oho Dofondant Jodl, it was
stated that 2
'In view of tho vast size of tho occupied
areas in tho East, tho forces availobio
for ost-blishing security in those areas
will bo sufficient only if all rosistanco
is punishod, not by legal prosecution of
tho guilty, but by tho spreading of such
terror by tho Armed Forces as is alono
^^^PP '^^ 'pniato to oro.dicato every inclination
to resist among the population
Coroandors raust find tho moans of kooping
ordor by applying suitable Draconian
moasuros.'
Tho ovidonco has shown that this order v/as ruthlessly
carried out in tho territory of tho Soviet Union and
In Poland. A significant illustration of the
moasuros actually applied occurs in tlio docvu'.iont
which was sent in 1943 to tho Dofondant Rosenborg
by tho Rolch Gonmissar for Eastern Territories, vdao
wrote:
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'It shoulc". "bo possible to civold atrocities
and to burr 'jhoso who IiavG boon liquidatGd.
To lock r.ion, wonon, and childron into
barns and sot xiro to thoi;] docs not appear'
to bo a suitable nothod of conbating bands,
Gvon if it is dosircd to oxtorriinato tho
population. This motliod is not v/orthp of
tho Gornan cause, and hurts our reputation
severely.'
''The foregoing crincs-against tho civilian
population are sufficiently appalling, and yet the
ovidcnco shovirs that at any rate in the East" tho nass
murders and cruoltios wore not coi::mittod solely for
tho purpose of stamping out opposition or resistance to
tho German occupying forces. In Poland and tho Soviet
Union those crimes wore part of a plan to get rid
of whole native populations by expulsion and anni
hilation, in order that tjioir territory could be
used for colonisation by Germans. Hitler had written
. in lie in Kaiopf on these linos, and tho plan was clearly
stated by Himmlor in July 1942, when ho wrotos 'It
is not our task to Gonmanizc tho East in tho old
sense, that is to teach the people there tho Gorman
language and the Goihian lawg but to see to it that
only people of purely Germanic blood live in the
East. '
-iT
"In hugust 1942 tho policy for tho Eastern
Torritorios as laid down by Bormann was suie; aarisod by
a subordinate of Rosenborg as followss
'The Slavs are to 'jvorlc f or* us. In so
far as wo do not need them, they may die.
Thoroforo, compvilsory vaccination and
Germanic health services arc superfluous,
Tho fertility of tho Slavs is undosirablo,'
It was Himmlor again who stated in October 1945
'hliat happens to a Russian, a Czech, does
not interest mo in tho slightest. Vdiat
tho nations can offer in tho way of good
blood of our typo, wo will take. If
necessary, by kidnapping their childron
and raising then hero with us. Whether
nations live in prosperity or starve to
death interests mo only in so far as wo
need then as slaves for our Kultur, othor-
wiso it is of no interest to no. '
In Poland tho intolligontsia had boon ..larkod* down
for oxterninatlon as early as September 1939, and in
liay 1940 tho Defendant Pranlc wrote in his diary of
'taking advantage of*tho focussing of world intorost
on tho Western Front, by wholesale liquidation of
thousands of Poles, first loading roprosontativos of
the polish intolligontsia,' Earlier, Franlr had. boon
diroctod to roduco the 'ontiro Polish economy to an
absolute mininui.i necessary for baro existence. Tho
%
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IPoles shall bo the slaves of the Greater Gorr.ian
World Enpiro.* In Janur.r"" 1940 ho recorded In
his diary that 'cheap labor nust be renovod fron
the General Govornnont by hiandrods of thousands.
This will hanpor the native biological propaga.tion.
So successfully did the Gornans carry out this
policy in Poland that by tho end of the war^ono
third of tho population had boon killed, and tho
whole co;mtry devastated.
''It v/as tho sane story in tho occupied area of
the Soviet Union, ht tho tine of the launching of
tho Gorioan attack in June 1941 Rosenborg told his
collaborators :
'The object of feeding tho Gornan Pooplo
stands this year without a doubt at tho top
of the list of C-ornany's clains on tho
East, "and there tho southern territories
and tho northern Crnicasus will have to
servo as a balance for tho feeding of
the Gornan People .,.— very oxtonsivo
^ evacuation v/ill bo nocossary, without
W any doubt, and it is sure that tho future
will hold very hard years in store for
tho Russians,'" (Trial of tho Major War
f Crlninals, Ibid, pp.232-238),
Those findings of tho IMT are sustained by the record
in this case, and other offonsos are shown as woll.
' Tho connection of tho dofondants with thoso offonsos
is disposed of in our discussion of tho individual casos.
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Soon after Hitler came to power, an Air Ministry was
established with Soering as the Minister. In 1935, the'Ger
man Government openly denounced the Military, Kaval, and Air
j
Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. At the same time, it
TfJas announced that Germany was building a military air force.
The Reichsx-^ehr Ministry was re-named the "War Ministry",
and the Minister, von Blomberg, assumed the title "Commander-
in~Chief of the Armed Forces". Subordinate to von Blomberg
were the Commander-in-Ghief of the Army (von Fritsch) and
of the Navy (Haeder). In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief
of the German Air Force, Goering was also subordinate to
von Blomberg, but in his capacity as Minister for Air, he
Was of co-equal cabinet ranh, and, needless to say, Goering
was a very much more powerful figure in "the Third Reich.
In February 1938, a crisis in the relations between
Hitler and the Army led to a drastic re-organisation of the
High Corap.and. In place of the Ministry of War, over-all
control and co-ordination of the three services was achieved
through the newly created Armed Forces High Command (Ober-
hommando der Wehrmacht, known as "OKW"). Hitler himself
assumed the title "Commander-ln-Chief of the Armed Forces",
and the OKW was, in essence, Hitler's working staff for
Armed Forces matters. Kcitel was given the title "Chief"
of the OKW and the rank of Minister. Von Brauchltsch re
placed von Fritsch as Commander-In-Chief of the Army,
A. The OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)-
Supreme Commend of the Armed Forces
The OKVJ controlled all matters of inter-service policy,
It xiras responsible for preparations for national defense in
of peace, and for the over-all conduct of operations
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during war.- Directly under Hitler, Keltel served as Hitler's
highest executive officer in the administration of the Armed
Forces and in the application of Hitler's policies and plans.
There has been considerable testimony in the case relative
to the powers of the OKW and to the effect that Hitler fre
quently operated directly through the commanders-in-chief
of the OICH, the OKL, and the OKM and obviously after he as
sumed command of the OKH, he in many instances operated
directly as Commander-in-Chief of the OKH, It is neverthe
less apparent that Hitler, through exercise of his
functions us the Supreme Commander of the OKVii, could and
In many instances did, exercise through the OK\i/ the
over-all command of the throe branches of the armed,
services.
The most Important section of the OKW, directly concerned
xvlth operations in the field, etc., was called the Armed
Forces Cperrtions Staff (Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab or WFST).
This i^as headed during the vjar by Ceneral Alfred Jodl. Jodl's
immediate subordinate was the defendant, "Wnrllmont, as chief
of Department National Defense (Landesverteidigung (L) ) In
the Armed Forces Operations Staff. In addition, In January
1942, Warlimont was appointed Jodl's deputy with the title of
Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff,
Besides the 'JFST, there were numerous additional
branches aiid sections within the OKW, all headed by senior
officers, experts in their own fields, vh.o were directly re
sponsible to Keitel. However, these branches were mostly
with the rear echelon (as distinguished from the WFST,
which usually was with the Fuehrer-Headquarters in the
"field"), and dealt with numerous administrative matters of
joint interest to the three branches of the Armed Forces,
The G-eneral Armed Forces Office (Allgemeines
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Wehrrriaclitamt - AVJA) was one of the principal administrative
agencies within the OKW. The chief of this office was the
defendant Heineche who held this position continuously from
December 1939 until May 1945. The primary responsibilities
of this office were administrative end executive rather than
operational.
One of the most important sections of AWA was the Office
of the Chief of Prisoner of War Affairs (Chef des Kriegs-
gefangenenwesens - Chef Kriegs-Cef) which was in administra
tive charge of all matters relating both to G-erraan and Allied
prisoners of war. The Office of the Chief of Prisoner of War
Affairs remained a part of the General Armed Forces Office
(A;3A) until October 1944, at which time many functions of this
office were tr.ansferred to SS supervision. Another section of
AWA was the National Socialist Guidance Staff of the OKW
(Nstionalsozialistischer Fuehrungsstab des OKW - NSF/OKW),
established in December 1945. This "gency was to insure uni
form political indoctrination in the Armed Forces in co
operation with the Nazi Party Chancellory. This office was
placed under the direct control of the defendant Reinecke.
Another important branch of the OKVJ was the Armed Forces
Legal Department (Wehrmachtrechtsabteilung - WR). From 1938
until 1945 it was headed by the defendant Lehmann. The Legal
Department was charged with certain legal matters in the pre
paration of legal opinions of interest to all three branches
of the Armed Forces, but the legal staffs of the three forces
were not subordin-'te to him.
B. The OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe) -
Buoreme Command of the Air Force
The Air Force was the youngest of the ttnree branches
comprising the German Armed Forces. The creation of the German
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1Air Force occurred offlclf^lly in Morch 1935, end &oering wes
appointed r.s its Comrr.ender-in-Chief with the rank of Air Force
3-ener-^l. Shortly after the announcement of the creation of
an indeoendent Air Force, all anti-r.ircraft artillery and at
tached signal units were taken over from the Array by the Air
Force. G-oering served in the dual c-:rpacity of Minister of
Aviation (Reichsminister der Luftfahrt) and Commender-in-
Chief of the German Air Force (Oberbefehlshaber der Luftv/affe)
and continued to head the Air Force until shortly before the
end of the war.
C, The OKM (Oberkomrnando der Kriegsmarine) -
Supreme Command of the Navy
The navy was the smallest of the services, and its per
sonnel and units were numerically the smallest within the
German Armed Forces. From 1928 until 1943 the OKM wps headed
by Fleet Admiral Erich Rneder. From 1943 to the end of the
war in May 1945, Fleet Admiral Doenitz, succeeding Raeder,
T^os Commander-in-Chlef of the German Navy, having previously
been in charge of its most importsnt weapon, the submerlne,'
I'fithin OKM, performing functions somewhat analogous to
^ the General Staff of OK?I, was the Naval VJpr Staff (Seekrlegs-
leltung (SKL) ) directly subordinate to the Commander-ln-
Ohief of the Navy. It concerned Itself mostly with operational
f-nd intelligence questions. Between the years 1938 and 1941
the defendant Schniewlnd was the Chief of Staff of the SKL,
directly responsible to Raeder.
Under the OKM, the Naval Group Commands (Marinegruppen
Befehlshaber) controlled all naval operations In a given sector,
with the exception of the operations of the High Sea Fleet and
the submarines, v^hlch by their very nature were too mobile to
he restricted to a given area command. Between 1941 and 1944
the defendant Schniewlnd, was Goraraander of the High Sea Fleet.
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E. The OKH (Oberkomraando des Heeres) -
Supreme Command of the Army
The Army v/as by far the l^^rgest and most importa.nt of the
three branches of the Wehrmacht, From 1938 until December 1941.
Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch was Commander-in-Chief of
the Crerman Army with General Franz Haider as his Chief of Staff.
In December 1941 Hitler relieved von Brauchitsch of his as- -
signmont and himself took over command of the German Army,
Hitler retained his position as Commander-in-Chief of the
German Army until his presumed death at the end of the war;
and the result of unification of command, whereby Hitler v/r.s
Supreme Commender-ln-Cliief of the German Armed Forces and
Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, was a partial merger
and overlapping of the functions of the OKW and OKH. In
Septeraber 1943 Haider w:.'s relieved as Chief of Staff by General
Kurt Zeitzler, Colonel-General Heinz Guderlan replaced
Zeitsler in July 1944 and himself gave way to General Hans
Krebs in February 1945.
After Hitler himself took command of the German Army,
the highest Field and Occupational Headquarters of the German
Army v;ere directly under Hitler, either in his capacity as
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, or in his capacity as
Commandor-in-Ghief of the Army. Because of the paxtial
merger axising from Hitler's dual capacity and command func
tions, it became difficult at times to delineate clearly between
the responsibilities of the OKW and those of the OKH.
E, Army Field Headquarters
Army Groups and Armies. The largest field formation in ^
the German Army was known as an Army Group, which was a Head
quarters controlling two or more Armies. An Army Group was cus
tomarily Goramanded by a Feldmaxschall(flve star general), or mopt
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rarely "by a G-eneraloberst (four star general). An Army might
be commanded by a Feldmarschall, a G-eneraloberst, or a
G-eneral (three star general).
At the beginning of the war, sn Army Group Headquarters
was usually formed for a particular campaign or occupational
theater. During actual operations, the principal purpose of
an Army Group x-^as to exercise operational command over the
Armies subordinated to it. It had at first a relatively small
staff devoted purely to operational matters. As the war pro
gressed, administrative functions were added and its staff in
creased. An Army Headquarters was a more permanent command
> framework. In addition to its operational and tactical con
trol of subordinate units, the Army was the top field head-
quarters for matters of administration, supply,and other
functions.
Corns and Lower Headquarters. An Army controlled one or
more (usually between two and seven) Corps. The Corps x^as a
permanent headquarters which controlled as a rule from two
to seven divisions. The division xvas the basic "self-contained",
unit of tne German Array and its structure varied according to
its type.
-A
Headquarters Staff Organization. The size and structure
of an Army Keadaunrters, varied to a considerable extent. All
headquarters were, however, organized according to a uniform
system and consisted basically of a commanding officer assist
ed hy a stoff. The staffs of corps nnd higher headquarters
were headed by a chief of staff. At all German headquarters, .
the staff officer in charge of operations vjas known as "la",
the chief supply officer as "lb", and the chief intelligence
officer as "Ic".
SS Field Formations (Waffen SS), "When the war broke out
in 1959, Hirnmler commenced the formation into Divisions of units
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of tlie SS, armed and trained for employment with the army. Only
two or three such divisions were formed prior to the Russian
campaign, but by the end of the war there were many SS divisions.
For certain administrative purposes, the Waffen SS units
remained part of the SS and under the control and command of
Himmler as Heichsfuehrer SS* However, for operational pur
poses in combat and In occupied areas, the SS divisions were
under the command of the array, and their employment differed
little from that of the regular divisions of the army.
F. Occupational Headquarters and Units,
Armed Forces Commander.
In a territory occupied by German forces, the Germans
sometimes found it desirable to appoint a senior over-all
commander to whom the heads of the army, navy, and air force
In the territory were all tactically responsible. Such com
manders had strategic as well as administrative responsi
bility, and. were directly responsible to OKW.
Mllitag-^y Commander. In German-occupied territory, the
administr:?tion of the area in conformity with rules and
policies laid down by the German authorities was entrusted
to an Army officer, usually a General, who was designated
as Military Commander (Milltaerbefehlshaber). The Military
Corar.anders had the 'primary mission of insuring security and
order within the region or country that they were responsible
for, including the protection of roads, railroads, supply
lines, and communications.
Rear Area Commanders. During wartime the operational
prea of the army (Heeres) was divided into various segments.
The operational area of an army (Armee) consisted of the cora-
brt zone and an army rear area. The operational area of an
array . '^roup consisted of the operational areas of the armies
under it and an army group rear area. The boundaries of the
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1army group rear area coincided with the boundaries of the army
rear areas and extended to the territory under civil administra
tion of the Heich, such as the Commissariat Ostland in the east.
The army group and army rear areas wer§ commanded by
general officers who were directly responsible to the commander-
in-chief of the army group, or army, respectively. The missions
With wnich these commanders were charged can be summarized as
follovjs:
1. Administration of the occupied area;
The maintenance of peace and order in these areas;
and
S.
3. Responsibility for the security of the railroads
and main supply routes leading to the front line,
as x^ell as for all supply agencies engaged on be
half of the front line troops.
In order to accomplish these missions, these commanders often
had one or several of the following units at their disposal:
1. Security divisions (Sicherungsdivisionen);
2. Units of the German police;
3. Indigenous police and constabulary forces recruited
from the native population;
4. Special security battalions (Landes-Schuetzen-
bataillone).
For the administration of the civilian population, the fol
lowing subordinate headqu^^rters were usually organized in an
army or rri'iy group rear area:
1. District wain Headquarters (OberfeJ.dhommandanturen);
2. Sub-district Headquarters (Feldkoramandanturen); and
3. Sub-district Detec.iments (Ortskommandanturen),
In addition to these, numerous special staffs were at the dis
posal of the commanders of the rear areas, which were charged
with such tasks as supervision over agricultural output,
forestry service, mining, and industrial utilization.
The commanders of army rear areas were generally called
"Koruecks" (Koramandier doe rueokwaertigen Armee-
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gebletes). The commanders of army group rear areas were known
OS "Befehlshrber des rueckwaertigen Heeresgebletes", and they
often carried after their titles the numerical designation
identifying the army group rear area for administrative pur
poses. Thus, the defendant von Roques was known a.s the Com
mander of Army Croup Rear* Areo. 103 (South).
Higher SS and Police Leaders. During the course of the
Nazi regime, Heinrich Himmler succeeded in bringing about an
almost complete merger of the regular Cerman police forces
with the police and intelligence components of the SS. This
merger was reflected in Himmler 's own title - Leader of the
SS and Chief of the German Police (Reichsfuehrer SS and Chef
der Deutschen Pollzei). Thereafter, Himmler designated vari
ous of his subordinates to head the SS and police activities
in specified areas of Germany and in German occupied territory.
An individual thus designated was called a "Higher SS and
Police Leader" (Hoeherer SS and Pollzei Fuehrer, usually -r^b-
brevicated HSSPF). In the occupied territories, the HSSPFs
continue:! to be personally responsible to Himmler ani tasi ccmtant
instructions from him, but they were, for operational pur
poses, responsible to the senior military commander strtionod
in that territory. The principal functions of the HSSPFs were
to control the local police authorities, handle special police
and intelligence matters, *^nd c.-^rry out other special missions
of a security nature for Himmler and for the railitr-ry authori
ties. A HSSPF usuniiy hold the rank of Gruppenfuehrer or
Obergruppenfuehrer in the SS, these ranks being respectively
the equivalent of a two st-^r and a three star general in the
United States Army.
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SUPERIOR ORDERS
Control Council Law No, 10, Art. II, Sees. 4 (a) and
4 (b), provides :
"4.(a) The official position of
any person, whether as Plead of State
or as a responsible official in a Govern
ment Department, does not free him from
responsibility for a crime or entitle .
him to mitigation of punishment.
(b) The fact that any person acted
pursuant to the order of his Government or
of, a superior does not free him from re
sponsibility for a crime, but may be con
sidered in mitigation."
These two paragraphs are clear and definite. They relate
to the crimes defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Art.
II, Sees. 1 (a), 1 (b), and 1 (c). All of the defendants
in this case held official positions in the armed forces
of the '-^hird Reich. Hitler from 1938 .on was Commander in
Chief of the Armed Eorces and was the Supreme Civil and
Military authority in the Third Reich, whose personal
decrees had the force and effect of law. Under such cir
cumstances to recognize as a defense to the crimes set
forth in Control Council Law No. 10 that a defendant
acted pursuant to the order of his government or of a
superior would be in practical effect to say that all the
guilt charged in the Indictment was the guilt of Hitler
alone because he alone possessed the law-making power of
the state and the supreme authority to issue civil and
military directives. To recognize such a contention
would be to recognize an absurdity.
It is not necessary to support the provision of
Control Council Law No. 10, Art. II, Sees. 4 (a) and (b),
by reason, for we are bound by it as one of the basic
authorities under which we function as a Judicial Tribunal.
Reason is not lacking.
» 60 -
Inasmuch as one of the reiterated arguments ad
vanced is the injustice of even charging these defendants
with being guilty of the crimes set forth in the Indict
ment, when they v/ere, it is said, merely soldiers and
acted under governmental directives and superior orders
which they were bound to obey, we shall briefly note
what we consider sound reasons for the rejection of such
a defense.
The rejection of the defense of superior orders
without its btiing incorporated in Control Council Law No,
10 that such defense shall not exculpate would follow of
necessity from our holding that the acts set forth in
Control Council Law No. 10 are criminal not because they
are therein set forth as crimes but because they then
were crimes under International Common Law. International
Common Law must be superior to and, vi;here it conflicts
with, take precedence over National Law or directives
issued by any national governmental authority. A directive
to violate International Criminal Common Law is therefore
void and can afford no protection to one v/ho violates
such law in reliance on such a directive.
The purpose and effect of all law, national or
international, is to restrict or channelize the action
of the citizen or subject. International law has for
its purpose and effect the restricting and channelizing
of the action of nations. Since nations arc corporate
entitles, a composite of a multitude of human beings,
and since a nation can plan and act only tiirough its
agents and representatives, there can be no effective
"i
restriction or channelizing of national action except
through control of the agents and representatives of '
the nation, who form Its policies and carry them out in
action.
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The State being but an inanimate corporate entity
or concept, it cannot as such make plans, determine
policies, exercise judgment, experience fear or be re
strained or deterred from action except through its ani
mate agents and representatives. It would be an utter
disregard of reality and but legal shadow-boxing to say
that only the ^tate, the inanimate entity, can have guilt,
and that no guilt can be attributed to its animate agents
who devise and execute its policies, x^or can it be per
mitted even in a dictatorship that the dictator, absolute
though he may be, shall be the scapegoat, on v;hom the sins
of all his governmental and military subordinates are
wished; and that, when he Is di'iven into a bunker and
presumably destroyed, all the sins and guilt of his sub
ordinates shall be considered to have been destroyed v;itli
him.
The defendants in this case who received obviously
criminal orders were placed in a difficult position but
servile compliance with orders clearly criminal for fear
of some disadvantage or punishment not immediately
threatened cannot be recognized as a defense. To es
tablish the defense of coercion or necessity in the face
of danger thel?e must be a showing of circumstances such
that a reasonable man would apprehend that he was in
such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of free
dom to choose the right and refrain from thu wrong. No
such situation has been shown in this case.
furthermore, it is not a new concept that superior
orders are no defense for criminal action. Article 47
of the German Military Penal Code, adopted in 1872, was
as follows:
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"If through tho execution of an order
pertaining to the service, a penal
law is violated, then the superior giv
ing the order is alone responsible.
Howevur, the obeying subordinate shall
• bo punished as accomplice (Theilnehraer):
"l) if ho went beyond the order given to him, or
"2) if he knew that the order of the superior
concerned an act which aimed at a civil
or military crime or offense."
The amendment of this in 1940 omitted the last two words
"to him" in Section 1 above and in Section 2 changed the
words "civil or military crime or offense" to "general
or military crime or offense." If this amendment had
any effect, it extended rather than restricted the scope
of the preceding act.
It is interesting to note that an article by Goebbcls,
the Reich Propaganda Minister, which appeared in the
"Voelkischer Beobachter", the official Bazi publication,
on 28 May 1944, contained the following correct statement
of the law:
"It is not provided in any military law
that a soldier in the case of a despica
ble crime is exempt from punishment be
cause ho passes the r,:,sponsibility to
his superior, especially if the orders
of the lattor are in evident contradic
tion to all human morality and every
international usage of warfare."
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A qUGstion of ^^onorr^.l intorost to the v?.rious
dofonCants in this c^.so involves tho criminal rosponsihility
for drafting, transnitting, and Liplononting illogal
orders of their superiors',
I
For tho first tino in history individuals arc oallod
upon to answer criminally for certain violations- of
international law. Individual criminal responsibility has
boon Imown, accepted, and applied horotoforo as to
cortain offenses against international law, but tho
lJurnborg trials have oxtondod that individual responsibility
beyond those specific and sonowhat limited fields.
This Tribunal is therefore ch'^rgod not only to
dotornino v;hother certain acts infringe international law,
but also whether criminal responsibility attaches to a.n
individual for such infringonont, and wo must look not
only to the international law itself but to fundamental
principles of criminal law as generally accepted by tho
civilized nations of the world for detoralnation of that
quostion. Such has boon tho principlo applied by tho
Tribunals v/hich havo procedod us and wo conform to that
standard.. For a defendant to bo hold criminally ros-
•ponsiblo, there must bo a broach of some moral obligation
fixed by international lav/, a personal act voluntarily
done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under
intornational law.
Control Council Law No. 10, Section 4, Sub-soctlon
b, provides that:
"Tho fact that any person actod pursuant
to tho order of his Govornnont or of a
superior does not froe'hir.] from res
ponsibility of a crime, but may bo
oonsidorod in mitigation."
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It is urgod that a co:'X""'andor boconos rosponsiblG
for the tro.nsnittr.1 in any nc.nnor whatsoovor of a crininal
order. Such a.concrasion this Tribunal considers too
j.ar reaching. The transr.iittal through the chain of
co.r.iand constitutes an ir.iploi:iontation of an order. Such
orders carry tho authortativo v/oight of .the superior
\/ho issues thoij and of tho subordinato counandors who
pass thoi-j on for conplianco, Tho leoro intornodiato
acboinistrativo function of transmitting an order diroctod
by a suporior mithority to subordinato units, hov/ovor, is
not oonsidorod to anount to such ii'iplomontation by tho
comnand.or through whoso headquarters su';h orders pass.
Such transj'iittal is a routine function which in many
instancos would bo handled by tho staff of tho coni.iandor
without being called to his attention. Tho coi'.r.oandGr is
not in a position to screen orders so transnittod. His
hoadquartors, as an 1 iplor.ionting agency, has boon by
passed by tho suporior coimand.
Purthormoro, a distinction uust bo drawn as to tho
naturo of a criminal ordor Itsolf. Orders are tho basis
upon which any army oporatos. It is basic to tho discipllno
of an arny that ordors aro issued to bo carried out. ' Its
discipline is built upon this princlplo. Without it, no
arny can bo offoctivo and it is certainly not incuiebont
upon a soldier In a subordinato position to scroon tho
ordors of suporlors for quostionablo points of legality.
Within certain llrdtations, ho has tho right to.assui'.io
that tho orders of his suporlors and tho sta.to which ho
servos and which aro issued to hln aro in oonfornity with
Intornational law,
Ilany of tho defendants hero wore field compandors and
woro charged with hoavy rosponslbllitios in actlvo conbat.
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Ttioir logal fo.cilltios v/orc liuitocl, Thoy v/oro soldiors -
not lavryors. Military coLaiandors in tho fiold with far
reaching military rosponsibiliti-os cannot ho charged "und-or
intornational lav/ with cri-jinal participation in issuing
ordors v/hicn aro not obviously crirjinal or which thoy aro
not shown to have loiown to bo crininal undor intornational
law« Such e com.iandor cannot bo oxpoct^d to draw fino
distinctions and conclusions as to logality in connection
V7ith ordors issued by his superiors. Ho has tho rijaht to
prosiuno, in tho absonco of specific knowlodgo to tho
contrary, th"t tho legality of such ordors has boon oroporly
dotorninod before thoir issuance. Ho cannot bo hold
crininally rosponsiblo for a aioro error in judguont as to
disputable logal quostions.
It is thoroforo considorod that to find a fiold. con-
nandor crininally rosponsiblo for tho transaiittal of such
an order, ho "oust havo pp.ssod tho order to tho chain of
coixiand tho ordor oust bo ono thot is crininal upon
its lacoj or ono v/hich ho is shov/n to havo known was
crininal,
\i/hilo, as stated, a connr.ndlng officer can bo crininally
>
rosponsiblo for inploi.ionting an illogal ordor of his suporiors,
tho question arises as to whothor or not hoboconos
rosponsiblo for actxons conLiittod within his con'-.?and
pursuant to crl.iinal ordors passed dov/n indopondont of hln.
Tho choices v/hich ho has for opposition in this caso 'arc
fow; (1) ho' can isruo an ordor countorr.iandlng tho order;
(2) ho can resign; (3) ho oa.n sabotage tho onforcoiaont of
tho ordor within a sonowhat liuited sphero.
ds to countornanding tho ordor of his suporiors, ho
has no legal status or powor, L eountorrjandlng ordor would
not only subject hin to tho sovorost punishiaont, but would
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"bo uttorly futilo nnd .in it v/ould undoubtodly
have focusod tho oyos jf Hitler on its rigorous onforconont.
His socond choico —resignation —was not nuch.
"bettora Resignation in v/a.r tino is not a privilogo
gonorally accorded to officors in an arioy. This is true
in tho xj.rr.iy of tho United States. DisagrGouont with a state
policy as oxprossod by an ordor affords slight groxmds for
resignation. In Gcr:::any, undor Hitlor, to - assort such a
ground, for resignation probably v/ould havo entailed tho
nost serious consoquoncos for an officors
iuaothor field of opposition v/as to saboto.go the order.
This he could do only verbally by personal contacts. Such
verbal repudiation could never be of suf.iTlciont scope to
annul its onforc er.jont.
h fourth decision ho could nal<e Vi'as to do nothing.
Control Council Law Ho. 10, :.rticlo 2, paragraph 2,
provides in portinont part as f ollov/s ;
"Any person v/ithout regard to nationality
or tho cap'-.city in which ho actod, is dooriod
to have covrnittod a crino as defined in
paragraph 1 of this article, if ho...
(b) was an accessory to tho connission of
a.ny such crino or ordered or abetted tho
sane or (c) took a consenting p'^.rt therein
or (d) was conhQc"'tordr with? plans or ontorprisos
involving its conbission " (onphasis
supplied),
As horotoforo stated, his "connoctijn" is construed
as requiring a personal broach of a i.ioral obligation.
Viewed'fron an international standpoint, such has boon
tho intorprotation of proooding Tribunals. This comioction
nay however be negative. Under basic principlos of co:::.:r.nd
authority and rosponsibility, an officer who noroly stands
by whilo'his subordinates oxocuto a crininal order of his
superiors which ho knows is crininal, violates a noral
obligation undor international law. By doing nothing ho
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cannot wash his hands of intorn-tional rosponsibility.
His onlr dofenso llos in the fact that ,the ordon was fron
a snpcrior which Control Council Law Ho. 10 doclaros con- •
stitutos only a uitiar.ting circunstanco.
In any ovont in dotorninlng tho criminal rosyonsibility
of the dofondants in this case, it boconos nocossary to
dotormino not only tho criminality of an order in itsolf
bub ^.Iso ..s to whothor or-not such an order v/as crinina.1 .
on Its face.. Certain orders of tho lYohmacht and tho
Gornan hrr,ry wore obviously criminal. No legal opinion was
nocossary- to dotornino tho illerality of such orders. By
ajiy standard of civilised nations thoy wore contrary to
tho customs ^of war and accepted standards of hui.ianity,
duiy co:-.nandine officer of normal intollisonco rmst see
and understand their criminal nature, hny participation
in implononting such orders, tacit or othorwiso! an-
silent acquiescence in their onforconont by his subordinates;
constitutos a criminal act on his
There has also been much evidence and discussion in
this case concornine tho duties and responsibilities of
staff officers in connection with tho preparation and
transmittal of illegal orders. In regard to tho respon
sibility of the chief of staff of a field oonmand, tho
finding of Tribunal Vin Case No. 7 as to certain defendants
has boon brought to tho attention of tho Tribunal. It is
pointed out that tho decision as to chiefs of staff in '
that case was a factual detornlnatlon and constitutes a
legal dotornination only insofar as it oortains t-, tho
particular facts therein involved. V/o adopt as sound law
tho finding therein made, but wo do not give that finding
tho Ecopo that is urged by dofonso counsel in this case
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to tlio ol*! oct tlio-t all cri:::;inQl acts wltliin a conir.iand a.ro
tho solo rosponsibility of tho connanding gonoral and that
his Ciiiof of staff is absolved fron all criminal rosponsibility
;ioroly b^ reason of tho fact that his oonnianding gonora.1
i-ia^ bo charged with rosponsibility thoroforo It is further
pointod. out that tho facts in that case aro not applicable
to any dofondant on trial in this case.
The tostinony of various dofondants in this case as
to tho functions of staff officers and chiefs of staff
has not boon entirely consistent» Corrianding generals on
trial havo pointoci out that there woro corto-in functions
v/hich they nocossarily loft to tho chiefs of staff and.
that at tines they did net toow of orders which adght
bo issued landor authority of tholr connand. Staff officers
on trial have urged that a coiesanding officer v/as solely
responsible for what v/as done in his nano. Both con
tentions aro subject to soliq scrutiny. ,
In regard to tho functions of staff efficors in
gonoral as derived fron various docurjonts and tho tostinony
of witnesses, it is established that the duties and '
functions of such officers in tho Gornan /jany did not
differ v/idoly fron tho duties and functi:;ns in other arnios
of tho v/orld. Ideas and gonoral diroctivos nust bo trans
lated into properly proparod ord.ors if they aro to bocono
offoctivo in a nilitary organisation. To prepare orders
is the function of sta.ff officers. Staff officers are
an indisponaablo link in tho chain of thoir final oxocution.
If tho basic idea Is crininal imder international law,
tho staff offlcor who puts that idea into tho forn of a
nilitary order, either hi- self or through subordlnatos
under hiio, or takes personal action to see that it is
properly distributed to those units where it boconos
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oiToctivG, connits a crininal act undor intornational
lav/,
Staff officers, oxcopt in liriitocl fields, are not
endowed with connand authority. Subordinate staff officers
normally function through the chiefs of staff, fhe
chief of staff in any coiTjand is the closest officer,
officially at loast, to the connanding officer. It is
his function to see that the wishes of his cor.iuanc?ing
officer arc carried out. It is his duty to keep his
corr.ianding officer, inforned of the activities which take
place v/ithin the field of his connand. It is his function
to sec that tho cooeanding officer is roliovod of certain
dotails and routine i.iattors, that a policy having boon
announced, the nothods and procedures for carrying out
such policy are properly executed. His sphere and personal
actrvitios vary according to tho nature and interests of
his conrianding officer and increase in scope dopondGnt
upon tho position and responslbilltios of such coix.iandor.
Since a chief of staff does not havo connand authority
in the chain of co;jnanci, an order over his ov/n signo.ture
docs not have authority for subordinatoa in the chain
of connand. ..s shown by tho record In this case, however,
ho signs orders for and by order of his cor.manding officer.
In practice, a connandlng officer nay or nay not have
soon those orders. Kowovor, they are prosuioed to oxpross
the wishes of tho connandlng officer. V/hilo tho conr.-.anding
officer nay not and frequently does not see those orders,
in tho nornal process of connand ho is inforned of then
and thoy are prosmod to represent his will unless
ropudiatod by hln. failure to properly oxerciso
cotnioand authority is not tho rosponsiblllty of a chief
of staff.
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In tho absonco of particip,'^tion in crininal orders
or thoir oxocution within a co:;ii-iand, a chiof of staff
doos not bocono crininally rosponsiblo for orinino,! acts
occnrrin£5 thoroin. Ho ho-s no cor.]i.iand authority over
subordinate units# ^#11 ho can do in such cases is
call those nattors to tho attontion of his corr-.imding-
Gonoral, Coniiand authority and rosponsibllity for its
oxorcisG rest definitely upon his conioandor#
Undor normal military procoduro a dommanding officor
signs cor.imunications to higher corr:andors. Ho also in
certain casos signs ord.ors to subordinatos which are
considered to osto.blish basic policy or whoso importance
ho wishes to omphasizoi but tho majority of orders
issuod in a command, as shown by the record, are issued
"for'' or "by order" and signed only by the chiof of staff,
zVll such orders are binding on subordinates. How far
a chiof of staff can go in issuing orders without
previous authorization or v/ithout calling thorn to the
attontion of his conmandor doponds upon many factors,
including his own qualifications, his rank, tho nature
of tho headquarters, his personal rolatienship with
his commander, and primarily upon tho personality of tho
ooimiandor. h chief of staff doos not hold a clerical
position. In tho Gonoan chiefs of staff wore not
used below an army corps. Tho ranlc and caro with which
staff officers wore solootod show in itself tho wide
scope of their responsibilities which cm.ld, and. In many-
instances und.oubtodly did, result in tho chiof of staff
assuming many command and. oxocutivo rosponsibilitios
which ho exorcised in tho name of his com.-iandor.
One of his main duties was to
roliovo his commander of certain rosponsibilitios so that
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such co-ix.ip-ndor could confino hiusolf to thoso ;..]o.ttors
considorod by bin of najor iioportanco^ It of coursG
the d\ity of u chiof of staff to koop such cor,r:andor in-
fornod of tho activitios which took place v/ithiii the field
"of his connrnd insofar at loast as thoy wore considorod of
sufficient inportanco by such ooniiandor,. Another v;oll
acGOptod fvinction of chiefs of staff and of all staff
officers is, within the field of their activities, to
proparo orders and directives which they consider nooo30o.ry
and appropriate in that field and which are subnitted to
their superiors for approval.
As stated heretofore, tho responsibility allov/ed a-
chiof of staff to issue orders and directives in tho noaio
of his coainandor varied v/idoly and his indopencLont powers
for exorcising initiative therefor also varied v/idol^ in
practice. ' Tho field for personal initiative as to other
staff officers also varied v/idoly. That, such a field eld
exist however is apparent fron the tostimny of tho various
defendants v/ho hold staff po3itl^n3 and in their testimony
have 'pointed out various oases in v/hich thoy laodifiod
tho specific desires of their superiors In tho In'corosts
of legality and hurianity. If thoy wore able to do tliis,
tho sane power could bo exorcised for othor ends and
purposes o.nd thoy wore not rioro tro.nscribors of orders.
Surely tho staff officers of tho OK?// did not hold
their high ranlcs and positions and did not bask In tho
hrlght sunlight of official favor of tho Third ^?nd
Thousand Year Reich by noroly inpoding o.nd annuling tho
v/ishos ITazi nastors whon thoy served.
It ovor-taxea tho credulity of this Tribunal to
bolioyo that Hitler or hoitel or Jodl, or all throe of
thoso dead oon, In addition to their riany activities as to
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both nilitary r.iattors and natters of state, v/cro rosponsiblo
for the details of so nany orders, words spchon in conforoncos,
and oven spoochos which v/oro r.:ado. V/o c.ro aware that nany
of the ovil and inhunauo acts of the last v/ar nay have
originated in the ninds of these non» But at is oq^ua-lly
true that the ovil they originated and sponsored did not
spread to the far flung.troops of tho Wehrnacht of itself.
Staff officers were indlsponsablo to that ond a.nd cannot
oscapo crininal rosponsibility for their essential con
tribution to the final oxocution of such orders on tho
ploa that thoy v/oro conplying with tho orders of a superior
who was noro crininal.
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COmfilSS.^'R ORDER
This "was one of the most obviously malevolent, vicious
and criminal orders ever issued by any army of any time-
It called .for the murder of ^'tussian political function
aries and, like so much of the evils of the Third Reich,
originated in Hitler *s fertile brain, -^s v/ill bo shown,
it was issued prior to the opening of the campaign against
hussia.
On 30 March 1941 Hitler held a conference at Berlin
with leaders of the VKohrmacht. Von Loeb was present i -^t
that time, according to the summary contained .in i-rcneral
Haider*s- Diary, Hitler said?
"Clash of two Idecloglos. Crushing
denunciation of Belshevism, identified
with asocial criminality. Coiranunism
is an enormous danger for our future. ii«o
must forget the concept of comradoship be
tween soldiers. A Communist Is no comrade
before nor after the battle. This is a
war of extermination. If we fail to grasp
this, and though we'arc sure to beat the
enemy, vie shall again have to fight the
Communist foe 30 years from nov^* We do
not wage war to preserve the enemy.
If
"Vtfar against Russia; Extermination of the
Bolshevist Gormnlssars and of the CoouTiunist
intelligentsia. The new states must bo
Bocialist, but without intellectual classes
of their own. Growth of a new intellectual
class must be prevented. A primitive Social'
ist intelligentsia is all that is needed.
We must fight against the poison of disin
tegration. This is no job for military
courts. The Individual troop commander must
know the issues at stake. They must be
leaders in the fight. The troops must
fight back with the methods with v/hloh
they are attacked. Commissars and GPU
men are criminals and must be dealt with
as such. This need not moan that tho
troops get out of hand. Rather the com
mander must givQ orders which express the
common feelings of his troops.
'This war will be very difforont from tho war
in the Vi/est, in the East, harshness today
means leniency in the future. Commanders
must make the sacrifice of overcoming their
personal scruples."
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This seemed to have caused quite a bit of excite
ment among those present, who, of course, recognized it
as being brutal, murderous and unclvilizedi After Eit-
Isr had made his speech and had departed to his inner
sanctum, protests were uttered by the commanders to the
effect the extermination planned by Hitler would yiolate
their soldierly principles, and, further, would destroy
discipline. Brauohitsch agreed with them and promised
to express their opinion to the OKyV and Hitler respectively.
He tried through Aeitel to obtain a change in the plans
but was unable to do so. Subsequently, he lent his ap
proval to the objections made by the field coirimanders,
'who, in some instances at least, expressed a negative
opinion of the order to their subordinates and tried to
avoid its execution as far as they could do so without
peril to themselves. One of the means to ameliorate the
brutality of the Goramissar Order v/as the issuance by von
Brauchitach of what Is known as th^ "Maintenance of Dis
cipline" order hereafter referred to.
On 6 "^une 1941 the Commissar Order was issued from
the Fuehrer Headquarters as. "TOP SECilHT. Transmission only
by officerJ" and was captioned, "Directives for the Treat
ment of Political Commissars." It was as follows:
"In the fight against Bolshevism it is not
to bo expected that the enemy will act in accord
ance with the principles of Humanity or of tnw
International Law. In particular, a vinaictive,
cruel find inhuman treotment of our prisoners
must be expected on the part of the
Commissars of all types, as they are thu actual
leadors""of the resistance.
"The troops must realize:
'l) In this fight, leniency and considerations of
international law are out of place in dealing
with these elements. -^hey constitute a danger
for their own safety and the swift pacifica
tion of the conquered territories.
'2) ' originators oi barbarous Asiatic raethoda
warfare
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rare the political ^-'ommiasars. '- '^hey must
therefore be dealt with most severely, ^
once and sumisirily.
"Therefore, they are to bo liquidated at once
when taken in coinbat or offering resistance.
"For the rest the following directives will
applyJ
"I. Combat zone
1. ) Political commissars who oppose our troops
will be treated in accordance with the 'de
cree concerning the application of martial
law in the Barbarossa area'. This applios
to Goimissars of any typo and grade, even
if they are only suspected of resistance,
sabotage or of instigatxon thereto.
Reference is made to the 'directive concorn-
the conduct ol the troops in^'-ussia.'ing
2.) Political commissars as organs of the enp^
troops are recosnizabio by special insigniar i-o Xov/—o---
- red star witn interwoven gold hammer and
sickle on the sleeves - (for particulars
se-' 'fhe -H-rmed Forces of tho- USSR*, High
Gomiand of the Armed Forces/General Staff
of the Army, Q.u IV, Auction Foreign armies
Jiast (II) No. 100/41 secret, of 15 January
1941, appendix 9 d). They are to be se
gregated at once, 3. g. still on the^battle
field, from the prisonors of war. This is
necessary to prevent them from influoncing
the prisoners of war in any way. These
commissars will not be recognized as soi-
diors, the protection of prisoners of war
by international law does not apply to them.
They will be liquidated after segregation.
3.) Political commissars who have not committed,
nr arei not suspocted of hostilp_ac^ will
not be harmed lor the time being. ^^1^
after deeper penetration of the country
will it be possible to decide whether of
ficials v/ho were left behind may stay
whore they are or will bo handed over to
the Sonderkommandos. Preferably the
latter should decide on this point.
As a matter of principle, in deciding the
question whether 'guilty or not guilty ,
the personal impression which the commissar
makes of his mentality and attitude will
have precedence over facts which may be
unprovablc.
4,) In cases 1.) and 2.) a short message (mes
sage form) about the incident will be senti
a) by divisional units to divisional
headquarters (Intelligence Off leer)
- 76 •
. I,
. r
b) by troops directly under the com
mand of a corps, an army or an
army group or a Panzer group, to
the respective headquarters. (In
telligence Officer).
5.) Kone of the above-mentioned measures must
obstruct the operations, iuothodical
searches and mopping-up actions, therefore,
will not be carried out by the troops.
"II. In the communications zone.
Commissars who are arrested in the comrauni cat ions
zone on account of a doubtful attitude will be
handed over to the Einsatzgruppcn and/or Ein-
satzkommandos of the Security Police (Security
Service).
"III.Limitations of Courts-Martial and Summary Courts.
The courts-martial and summary courts of the
regimental and other conmanders must not be
entrusted with the execution of the meas\iros
as per I and II. "
On 8 June 1941 von Brauchitsch sent out a supplement
of two additional clauses to be added to the original, viz.
to I Number 1,
to I Number 2,
"Action taken against a political
coinmissar must be basod on the fact
that the person in question has shown
by a special, recognisable act or at
titude that he opposes or v/ill in future
oppose the Viiehrmacht."
"Political commissars attached to the
troops should bo segregated and dealt
with by order of an officer, incon
spicuously and outside the proper battle
zone."
On 24 Iviay 1941, however, von Brauchitsch formulated
the Maintenance of Discipline order, in which as a supple
ment to tho Fuehrer Order it is said:
"Subject: Treatment of Enemy Civilians and Criminal
Acts of members of the wehrmaoht
against Enemy Civilians.
Attached Fuehrer decree is (hereby) announced.
It is to be distributed in writing dovm to the com
manders with jurisdiction of their own beyond that,
the principles contained in it are to be made known yv
orally.
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Supplements to I -
I expect that all counter intelligence
measures of the troops will be carried out ener
getically,. for their ovm security and the speedy
pacification of the territory won. It will be
necessary to take into account the variety of -
ethnic strains within the population, its over
all attitude, and the degree to wlruch they have
been stirred up.
i.;ovement and combat against the onerny^s armed
forces are the real tasks of the troops" It demands
the fullest concentration and the highest effort of
all forces. 'J-his task must not be Jeopardized in
any place, therefore, in general, special search
and mopping-up operations will be out of question
for the combat troops.
The directives of the fuehrer concern serious
cases of rebellion, in which the most severe measures
are required.
Criminal acts of .a minor nature aroj, always
in accordance with the combat situation, to be
punished according to detailed orders from an of
ficer (if possible, a pest conirniinder) by resorting
to provisional measures (for Instance, temporary
detention at reduced rations, roping-upon a tree,
assdgriment to labor).
The G-ln-C*3 of the -t^rmy G-roups are requested
to obtain my approval prior to the rc-instatemont
of \iVehrrnacht jurisdiction in the pacified territories.
The G-ln-C»s of the Armit^s are expected to make
suggestions in this respect in time.
Special instructions will be Issued about the
treatment to be given to political dignitaries.
Supplements to II-
Undor all circumstances it will remain the
duty of all superiors to prevent arbitrary excesses
individual members of the iirmy .and to prevent in
time the troops becoming unmanageable. It must not
come to it that the individual soldier oommits or omits
any act ^ thinks proper toward the indigenous popu
lation; ho must rather feel that in every case ho
bound by the orders of his officers. I consider
it very important that this bo cloarly understood
down to the lowest unit. Timely action by every
officer, especially every company commander, etc.,
help to m£Llntaln discipline, the basis of our
successes.
Occurrences with, regard to 'I* and *11', and
#iich are of special Importance, are to bo reported
by the troops to the OlvH as special events.
(signed) von Brauchitsoh"
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There aro 340 copies of this order, which, os noted,
viad attached a copy of the Fuehrer Order. This apparently
was given wide distribution, although the original Fuehrer
Ord®^ ^ very limited distribution.
It is said the intenp.nce of -U1 sc 1p1ine order was
conceived by von Brauchitsch as a moonis of sabotaging the
Hitler order, but it will be noted that in the quoted part
of Haider*s Diary ho has Hitler saying, "This need not moan
that the troops get out of hand."
It seems to bo conceded - if any concession is nect-ssary -
that this order was criminal. It has neither defender nor
apologist. Instead of a straightforward and manly refusal
to execute a criminal order, some of the defendants sought
a surreptitious sabotaging and evasion of its enforcement.
However, in spite of such rejection or opposition on the
part of those in high command, tho record contains a large
number of reports showing the execution of coirunissars by
units subordinate to various of tnc defendants, as v/ill
be shown in the discussion of the case pertaining to each.
This would havG been avoided had some of these commanders
been sufficiently courageous to have forced the issue.
This was not done. It was implemented throughout tho army.
It is claimed that on some occasions at least, blown-
up or exaggerated or even fictitious figures v^ero given of
the number of theso functionaries who were murdered. But
the cold, hard. Inescapable fact reraains that many were
so executed in utter violation of the laws of war and of
humanity.
Dan these defendants escape liability because this
criminal order originated from a higher level? They knew
it was diroctod to units subordinate to them, deports
coming In from tiirjo to time from these subordinate units
showed tho execution of these political functionaries.
— ••
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It is true in many cases they said they had no Imowlcdgc
of these repcrts. They should have had such knowledge.
If they had expressed thoir opposition to and rejootion
of the Commissar tirder, that tho reports showing the car
rying out of this order would havo boon shown to them
by their subordinates is a conclusion that is Inoscapablc.
It was criKiinal to pass it down to subordinate units.
When tho subordinates obeyed the order, the superior cen-
not absolve himself by the ploa that his character was so
well known that his subordinates should havo had the
courage to disobey tho order which ho himself in passing
It down showed that he lacked. Such a pica Is oontompti-
ble and constitutes no defense.
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BARBAROSSA JURISDICTION ORDER
The so-called Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order is in a dif
ferent category from the Commissar and Commando Orders and
its consideration is somewhat more complicated. This order
was issued by Keitel on 13 May 1941 as "Decree on Exercis
ing Hilitany Jurisdiction in the Area of Barbarossa and
Special Measures by the Troops", and reads as follows:
"The Wehrmacht' s :^pplication of its laws
(v/ehrmachtsgerichtsbarlceit) place at maintaining
discipline.
"The vast extent of the operational areas
in the East, the fighting methods necessitated
thereby and the peculiarity of the enemy give
the I'/ehrmacht courts jobs which - in view of
their limited personnel - they can only solve
during war operations and until some degree of
pacification has been obtained in the conquered
area if they limit themselves at first to their
main task.
"This is possible only if the troops them
selves oppose ruthlessly any threat from the
enemy population.
"For these reasons herewith the following
is ordered for the area 'Barbarossa' (area of
operations, army group rear area, and area of
political administration).
I.
"Treatment of Crimes committed bv Enemy Civilians
1. Until further order the military courts and
the courts-martial will not be competent for
crimes committed by enemy civilians.
2. Franc-tireurs will be liquidated ruthlessly
by the troops in combat or while fleeing.
3. Also all other attacks by enemy civilians
against the Armed Forces, its members and
auxiliaries will be suppressed on the spot by the
troops with the most rigorous methods until the
assailants are finished. (Kiederkaerapfen).
4. Waere such measures were not taken or at least
were not possible, persons suspected of the act
will be brought before an officer at once. This
officer v;ill decide whether they are to be shot.
"Against localities from which troops have
been attacked in a deceitful or treacherous man-
ner, collective coercive measures will be applied
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immediately upon the order of an officer of the
rank of at least "battalion, etc., commander, if
the circumstances do not permit a quick identi
fication of individual perpetrators.
5. It is strictly forbidden to keep saspects in
custody in order to put them at the disposal of
the courts after the reinstatement of jurisdiction
over indigenous inhabitants.
6, The C in C's of the Army Groups can - by
agreement with the competent commanders of the
Luftwaffe ^^nd the Navy - reinstate .iurisdiction
of the Wehrmacht courts for civilians, in areas
sufficiently pAcified.
"For the area, of the Political Administra
tion this order will be given by the Chief of the
OKVL
II.
Trea-troenjt of_crime^ coramlt_ted againsjt i.nhabijtant^
by_.m_embers_of the, Nehrmanh^ ^nd 2.'-^xiJ.i^r_ie^.
1. With re^ard^to, £ffenc£s_c2mmi_tt£d_a.£a3n£t_
^nerny; £ivil^ians_ ^_m£mbers_of ^he. Wehrraach_t or
by its auxiliaries, prosecution is not oblig.gtory.
even where the deed is at the same time a military
crime or misdemeanor.
2. When judging such offences, it will be taken
into consideration in any type of procedure that-
the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent
sufferings of the German people and the fight
against National Socialism which cost the blood
of innumerable followers of the movement were
caused primarily by bolshevist influence and that
no German has forgotten this fact.
5, Therefore the judiciary will decide in such
case whether disciplinary punishment will be ap
propriate, or whether prosecution in court is
necessary. In the case of offences against in
digenous inhabitants the judiciary will order a
prosecution before the military courts only if
the maintenance of discipline or the security
of the Forces call for such a measure. This ap
plies for Instance to serious deeds due to lack
of self-control in sexual matters, which origi
nate from a criminal disposition and which in
dicate that the discipline of the troops is
threatening to deteriorate seriously. Crimes
which have resulted in senseless destruction of
billets or stores or any other kind of captured
material to the disadvantage of our Forces will
be judged, as a rule, not less severely.
"The order to start Investigation procedure
requires in every single case the signature of
the judicial authority.
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4, £ -treme. caution is required in judging tiie
credibility" of statements made by enemy civilians.
III.
"Responsibility of the Troop Commanders.
"Inasfar as.they are competent, it is the personal
responsibility of the troop commanders to see to
it -
1.
2.
3.
that all officers of the units under their
command are Instructed in time and in the
most emphatic manner about the principles
set out under 'I' above.
that their legal advisers are informed in
time of these rules and of_the_verbal com-
muni£p^i£n_s in_wh.i£h_the_p£ljt^al j^n_tent_lone
of_the_Si^reme_Command_( Fu^hnungX were_ex-
£lained io_the_C__in C'_s.
that only those sentences will be confirmed
which correspond to the political intentions
of the Supreme Command (Fuehrung).
IV.
"Protection as secret matter.
"Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will
merely have the classification of a Top Secret. "
It is divided into two main parts: first, it dispensed
with court-martial jurisdiction over the civilian popula
tion and provided that civilians in the occupied areas would
be subjected to arbitrary punishment upon the decision of
an officer. The second part provided th^^t there was no ob
ligation to prosecute members of the wiehrmacht or its
auxiliaries who committed crimes against enemy civilians
except in c^ses involving discipline which were restricted
to certain types of offenses.
As to the first phase, court-martial jurisdiction of
civilians is not considered under international law an in^
herent right of a civilian population and is not an inherent
prerogative of a military commander. The obligation
towards civilian populations concerns their fair treatment.
Court-martial jurisdiction of a military commander and its
extent are determined by his superiors. It has been urged
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In this trial that there is no rule of international law
that guerillas be brought to trial before a court and that
this order authorizing their disposition on the arbitrary
decision of an officer is therefore not Illegal. There may
be some doubt that trial before a cou?:'t is in fact required
under international law.
But in considering this order it must be borne in mind
that it was not solely applicable to guerillas and that it
is an obligation upon an occupying force to provide for the
fair treatment of the civilians within the occupied area.
Whatever may be said as to the summary proceedings against
guerillas, the allowing of such summary proceedings in the dis
cretion of a junior officer, in the case of the wide variety
of offenses thet were left open'to him, is considered criminal.
Furthermore, the fourth paragraph of Section I above
in its most favorable construction Is at best ambiguous
but the logical inference to be drawn from this section goes
further In the opinion of the Tribunal and provides that sus
pected franc-tlreurs may be shot, which is also considered
illegal.
The fourth paragraph of Section I also provides for col
lective coercive measures to be applied immediately upon
the order of an officer of at "least a battalion, etc.,
commander", and is considered Illegal in that it places
no limitations upon such collective actions whatsoever.
For these reasons the first part of this order Is
considered illegal and we so find.
With regard to the second aspect of this order, that
Is the obligation to prosecute soldiers who commit offenses
against the indigenous population, this obligation as a
matter of International law Is considered doubtful. The
duty imposed upon a military commander is the protection
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- oX ±yx& civilian population^ Whether this protection
be assured by the prosecution of soldiers charged
with offenses against the civilian population, or
whether it be assured by disciplinary measures or other
wise, is immaterial from an international standpoints
This order in this respect is subjept to interpretation.
It surely opened the door to serious infractions of
discipline. The German Army was concerned with the dis
cipline of its troops. That discipline could not be
maintained without punishment. Unwarranted acts of a
soldier against a civilian, constituted a breach of dis
cipline. As a matter of fact, practically any offense
against civilians could be construed as a breach of dis
cipline, The provisions of the act itself recognize in
part this situation. Recognition of this fact in the
order was further strengthened by the von Brauchltsch
so-called disciplinary order. This order was issued on
21 May 1941, practically coincident with the Barbarossa
Jurisdiction Order, and was quoted above in connection
with the Commissar Order.
This order was apparently given wldo distribution
and it is considered not without merit that the mili
tary authorities in the issuance of this order had sub
stantially limited Section" 2 of the Barbarossa Juris
diction Order insofar as that order did away with the
obligation to prosecute. At any rate, as far as the
acts of a soldier against the civilian population were
concerned, practically any act might be Interpreted as
an act against discipline.
This disciplinary order by von Brauchltsch, however.
ae -
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was virtually canceled by certain subsequent-orders issued
by Keitel which will be hereafter noted in this opinion.
As regards the first part of the Barbarossa Jurisdic
tion Order, commandeps were merely deprived of jurisdic
tion. It was not a positive prder to do some act. It was
merely an order which took away part of their powers. It
is difficult to see how courts-martial could have been
established to try civilians under such circumstances and
the actions of such courts would have been Illegal and futile.
As regards the second part of the order, as heretofore
stated, it was subject to the interpretation that unwar
ranted acts against civilians constituted a breach of dis
cipline, The illegal application of the order, therefore,
rested to a marked extent with the commanders in the field.
Another provision of this order must be given consi
deration in this regard. Section 6 of paragraph I provides
that the commander-in-chief of the army groups can by agree
ment with the competent commanders of the Luftwaffe and the
Navy "reinstate jurisdiction of the wehrmacht courts for
civilians, in areas sufficiently pacified". While the
limitation is placed upon this provision that the areas
must be sufficiently pacified before the jurisdiction of
the Wehrmacht courts could be reinstated, this provision
nevertheless left the door open for comraanders-in-chlef of
army groups opposed to the arbitrary provisions of the
order rs to civilians, to take action to eliminate it from
their areas. This the record shows none of them did.
This Tribunal does not hold field commanders guilty
for a failure to properly appraise the fine distinctions
of international law, nor for failure to execute court-
martial jurisdiction which had been taken away from them,
but it does consider them criminally responsible for the
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. treiismission of an order that could, and from its terms
would, be illegally applied where ti^ey have transmitted
such an order wlthgut proper safeguards as to its appll-
cation. For that failure on their part they must accept
crimina.1 responsibility for its misapplication within sub-
ordinate units to which they transmitted it. And in view
of tne relation of this order to frgnc-tlreurs, it takes
the view tlia.t while commanding generals might not be
able under the provisions of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction
Order to establish courts-martial to try them, that such
commanders were nevertheless responsible, within the areas
of their comiaands, for the summary execution of persons
who were merely suspects or those who, from their acts,
were not in fact franc-tireurs at all, such as the ex
ecution of the nineteen year old girl who wrote a song
derog'atory of the German invader of her countryi
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i C0m:UM)0 ORDER
Following the Dieppe raid, and after drafts and changes
had been prepared largely by V/arlinont and Lahi'-iann, Hitloxj
issued the folloy/ing order on 18 October 1942:
"TOP SECRET
"1.) For sor.ie tine our enenies have been
using in their warfare methods v/hich
are outside the international Geneva
Conventions. Sspecially brutal and
treacherous is the behavior of the so-
called corx-)andj3, v;ho,. as is ests.blished,
are partially recruited even fron
freed criminals in enemy countries* From
captured orders it is divulged, that
they are directed not only to shaclcle
prisoners, but also to kill defenseless
prisoners on the spot at the moment in
which they believe that the latter as
prisoners represent a burden in the
further pursuit of their purposes or
could otherwise bo a hindrance. • Finally,
orders have been found in which the
killing of ioris oners has boon demanded
in prliKiiple.
"2.) For this reason it was already announced
in an addenduio to- the /^rned Forces report
of 7 October 1942, that in the future,
Germany, in the face of these sabotage
troops'Of the British and their accom-
plices^ v;ill-resort to the same pro
cedure, i.e., that thoy will bo ruthlessly
mowed down by the Gorman troops in combat,
wherever thoy may appear.
"3.) I therefore order;
"Prom nov/ on all enemies on so-called
Cor.iriando Missions in Europe* or hfrlca
challongod by Gorman troops, oven if
thoy are to all appearances soldiers
in uniform or demolition troops, whether'
armed or unarmed, in battle or In flight,
are to bo slaughtered to the last nan.
It does not make any difforonco whether
thoy are landed from ships and aeroplanes
^for their actions, or whether thoy arc
f dropped by parachute. Even if those
individuals, v;hon found, should apparently
bo proparod to give themselves up, no
^ pardon is to bo granted then on principle.
In each individual case full information
la to bo sent to the O.K.W.- for publi
cation in the Report of the Military
Forces, <
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"5.)
"50
If Individual nonbors of such corinandos,
such as ai^onts, saboteurs, etc# fall
into tho hands of the nilitary forces
by sone other noans, through tho police
in occupied territories for instance,
the^'" are to bo handed over inioediatoly
to the SE>. ahiy inprisonriont under
nilitary-guard, in PW Stockades for
instance, etc., is strictly prohibited,
Gvon if this is only intended for a
short tino.
This order does not apply to tho troatnent
of any onony soldiers who, in tho course
of nornal hostilities (largo-scale
offensive actions, landing oporatlons and
airborne operations), are captured in
open battle or give thonselvos up. Nor
does this order apply to oncny soldiers
falling into otat hands after battles at
sea, or onony soldiers trying to save
thoir livos by parachuto aftor battles^
I will hold rosponsiblo undor liilitary
Law, for failing to carry out this order,
all connandors and officers v/ho either
have negloctod their duty of instructing
the^troops about this order, or acted
c-gainst this order v/horo it was to bo
executed.,"
This order was criminal on its face. It sinply
directed tho slaughter of those "sabotage" troops,
Tho connection of certain defendants with it is
treated in tho discussion of tho individual cases.
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This was another criminal oj^<^or from Hitler ?s brain,
It was slf;7ied by Keitel on 7 DoCGnber 1941, after prior
-)0
nor;otiations with Lohnann V/arliDont, and is as follows
"SinoQ the opening of tho Russian
Ganpaign, Oc ^r.iunist olenents and other
anti-Gernan circles have increased their
assaults against the Reich and the
occupation power in tho occupied torritorios,
Tho extent and the danger of those activities
necessitate tho nost severe ".loasuros against
tho rjalefactors in order to intimidate then*
To begin with one should proceed along
according to tho following diroctivos,
I.
''In case of criminal acts connittod by
non»-Gornan civilians and which are directed
against the Reich or the occupation power '
endangering their safety or striking pov/or,
tho death penalty is applicable in principle,
IX.
"Criminal acts contained in paragro.ph
I will, in principle, bo tried in tho
occupied territories only when it appears-
probable that death sontencos are going to
bo passed against tho offenders, or at least
tho main offenders, and if tho trial and
tho oxooution of the death sentence can be
carried nut without delay. In other oases
tho offenders, or at least tho main offenders,
are to be talcon to Germany,
III.
"Offenders who are being taken to Germany
arc subject to court-martial procedure
there only in case that particular military
concerns shculd require this. Gorman and
foreign agencies v/ill declare upon inquiries
on such offenders that they wore arrested
and the state of the procooding did not
allov/ further infornations,
IV.
"Tho Conmandors-in-Chlof in tho occupied
territories and the justiciaries, within their
jurisdiction, will bo personally hold res
ponsible for tho execution of this decree,
V.
"Tho Chief of tho OKVV will docido in
which of tho occupiod torritorioa this docroo
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shall bo appliod. Ho is authorized '
to furnish explanations, supplements,
and to issue directives for its
execution. The Reich Minister of
Justice v/ill issue directives for
the execution within his jurisdiction."
V/o have heretofore quoted from the Judcment of the
International Military Tribunal relative to this order
and it need not be repeated; The enforcement of this
cruel and brutal order cost the lives of many innocent
people and untold suffering and misery to their loved ones
The connection of certain of the defendants with it
will bo treated in our handling of the cases against them.
There are criminal orders involved in this case,
other than those we have specifically mentioned, which we
discuss in connection with the case of the defendants to
whom they were applicable.
• 91-
h\'
I'll
»
i'J jr >, .
HOST/vGES ;j® KEPRISAIjS
In tho Southoast Caso, Unltod States vs. V/ilheln
List, ot al. (Caso No. 7), tho Tribunal had occasion to
oonsidor at consldorablo length tho lav/ rolatinc to
hostai^os and reprisals. It was therein held tliat under
cortaln vory rostrlctivo conditions and subjoct to
certain rathor oxtonsivo safeguards, hostages nay bo taken,
and after a judicial findin^^ of strict conplianco with all
pro-conditions and as a last dssporato ronody hostayos
nay ovon bo sontoncod to death. It was held further that .
slnilar drastic safoGuards, rostrictions, and judicial
pro-conditions apply to so-callod "reprisal prisoners".
If so inhui'-iano a noaauro as the killinG innocont persons
for offonsos of others, ovon whon drastically safoGuardod
o.nd linitod, is over pornissible under any theory of
international law, killinc v/ithout full conplianco with
all roqulronents would bo nurdor. If killinc
pernissiblo \mder any circuiistancos, then a killinc v/ith
full conplianco with all tho nentiened prerequisites still
would bo nurdor.
In tho caso hero presented, wo find it unnecessary
to approve or disapprove tho conclusions of lav/ announced
in said Judcr.iont as to tho porr.iissibility of such killiu^.p^
In the instances of so-callod hostaco takinc ^^-nd killincj
and tho so-callod reprisal killincs v/ith which v/o have to
doal in this caso, tho safecnards and pro-conditions
required to bo observed by tho Sjuthoast Judcieont wore
not ovon attonptod to bo pot or ovon sucC'^ ^^Qd as necessary.
Killincs without full conplianco with such pre-conditions
are noroly terror nurdors. If the law is in fact that
hostaco and reprisal killincs are never por::issiblo at all.
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%thon also tho so-callod hosta^o and reprisal killin£;s in
this case are norely terror niorders.
Tho responsibility of defendants for any such acts
will bo considered in our dotormination of tho cases
acainst -the individual defendants.
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a?hQ Gxecution of partisans as franc-tirours is ' . '
connoctod with tho Barbarossa Jurisdiction Docroo in
that it involves tho troatnont of civilians "by tho
occupying and invading forces.
The record In this case contains :;aich 'testimony and
ai-.ions the nuiierous exhibits are nany documents doalinr; v;ith
so-called partisan v;arfaro, V/o doen it desirable to naico
sone ooi:]i-.:ont on tho law relatinc thereto boifore considorinc
tho cases of the Individual defendants,
;.rticlGS 1 and 2 of tho ;jinox to the Hacuo Convention
are as follows:
"Article 1.
"Tho lav;3, riyhts, and duties of war
apply not only to arnies, but also to
nilltia and voluntoor corps fulfilling tho
following conditions :
"1. To be connandod by a person responsible
for his subordinates;
"2, To have a fixed distinctive o;;jbloi:i
recognisable at a distance;
"3, To carry arns openly; and
"4, To conduct their operations in
accordance with tho lav/s and custons
of v/ar •
"In countries whore nilitia or volunteer'
corps constitute tho arny, or forn po.rt of it,
they are included under the dononination
'arny *.
".,rticlG 2,
"Tho inhabitants of a territory v/hich
has not boon" occupied, v/ho, on tho approach
of tho onony, spontaneously take up arus
to resist tho invading troops v/ithout having
had tli:io to or.''"anizo thensolvos in accordance
with ;.rticlo 1,' shall be regarded as belligerents
if they carry arns openly and if they respect
tho laws and custons of vi-'ur
A failure to noot these roquironents deprives one so
failing on capture of a prisonor of war status,
\7e have a strong suspicion from the record
in this ,caso that anti-
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%partisan warfaro was used by the Gornan Roich. as a pretext
for the Gxtornination of many thousands of innocent persons
Hitler stated what it soens becane the V/ohrnacht policy
when he saids
"••• This partisan war again has sone
advantages for us; it enables us to
eradicate everyone who opposes us«"
The defendants without exception clain that they oxocuted
as partisans only those who were operating as franc-tiruors
and bandits and who failed to conply with the requironents
of the rules of war to constitute then lav/ful bolligeronts.
They clain thoro is no ovldenco adduced by the prosecution
that tho defendants are guilty of executing any as so-
ca3,lod partisans who conpliod with the roquirenonts to
constitute then lawful belligerents, that is, any who wore
not in fact franc~tirours» ilowovor, wo need not on tho
record before us dotonoino whether this is true or untrue
for tho evidence shows beyond any question that it was tho
policy of the Wohrnacht to create classes of partisans by
definition in orders and directives and by construction and
in this manner they brought v/ithln the list of those they
proscribed as partisans and shot or hung not only tho franc-^
tireur, in fact, but also many other classes that no
conceivable reason can be foiand for so including except as
Hitler stated it, "to eradicate all those who oppose us".
In a conference called by Gen. Mueller (General for Special
hsslgnmonts) at V/arsaw before tho Russian campaign to
instruct the Judge .advocate and Intolllgonco Officers of
the arnios on tho meaning and scope of tho Rarbaroasa
Decree, the following v/ns tho construction and instruction
givens
"One of tho two ononles must die;
do not spare tho bearer of enemy ideolo'^
but kill him. '
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"Evory civilian v/ho inpodcs or incitos
othors to iupodo tho Gorman Wohrnacht is
also to "bo considorod a j^uorilla (for
instance s instigators, porsoiis who dis-
trihuto loaflotsnon obsorvojico of Gorman
orders, arsonists, dostroyinG of road
signs, supplies, etc.).
"Tho population is doniod tho right to
take up arms voluntarily, IJblthor are para
nilitary associations (Konsonsl Osscavlachin)
entitled to do so,"
The classification certainly is elastic and capable of wide
extension, "Every civllian_j;'7hp_inpedes_or iucito£ othor^s
V
to_i^£do th£ Gernan_V/£hr;;.]acht", taken as a criterion for
detenaining who is a frano-tirour, clearly opens tho way .
for arbltriny and bloody inplonontation. Those falling into
the various classifications v/ere sui'.i.iarily executed as
partisans snd so classified in tho reports. There is no
warrant in tho Rules of War or in international lav/ for
dealing with such persons as franc-tirours, guerillas, or
bandits. Rod drny soldiers in uniforn were in sone
instances shot as so-called pc.rtisans. There is, of course,
no warrant in international law for such action.
The neat vicious classification of the proscribed was
that of "partisan suspect". The executions of such wore
a regular routine and their executions wore reported along
with those of the so-called partisans.
Suspicion is a state of nind of tho accuser and not a
state of nlnd or an act by tho one accused. It is a
nonstrous proposition containing tho very ossonco of
license that tho state of mind of tho accuser shall bo tho
doternlning factor, in tho absence of ovldonco of guilt,
whether the accused shall or shall not be suix.iarily oxGcutqd,
But it is said that when those accused wore captured they" 5
wore interrogated and sono wore not executed but released
or sent to prison canps. But this is no defense for it
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doos not nocGssarily r.ioan that those who v/ore executed
as suspects had boon found guilty even by the infernal
intorrogation, by an officer, but only that the interro
gator had not had hx£
renovod, so, xmdor the order, they, being still susp'ectod
>^
woro oxocutod. This doos not anount to even the ninlnun •
of judicial protection roqviirod' before an execution. .
The classification of the victins in the ntuoorous
reports in the record as partisan suspects is a natural
and proper one to bo nado under the order for execution o^
nere suspicion of partisan activity. If, as defendants
have contended, no suspects wore oxocutod until they v/oro
lawfully found and adjudged to bo guilty, there v;as no
need whatsoever for the distinction nado in the classifi-
cation. Wo find froi.i the evidonco that there woro great
nuiMbors of persona oxocutod in the areas of various of
those defendants, who, under no stretch of tho inaginatlon,
woro franc-tirours and groat nunbors of others executed
solely on suspicion, without any proof or lawful detor-
nination that thoy v/ore in fact guilty of tho offonsos
of which thoy woro suspoctod. Tho orders to oxocuto such
persons and noro suspects on suspicion only and without
proof, were crininal on their faoo. Sxocutions pursuant
thoroto woro crininal, Thoso who gave or passed dovm
such orders nust boar crininal responsibility for passing
thon dovm and for their inplonontation by tho units sub
ordinate to thon.
Notwithstanding our strong suspicion that tho
oxocutlons of persons doscribod in tho docu^ncaits as
partisans woro in a vast nunbor of cases not oxocutlons
of thoso whon it was pornisslblo to oxocuto undor tho
Rulos of War, but a noro cloak under which innocent
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kpersons woro oradioatod, wo accord to tho dofondants tho
"bonoflt of any possiblo doubt and detornlno tho question
of their criminality on tho basis of cases of tho typo
nontioned concorning tho criiuinality of which under both
the law and tho ovidonco thoro can bo no doubt*
Wo shall dotormino on conaidoration of tho ovidonco
oach defendant's guilt or innocence as to such matters
charged against hini
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THE HAGUE AKD GEKEVA COKVEKTIONS
Anotlier q.uestion of general interest in this case
concerns the applicability of the Hague Convention and
the Geneva Convention as between Germany and Russia. In
determining the applicability of the Hague Convention it
must be borne in mind, first, that Russia ratified this
convention but Bulgaria and Italy did not. The binding
effect of the Hague Convention upon Germany was considered
by the Ix-IT.in the trial against Goering, et al. On page
253 of that Judgment It is stoted:
"But it is argued that the Hague Convention
does not apply in this case, because of the
general-portlclpetion' clause in Article 2
of the Hague Convention of 1907. That
clause provided:
'The provisions contained in the regu
lations (Rules of Land Warfare) referred
to in Article I as well as in the present
Convention do not apply except between
contracting powers, and then only if all
the belligerents are parties to the Con
vention. '
"Several of the belligerents in the recent
wa.r were not parties to this Convention.
"In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not
necessary to decide this question. The rules
of land warfare expressed in the Convention
undoubted.ly represented an advance over exist
ing international law at the time of their
a.doption-. But the convention expressly stated
that it was an attempt 'to revise the general
laws and customs of war', which it thus
recognized to be then existing, but by 1939
these rules laid down in the Convention were
recognized by all civilized nations, and
were regarded as being declaratory of the
laws and customs of w^r which are referred
to in Article 6 (b) of the Charter."
It is apparent from the above quotation that the view
adopted by the IKT in that case as to the Hague Conventions
was that they were declaratory of existing international
law and therefore binding upon Germany. In
- 99 -r
this connection it is further pointed out that the de
fense in this case, particularly as regards partisan v;ar-
fare, primarily is based upon the fact that partisans oould
be shot or hanged since under the Hague Convention they
were not lawful belligerents.. The defense can hardly con
tend that Germany was in a position to sort out as bind
ing on her only those provisions of these Conventions
\i\hich suited her own purpos'es. Like the IMT, v/e do not
feel called upon in this case to determine whether or not
the nague Conventions were binding upon Germany as an in
ternational agreement. Vile adopt the principle outlined
^ in that case to the effect that in substance these provl-
: slons v/ere binding as declaratory of international law.
^ .4.5 rugards the Geneva Convention , it is to be borne
in i-nind that Kussia was not a signatory power to this
convention . There is evidence in this case derived from
a divisional crdor of a German division that Hussia had
signified her intention to be so bound. However, there is
no authoritative document in this record upon which to
^ base such a conclusion. In the case of Goerlng ct al.,
J!.- above cited, the IMT, on page 232, stated as follows:
"The argument in defense of the, charge
with regard to the murder and ill-treat
ment of Soviet prisoners of war, that
the U.3.S.H, was not a party to the
Geneva Convention, is quite without
foundation. On 15 September 1941 admiral
Canaris protested against the regulations
for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of
war, signed by General heinecke on 8
September 1941. He then stated:
*The Geneva Convention fdr the treatment
of prisoners of war is not binding in the
relationship between Germany and the U.S.
S,K. Therefore only the principles of
general international law on the treatment
of prisoners of v/ar apply. Since the 18th
Cuntury these have gradually been es
tablished along the lines that war cap
tivity Is neither revenge nor punishment,
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but solely protective custody, the
only p\irpos6 of which is to prevent
the prisoners of war from further
participation ..in the war. This
principle was developed in accord
ance v/ith the view held by all armies
that it is contrary to military tra
dition to kill or injure helpless
people . . . The decrees for the treat
ment of Soviet prisoners of war enclosed
are based on a fundamentally different
view-point.'
•if "if "it -i't 4<r
"Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides
that 'ill-treatment. , . of civilian
population of or in occupied territory
. . . killing of hostages . . . wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or vil
lages' shall be a war crime." In the
main, those provisions arc merely de
claratory of the existing lav;s of war
as expressed hj the Hague Convention,
Article 46, which stated; 'Family honor
and rights, the lives of persons and
private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice must be res
pected, ' "
It would appear from the above quotation that that
Tribunal accepted as international law the statement
of Admiral Canaris to the effect 'that the Geneva Con
vention was not binding as between Gorim-iny and Hussia
as a contractual agreement but that the general princi
ples of international law as outlined in those conven
tions were applicable. In other words, it would appear
that the IMT in the case above cited followed the same
lines of thought v/ith regard to the Geneva Convention
as with respect to the Hague Convention, to the effect
that thoy wore binding insofar as they, were in substance
an expression of international law as accepted by the
civilized nations of the world, and this Tribunal adopts
this viewpoint.
;•>>-.
'I'" w n ....
• ' " • '' "V. 'ijv '• •'v- .' ^ " "
IOne serious question that confronts us arises as to
the use of prisoners of war for the construction of forti
fications^ It is pointed out that the Hague Convention
specifically prohibited the use of prisoners of war for
any v/ork in connection with the operations of war, where
as the later Geneva Conventions provided that there shall
be no direct connection with the operations of war* This
situation is fiirther complicated by the' fact that when
the proposal was nmde to definitely specify the exclusion
of the building of fortifications, objection was made be
fore the conforonco to that limitation, and such definite
exclusion of the use of prisoners was not adopted. There
is also much evidence in this case to the effect that
Russia used Gorman prisoners of war for such purposes. lb
Is no defense in the view of this Tribunal to assert that
international crimes were oornmitted by an adversary, but
as evidence given to the interpretation of what con
stituted accepted use of prisoners of war under Internation
al law, such evidence is pertinent. At any rate, it
appears that the illegality of such use was by no means
clear. The use of prisoners of war in the construction
of fortifications is a charge directed against the
field commanders on trial here. This Tribunal is of tho
opinion that in view of the uncertainty of international
law as to this matter, orders providing for such use
from superior authorities, not Involving the use of
prisoners of war in dangerous areas, were not criminal
upon their face, but a matter which a field commander
had the right to assume was properly determined by the
legal authorities upon, higher levels.
Another charge against the field commanders In this
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Case 1b that of sending prisoners of war to the Reich for
use in the armament industry. The term "for the armament
industry" appears in numerous documents, while there is
some question as to the interpretation of this term, it
would appear that it was used to cover the manufacture of
arms and munitions. It was nevertheless legal for field
commanders to transfer prisoners of war to the Reich and
thereafter their control of such prisoners terminated.
Communications and orders specifying that their use vrrs
desired "by the armament industry or that prisoners were
transmitted for the armament industry are not in f^^ct bind
ing as to their ultimate use. Their use subsequent to
transfer was a matter over which the field commander had
no control. Russian prisoners of war were in fact used
for many purposes outside the armainent industry. Mere
statements of this kind cannot he said to furnish irrefutable
proof against the defendants for the illegal use of pri
soners of war whom they transferred. In any event, if a de
fendant is to be held accountable for transmitting prisoners
of war to the armament industry, the evidence would have
to establish that prisoners of war shipped from his area
were in fact so used.
Therefore, as to the field commanders in this case,
it ie our opinion that, upon the evidence, responsibility
cannot be fixed upon the field commanders on trial before
us for the use of prisoners of war in the armament industry.
In stating that the Hague and Geneva Conventions express
accepted usages and customs of war, it must be noted that
certain detailed provisions pertaining to the cere end
treatment of prisoners of wf^r can hardly be so designated.
Such details it is believed could be binding only by
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International agreement, -^t since the violation of these
provisions is not in issue in this case, v/e make no com
ment thereon, other than to state that this judgment is
in no vmy based on the violation of such provisions as
to Hussian prisoners of v/ar»
Most of the prohibitions of both the Hague and G-eneva
Conventions, considered in substance, are clearly an ex
pression of the accepted views of civilized nations and
binding upon Germany and the defendants on trial before
us in the conduct of the war against hussia. These
concern (1) the treatment of prisoners of war; (2) the
treatment of civilians within occupied territories and
spoliation and devastation of property therein; and (3)
the troatment of Hed Army soldiers who, under the Hague
Convention , v/ere lav/ful belligerents,
VMe cite in this category the following rules from
the Hague Hulos of Land ^i/arfare;
Article 4:
"Prisoners of war are in the pov/er of
the hostile Government, but not of the
individuals or corps v/ho capture them.
"They must bo humanely treated..."
That part of Article 6 which provides;
"...The tasks shall not be excossivo.
That part of Article 8 which provides:
"...iiscapod prisoners who are retaken
before being able to rejoin their own
army or before leaving the territory
occupied by the army which captured
them are liable to disciplinary punish
ment <
"Prisoners v/ho, after succeeding in es
caping, are again taken prisoners, are
not liable to any punishment on account
of the previous flight."
p'rom the Geneva Convention ;
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That part of Article 2 which provides:
"^..Thoy must at all times be humane
ly treated and protected, particularly
against acts of violence, insults, and
public curiosity..."
That part of Article 5 which provides:
"Prisoners of war have the right to
have their person and their honor re
spected. bVomen shall be treated with
all the regard due to their sex..."
ii-rticle 4 which provides:
"The power detaining prisoners of war is
bound to provide for their maintenance.
"Difference in treatment among prisoners
is lawful only when it is based on the
military rank, state of physical or mental
health, professional qualifications, or
sex of those who profit thereby."
That part of Article 7 which provides:
"Prisoners of war shall be evacuated
within the shortest possible period
after their capt\u?e, to depots located
in a region far enough from the zone of
combat fcr then to be out of danger..."
Those parts of Article 9 which provide that:
"...Prisoners captured in unhealthful
regions or vhore the climate is injuri
ous for persons coning from temperate
regions, shall be transported, as soon
as possible, to a more favorable climate";
and that:
"...No prisoner may, at any time, be sent
into a region where ho might be exposed
to the fire of the combat zone, nor
used to give protection from bombardment
to certain points or certain regions by
his presence.
That part of Article 10 which provides:
"Prisoners of v;ar shall be lodged In
buildings or in barracks affording all
possible guarantees of hygiene and health-
fulness.••"
Those parts of Article 11 which provide:
"The food ration of prisoners of war
shall be equal in quantity and quality
to that of troops at base camps., •"
and that:
"...A sufficiency of potable water shall be
furnished them..."
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. . ,,n. 7.
That part of ..rticlo 12 which provides that:
^'ClothinG, linon, and footwoar shall
ho furnishGCL pris-jncrs of war "by tho
dotaininc Pov/or.®,"
Tho.t part of *i.rticl3 13 which providos :
"Bolll£oronts shall bo bound tD taho
all sanitary looasuros nocossary to
assuro tho cloanlinoss and hoalth-
fulnoss of cai.ips and to provont
opidonics • •.
xlrticlo 25
•'Unloss tho conduct of i.iilitary opera
tions so roQuiros, sick ana wounc.oa
nrlsonors of war shall not ho transforrod
as long as thoir rocovory loaght bo ^ .
ondangorod by the trip*"
hrtlclo 29;
"]^Io prisonor of wm nay bo onployod at
labors for which ho is physxcally unxi .
That part of ;.rticlo 32 which providos ;
"It is forbiddon to uso prisonors of war
at unhoalthful or dangerous work.,.'
That part of Articlo 46 which provides;
"...-ny corporal punishioont, any in-
prisonLiont in quartors without daylight
and, in gonoral, ony forn of cruelty,
is forbiddono,•"
;^rticlo 50 v/hich providos:
"Escaped prisoners of war wh) aro
rotalion before boing able to rojoin
thoir .'vm aruy or to loavo tho territory
occuoiod by tho arny which captured then
shall bo liable only t^ disciplinary
punish lent •
"Prisoners wIid, after having sucGoodod
in rejoining thoir aruy or in leaving
tho territory :)Ccupiod by tho ..rny
which captured thon, nay again bo takon
orisonors shall not bo liable to an'j
punishment oxi acc junt of thoir previous
flight,"
That part of ..rticlo 56 which provides;
"In no case nay prisoners of war bo
transforrod to penitentiary establish-
nonts (prison, penitentiaries, convict
prisons, etc.) thoro t3 undergo discipli
nary pmishnont #. •"
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"UhcTor thoso provisions cortain nccGptod principles
of international law are cloarly stated, r^oong thoso
applicahlo in this case arc notod those provisions con-
corning tho proper care and naintononce of prisoners of
war. -'^Iso tho provisions prohibiting their use in
dangerous localitios and or.iplo^a-.iont, and in this connection
it should bo pointed out that wo consider their use by
coiobat troops in conbat areas for tho c:)nstruction of
field fortifications rjid otherwise to conetitutc dangerous
onployioont imdor the conditions of riodorn war. Under
thoso provisions it is ..Iso apparent that tho execution
of prisoners of war for attor.ipts to oscapo was illegal
and criminal.
*4.1so, it is tho opinion of this Tribunal that orders
which provided for tho turning over, of prisoners of war
to tho SD, a civilian organisation, v/horoin all accounta
bility for then is shown by the ovidonco to have been
lost, constituted a crininal act, particularly vdien fron
tho svirroundlng circuiostancos and published orders, it
nust have been suspectod. or Imovm that tho ultiioato
fate of such prisoners of v/ar v/as elinlnation by this
nurd0r oua organiSat i on•
Tho contention of tho dofonso as t: tho condition
of nany of the Russian prisoners when captured is con-
sidorod a dofonso as far as it goes. Ho doubt nany
v/oro 3.n a deplorable condition duo to lack of food,
poor clothing, wounds, siclmoaa, and. exhaustion whon
captured. There is no question that for tonporary periods
these conditions would bring about nuch hardship and
i.iany deaths regardless of tho efforts vof their captors.
However, the ovidonco in this case shows that hundreds
of thousands of Russian prisoners of war died fron hunger.
- 107 -
\
cold, In.clc of nodical- caro, and lll-troatnont that woro
not a rosult of those conditions. It Is true that later
on in the v/ar C-orr.iany realized that she had lost for her-
self a tror.ondjus source of r.ianpowor which had "bocorjo
one of tho najor problens of the Gorman nation. Thoroaftor
to some oxtont her troatmont of pris'^ners of v/ar v/as
based on tho sounder economic principle that it was
bettor to v/ork them to death than to merely lot them die.
Tho groat mass of Russian prisoners of war did not die
because of their condition at the tine of their capture,
Tho argument that tho v/intor ^f 1941-42 v^as the coldest
winter in years in that area can hardly bo alleged as an
oxouso for tho deaths of prisDnofs of v/ar from cold. Cold,
v/intors have certainly not boon unknovm in those parts
of Suropo where" those prisoners woro kept in captivity..
In fact, cold winters in those parts are tho rule and.
not tho exception. Hor can it bo said that tho German
..rmy did njt have fo ^d. with which to maintain thorn. In
their progress through Russia thoy had seized tho food
supplies of tho people and^ there is no evidence in tho
record to show that Gonaan soldiers at that tino woro
dying from starvation. There Is ovldonco that in some
cases there wore opidomics of typhus in the Gorman hrmy
but nothing to parallel tho varl-us opidomics which broko
out in tho Russian camps, Ro d.oubt sold.iors in tho German
hrmy died in isolated cases fro'/.i lack of medical supplies
and nod.lcal attention but tho ovidonco in this case
shows that thousandus of Russian prisoners of v/ar died
from lack of attention while tho Geraan drmy which hold
then vrns not materially suffering from lack of either,
.Is regards tho hujianity of their treatment, tho
ovidonco in this case discloses not only that htuoano
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troatrjont was not gonorally roquirod of Gornan soldiors
in dealing with Russian prisoners of war, but that the
directly •^oppaaiterprocoduhe"was imposed upon thorn by
superior orders. The treati.iont of Russian prisoners of
war by the Genoan Wehroacht was a crime under international
law and it is so found by this Tribunal.
Goncorning the compulsory use of the civilian popu-
lation, spoliation, and devastation v/ithin occupied areas,
the following provisions of the Hague Convention are
likewise cited as applicable in this case:
*lrticlo'-^3 5
"The authority of the legitimate
power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall
take all the measures in his power to
restoro, and ensure, as-far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely provontod, the laws
in f orce in the countr;^''."
trticlo 46 s
"Panily h'.>nour and rights, the lives
of persons, and private property, as
v/oll as religious convictions and
practice, oust bo respected."
Article 47:
"Pillage is formally forbidden."
Article 49s
"If, in addition to the taxes mentioned
in the above ..rticle, the occupant levies
other money contributions in the occupied
territory, this shall only bo for the
needs of the army or of the acb.iinistration
of the torritoiy," in quosti^n."
Article 50s
"Ho general penalty, pecuniary or other-
wise, shall be inflicted upon the popu
lation on acc->unt of the vacts of
individuals for which they cannot bo
regarded as jointly and sovorally
responsible®"
That part of ..rtlclo 52 which roads as follows s
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"Req-uisitlons in kind and services
shall not he demanded from municipalities
or inhrhitants except for the needs of
the army of occupation. They shall
he in proportion to the resources of
the country, and of such a nature as
not to involve the inhabitants in the
obligation of taking part in military
operations against their ovm country,,.*'
a.
That part of Article 53 which reads as follov/s;
"An army of occupation can only take
possession of cash, funds, and realizable
securities which are strictly the
property of the 5tate, depots of arms,
means of transport, stores and supplies,
and, generally, all movable property
belonging to the State which may be
used for military operations..."
Under the Articles above quoted, it is apparent
that the compulsory labor of the civilian population
for the purpose of carrying out military operations
against their own country was illegal.
Under the same Articles, the compulsory recruitment
from the population of an occupied coimtry for labor
in the Keich was illegal.
It is conceded that this policy of recruitment of
slave labor for the Reich did not originate with the
army. The army apparently desired this source of
labor for its own purposes.
The nature and the extent of this program of re
cruitment for slave labor is shown by Prosecution Exhibit
490. This docimient concerns the recriiitment of the age
groups 1926 and 1927 for labor in the Reich and applied
alike to men and women within these nge groups. In other
words, the Reich v/as drafting boys and girls in some in
stances as young as 17 years for slavery in A foreign
country. The Sauckel plan for the mobilization of foreign
labor v/as based on compulsory requisitioning from the
populations of occupied territories. In fact, all the
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economy of the Reich became dependent for its labor to
a large extent upon those sources,. This stupendous
undertaking could not have been effectively carried
out without the cooperation of the military authorities
in the occupied territories. Hundreds of thousands of
the helpless population of the occupied territories wore
transferred to the Reich under this program of labor,
recruitment.
The same principles of international law apply to
a large extent with regard to looting and spoliation^
The difference is mainly that in one case Gornaryrequired
human beings and in another, property f.or her own
economy and the conduct of the waPo
It is not contended that individuals of the German
Army were guilty, to a larger extent than is inevitable in
cases of this kind in any army. The Gorman Armyj, as has
boen pointed out, was on the whole a disciplined arny»
The looting and spoliation sh-own by the record was not
that of individuals but looting and spoliation by the
German government and the German Wehrmacht for the needs
of both. It was done on a larger scale than was possible
by individuals and the strictness of the prohibitions
against individuals in the army, as shown by the evidence
in this case, seems to have been sometimes based upon
the idea that in looting, the individual was not depriving
the victim of the property but was depriving the Reich
and the Wehrmacht#
The doctrine of military necessity has beon widely
urged# In the various treatises on international law
thei'e has been much discussion on this quo.sti.^n.
It has boon the viewpoint of many Gorman writers
and to a certain extent has been oontended in this case
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that military necessity Includes the right to do anything
that contributes to the v/lnnlng of a war. V/e content
ourselves on this subject with stating that such a view
v/ould eliminate all humanity and decency and all lavtr
from the conduct of v/ar and it is a contention which
this Tribunal repudiates as contrary to the accepted
usages of civilized nations. Nor does military necessity,
justify the compulsory recruitment of labor from an
occupied territory either for use in military operations
or for transfer to the Reich, nor does it justify the
seizure of property or goods beyond that which
is nocos3a.ry for tho use of the army of occupation.
Looting and spoliation are none the less criminal in
that they ivere conducted, not by individuals, but by
the army and the state.
The devastation prohibited by the Hague Rules and the
usages of war is that not warranted by military necessity.
This rule is clear enough but the factual determination as
to what constitutes military necessity Is difficult.
Defendants in this case were in many instances in retreat
under arduous conditions wherein their commands were in
serious danger of being cut off. Under such circumstances,
a ooror.iander must necessarily make quick decisions to meet
the particular situation of his command. R. great deal of
latitude must be accorded to him under such circumstances,
V/hat constitutes devastation beyond military necessity
in these situations requires detailed proof of an
operational and tactical nature. V/e do not feel that In
this case the proof Is ample to establish the guilt of
any defendant herein on this charge.
Concerning tho treatment of Red Army Soldiers, the
Haaue Conventions provides
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"The laws, rights, and dntlGS of v/ar
G-PPly only to arnies, "but also to
nllltla and volunteer corps fulfilling
the following conditions:
"1« To "be corvianded by a person respon
sible for his subordinates;
"2* To have a fixed distinctive ooblon
recognizable at a distance;
"3* To carry arns openly; and
"4« To conduct their operations in
accordance v»rith the laws and custons
of war.»
"In countries whore militia or voluntoer
corps•constitute the army, or form part
of it, they are included under the
denomination •ari.iyt,"
This Article defines what constitutes a lawful bolllgorentj
Orders to the effect that Red Army Soldiers v/ho did not '
turn themselves over to the German authorities would suffer
penalty of being treated as guerillas, and similar orders ,
and the execution of Red Army Soldiers thorounder, are
in contravention of the rights of lawful belligerents
and contrary to international law.
It has been stated in this case that /aierican
occupational oonmandors issued similar orders. This
Tribunal is not here to txry Allied occupational commanders
but it should be pointed cut that subsequent to the
unconditional surrondor of Germany, she has had no lawful
belligoronts in the field.
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RESPONSIBILITY OP CCMVUINDERS
OP
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
ThQ dofonsQ in this oaso as to tho fiold coni-iandors
on trial has boon partially based,on tho contention that
while crininal acts may havo occiirrod within tho torri-
torios undor their,jurisdiction, that those criminal acts
woro comi'-iittod by agoncios of tho stato v/ith which thoy
woro not oonnoctod and over whom thoy oxorcisod no
supervision or control. It is concodod that many of
thoso dofondants woro ondov/od with executive pov/or but
it is asserted that tho oxecutivo pov/or of field coixiandors
did nob oxtend to the activities of certain ocononic and
polico agoncios which operated v/ithin thoir aroas ; that
tho activities of thoso agoncios constituted limitations
upon their oxorciso of oxecutivo powor.
In this connection it must bo rocognizod that tho res
ponsibility of commandors of occupied torritorios is not
unlinitod. It is fixod according to tho customs of war,
intornational agroemonts, fundamental principles of
hui'nanity, and the authority of tho connandor which has
boon delegated to him by his own govornnont, Ls pointed
out horetofore, his criminal rosponsibility is porsonal,
Tho act or ncgloct to act must bo voluntary and criminal,
Tho torn "voluntary" doos not oxcludo prossuros or com
pulsions oven to tho extent of superior ordors. That
tho choice was a difficult one does not alter cither its
voluntary nature or its criminality. Prom an intornational
standpoint, criminality may ariso by reason that tho act
is forbidLdon by Intornational agroomenta or is inherently
criminal and contrary to accepted principles of huioanity
as rocognizod and accoptod by civilized nations. In tho
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caso of violr.tions of intornotional asrooriGnts, the
crininality arlsos fron viol-r.tion of the agrooniont itsolf-
iii othor casos, "by tho inhoront nature of tlio act.
\7ar Is hm.ian violonoo at its utmost. Undor its impact
Gxcossos of individuals arc not unknov/n in any arriy. Tho
ncasuro of such individual oxcossos is tho neasuro of .the
pooplo who composo tho army o.nd the standard of dis.ciplino
of tho army to which thoy holong, Tho Gorman hrmy was, in
gonoral, a disciplinod army. Tho tragedy of tho Gorman
Wohrnacht and thoso dofondants is that tho crimos chargod
against thorn stom primarily from its h..ghost nillto.ry
loadorship and tho loadorship of tho Third Roich itsolf«
Hilitary subordination is a comprohonsivo hut not
conclusivo factor in fixing criminal rosponsihility. Tho
authority, both adninistrativo and military, of a conxiandor
and his criminal rosponsihility aro rolatod hut hy no
moans co—oxtonsivo• Liodorii v/ar such as tho last war ontails
a largo moasuro of d^o—contralization. j.i high coixjanaor
cannot kocp oomplotoly informod. of tho dotails of military
operations of subordinates and. i.iost assiupodly not of i-.vory
adninistrativo moasuro. Ho has tho right to assumo that
dotails ontrustod to rosponsihlo subordinates v;lll bo
legally oxocutod. The Prosidont of tho Unltod States is
Comnandor-ln-Ghiof of its military forces. Grlr.iinal acts
oonr.iittod by thoso forces cannot in thomsolvos bo charged
to him on tho thoory of subordination. Tho samo is truo
of othor high coiiuandors In tho chain of cor.imand. Criminality
does not attach to ovory Individual in this chain of
command from that fact alone. Thoro must bo a porsonal
doroliction. That can occur only whoro tho act is
directly tracoablo to him or whoro his failure to pajoporXy
suporvlso his subordinates constitutes criminal nogligonoo
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on his part. In tho lattor case it nuat ho a personal
neglect arioimting to a wanton, ir.inoral disregard of tho
action of his suhordinatos anounting to acquiescence.
Any other intorprotati n international law w>uld g? \
far hoyond tho h-.sic principles of crh.lnal law as known ^
civilized ncti ^ns#
Concerning the responsibility of a field connander
for crines oonnittod within tho area of his coinand, partiq-
ularly as against tho civilian population, it is urged
by the prosecution that under tho Hague Convention, a
nilitary connander of an occupied torritory is por so
responsible within tho aroa of his occupation, regardless
of orders, regulations, and tho laws of his superiors
limiting his authority and regardless of tho fact that
tho crines cormittod therein were duo to the action of
the state or superior nilitary authorities which ho did
not initiate or in which ho did n6t participate. In thi
respect, howovor, it nust bo borne in nind that a nilit^.ry
oormandor, v/hothor it bo of an occupied torritorj or
otherwise, is subject both to tho orders of his nilitary
superiors and the state itself as to his jurlsclction
functions. Ho is their agent and instrument for certain
purposes in a position fron which thcj can ronovo h
will»
in this connection tho Yamashita case has been cited.
Vftiilo not a decision binding upon this Tribunal, it
ontitlod to groat respect because of the high court which
rendered it. It is not howovor entirely applicable to the
facts in this case for the reason that tho authority of
yaroashita in the field of his operations did not appear to
have been restricted by cither his nilitary superiors or
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tho stato, and tho crinos corr.iittod woro by troops imdor
his coi-.^r:and, whoroas in tho caso of tho occupational
corxoandors in thoso procoodincs, tho crinos char^^od v;oro
r.iainly coi;ii.:ittod at tho instance of higher nilito.ry and
Roich authorities.
It is tho opinion-of this Tribunal that a stato can,
as to certain nattors, undor International law liriit tho
oxoroiso of sqvereign pov/ors by a nilitary conn-andor in an
occupied area, but wo are also of the opinion that undor
international: law and accepted usages of civilized no.tions
that ho has certain responsibilities which ho cannot sot
aside or ignore by reason of activities of his ov/n state
within his area. Ho is tho instrunont by v/hich tho
occupancy exists. It is his arny which holds tho area in
subjoction. It is his might v/hich koops an occupied
territory from rooccupancy by tho arnios of tho nation
to v/hioh it inhorontly belongs. It cannot bo said that
ho exorcises tho powor by which a civilian population is
subject to his invading army while at tho sano timo tho
state which ho reprosents may como into tho area which he
Holds and subject tho population to murder of its
citizens and to othor inliur.ian troatmont. Tho situation
is scr.iov/hat analogous to tho acooptod principlo of
intornational law that tho army which captures tho soldiers
of its adversary has certain fixed rosponsibilitios as
to their caro and troatmont.
Vifo arc of tho opinion, howovor, as above pointed out
in othor aspects of this case, that tho occupying
oomiaandor must have knowlodgo of thoso offenses and
ccq.'uioscG or participato or criminally n^gloct to intor-
foro in their oonmission and that the offenses committed
must bo patently criminal. But regardless of v/hothor or
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not Tjndar international lav/ such responsibility is fixed
✓ ^
upon hin, under the particular facts in this case, res
ponsibility of the commanders in question rests upon
other factors. In this respect we quote certain pro
visions of the Handbook for the General Staff in V/ar
Tine, pertinent to executive pov/er:
"5. The exercising of executive power
by military connandors is govornod by No.
20 - 24 of /Jvrny Reg. 90 (of the Army in
the Field).
"6. If a Zone of Operation is
determined, the Cor.ii:iandor in Chief of the
Army and the Commanders in Chief of tho
Amies rocoivo at. tho declaration of a
state of defense or at tho declaration of
a state of war authority for exorcising
oxocutivo power in this territory, withovit
furthor order (Paragraphs 2 and 9 of tho
Reich Dofonso Law).
'In other cases the Fuehrer and
tho V/ehrmacht canSupreme Com::iandor of
transfer such authority for exorcising
executive power
of tho Army and
of tho Armies*
to
tho
>ho Gonnandor in Chief
Conjiandors in Chief
"7. Tho exocutivo power comprises
tho ontiro state pov/or including the right
of issuing lav/s v/lthout prejudice* to tho
indopendonco of jurisdiction. Those
persons invested with oxocutivo power
can decroo local orders o.ffocting tho
territory in v/hioh authority for exor
cising has boon turned over to thon or
transferred to thorn, sot up spooial
courts, and issue instructions to the
authorities and offices conpetont in the
territory named, with tho pxcoption of
tho Supreme Reich Authorities, the
Supreme Prussian Provincial Authorities,
and the Roichloitung of the NSDilP*
"8. The Supremo Reich AuthDcltiosj
Supremo Prussian .Provincial Authorities, and tho
Roichloitung of the NSD^iP can decree
orders for tho torrltory Into which '
executive power has boon tranaforrod,
only by agroomont v/ith tho persons in-
vostod with oxocutivo power. Thoir
right of issuing instructions to tho
authoritlos and offioos subordinated
to them ronalns Intact. Nevertheless
tho right of issuing instruction by
tho person invested v/ith executive
authority takes procodonco.
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"9« .authority for exorcising
oxocutive power is incumbent only on the
persons inyostecl. It can bo transferred
further only inasmuch as an authoriza-^ion
is ordered thereto actually or legally.
"Accordingly persons invested v;ith
executive power o.re authorized to entrust
subordinated offices with the execution
of individual missions.
"10, The lav;s, decrees, etc, which
are valid at the transfer of the executive
pov/er retain their validity so long as
the person invested with executive power
encounters no contrary order.
"11, The Conmandor in Chief of the
Amy regulates the exercising of executive
power through the Connanders in Chief of
the ;*.rnios.
"The revision of questions which occur
in the exorcising of executive pov/er does
not fall into the realm of work of the
Army judges. The civilian conmissionor
with the High Comiiand of the -'.rny is
assigned, for that purpose to the Gor.iiuandor
in Chief of the ;.rmyi the chiefs of the
civil administration, to the Coi.roandors
in Chief of the -mlos.. Persons Invostod
with oxocutive power are authorized^
howovor, to call in the Army judges
assigned to then as counsellors, especially
in the doorooing of legal orders of penal
law content."
It is therefore apparent that oxocutive power under
Gorman law is the exorciso of sovereign powers within
an occupied area conferred upon a military commandor by
the stato. The defense has undertaken to minimize to
a largo extent this wid^o authority but in view of the
above docuioont, it docs not appear to bo the more
shadow of authority contondiod. In fact, those pro
visions fix upon an occupying conmandor certain rospon-
aibilitios as to the preservation of law pjid order within
his area.
The contention of defendants that the economic agonclos
were oxcludod from their oxoroise of ©xocutlvo pov/or
is disproved by vari:ius doouioonts which will hereafter be
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citod in considoring tho guilt or innoconco of dofondants
on trial, /jid rogardlosa of that fact, tho proof in this
case also ostablishos a voluntary cooporation of dofondants
on trial with those ocononio agancios in tho furtherance
of thoir illogal.activitios*
Tho dofonso contends, that the activitios of tho
Elnsatzgruppon of tho Socurity Polico and SD v/oro boyond
thoir sphoro of authority as occupational connandors
bocausG tho stato had authorized tho illegal activitios
of those police units and so liriitod the oxocutive pov/or
of tho occupational coiTn.iancGrs« However, tho occupational
coLiriandors in this caso woro boarors of oxocutive power
» ♦ ' '
and, ono and all, havo doniod rocoipt of any orders showing,
or Icnov/lodgo of, a stato authorized program providing for
tho illegal activitios of tho Einsatzgruppen,
Ono of tho functions of an occupational cor.inandor
endowed with oxocutivo pov/or was to maintain order and
protoct tho civilian population against illegal acts.
In tho absonco of any official diroctivos limiting his
/
oxocutivo powers as to those illogal acts within his
aroa, ho had tho right and duty to tako action for thoir
supproasion. Cortainly ho is not in a position to contend
that thoso activitios v/oro takoii from his flold of
oxocutivo powor by his superiors whon ho know of no such
action on thoir part.
Tho solo question then as to such dofondants in this
caso is whothor or not thoy Icnow of tho criminal activitios
of tho Elnsatzgruppon of tho Socurity Polico and SD and
jioglootod to suppross thorn.
It has boon urgod that nil of tho dofondants in this
caso must havo had knov/lodgo of tho illogal activitios of
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the Einsatzgruppon. It has been argued that "because of
the extent of their murder program In the occupational
areas and "by reason of the communications availa"ble to
the high coiimanders, and the fact that they were in
coimaand of these areas^ they must necessarily have knov/n
of this program. The record in this case shows that some
90,000 so-called undesirable elements v/ore liquidated by
Einsatzgruppe D, largely within the area of the 11th Array*
It also shows that some 40,000 Jewish v/omen and children
were liquidated in Riga which at that time was in the
Coniiiiissariat Ostland, immediately to the rear of the Army
Group ITorth, The Einsatzgruppen and their subordinate
units were organized to carry out this program within the
operational areas of the army.
It is true that extermination of such a large number
of people must necessarily havo come to the attention of
many individuals, and, also, it is established that soldiers
in certain areas participated in some of these executions.
In many respects a hi£^ commander In the German Army
was ronoved from Information as to facts which may have boon
y
known to troops subordinate to him. In' the first place,
these troops were in many instances far removed from his
headquarters. In addition the connon soldiers and junior
officers do not have oxconsive contacts v/ith the high
commandGrs and staff officers.
Another factor must also be taken into consideration in
connection v/ith the activities of the Einsatzgruppen,^ This
Is the dual nature of its functions. On the one hand, it
was charged with the criminal liquidation of certain elo-
ments; on the other hand it exercised legitimate police
activitloa In connection v/ith the security of the rear
communications of the armies, in which capacity it operated
largely against guerillas,
- 121 -
Another factor was the effort made to keep the
criminal activities of these police units from the
Wehrmacht, In the early stages of the viar many of
their mass execut^g^gj as is shgwn by the record, ^
occurred ugder the guise of pogremg ipe^igated by the
SIPO and SD but actually carried out by local inha
bitants. Racial hatreds and pogroms ha^e been known
In Europe for centuries. Pogroms occurred at the tlije
of the Crusades and have recurred in the history of
Europe, even In our time. It is established that
pogroms were used by Elnsatzgrjippe A which operated in
the area of the Army Group North and In the Commissariat
OstlaJid, as a vehicle for, their criminal activities.
At times it is shown such pogroms were participated in
by local militia which necessarily owed its existence
to the German Army,
Another source of information was reports submitted
by Einsatzgruppen to army headquarters, but it is noted
that such reports concerned mainly activities within
their legal sphere of combatting partlssrs and the
maintenance of security. However, such reports showed
tiae execution of Jews, gypsies, and others as specific
classifications of those liquidated. Reports of the
mass murders carried out by these police units, however,
were submitted through their own channels to the RSHA
in Berlin and were not submitted to army headquarters
or through such headquarters.
An army commander has two reliable and extensive
official sources of information! (l) superior orders;
(2) reports of subordinate urlta.
It is true that no superior orders transmitted to
the defendant field commanders shov; the mass murder
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procran of tho Third Roich havo boon introducod in ovldonco
with tho oxcoption of tho Co^.r.iissar Order in which tho
oxoctiting agency was not tho SD but tho arrjy itsolf.
'Official reports of subordinato units nornally furnish
a vast aiiiount of infonnation. Reports of individual in
stances of illegal acts ::iay however not be subnitted to
higher headquarters if for no other reason than that tho
suppression of such acts is tho province of tho subordinato
rnd their occurrence night bo a subject for criticism,
Also tho staff of high operational coiriands engaged in
extensive combat operations is much loss lilrely to bring
such matters to tho attention of tho commander than tho
staff of a lower command.
Other factors to bo considorod as to tho laiowlodgo of
criminal acts of tho SIPO and SD by defendants is tho tine,
tho localltioa, tho combat situation, tho oxtont of tho
activities, and tho nature of the command.
This, in brief, sumiviariz os the main factors considorod
and tho sources of Icnowlodgo appraised in dotormining tho
criminal responsibility of tho defendants in this case In
connection with activities of tho Einsatagruppon of tho
SIPO and SD. From this discussion it is apparent wo can:
draw no general presumpti'en as to their Icnowlodgo in this
natter and must necessarily go to tho ovidonco pertaining
to tho va.rious defendants to make a dotornlnation of this
question,
j.'ind it is further that to osts.bllsh tho
guilt of a defendant from connection with acts of tho SIPO
and SD by acquiosoonce, not only must knowledge bo estab-
lishod,. but tho tine of such Icnowlodgo must bo ostabllshod.
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Vjfhon V7G discuss tho ovidonco agninst tho various
dofondants^ wo shall troat with groator detail the
ovidonpQ rqla^iins thq activities of tho Einsatzgruppon
in tho counandg of thq ^ajijous dofondants, and to what
Gxtont, if any, such astivitios were known to and
acquioscod in or supported by then* •
t'
.i
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HITLER .J>1D THE VjEHRIyLVCHT
The defense has asserted that there was considerable
opposition to Hitler's plans and orders by the higher
military leadership. General Franz Haider, who was Chief
of the German General Staff from 1938 to 1942, testified
that Hitler's plans to invade the Sudetenland caused the
formation of a plot for a coup to overthrow Hitler, but
that this plot was abandoned because of the liunich Pact,
Be this as it may, the success of Hitler at Munich increased
his prestige with all circles of the German people. Including
the higher military leadership.
In 1939, Hitler advised certain of the high military
loaders of his decision to attack Prance by violating the
neutrality of the Low Countries. On 11 October 1939, von
Leeb wrote his commander in chief, von Brauchitsch,
Inclosing a memorandvim prepared by him advising against
this course of action. In It he argues that the Invasion
would develop into a long drawn out trench warfare, and
then continued:
-it Besides, wo will not bo in
a position to rally allies to our cause.'
Even, now, Italy is sitting on the fence,
and Russia has accomplished everything
it had aimed at by virtue of our victories,
and by this has again become a predominant
and directly decisive factor as far as
Central Europe is concorned. Furthermore,
Russia's attitude remains uncertain In
view of its continued diplomatic rolations
to the Western powers. The more v/o tie
ourselves down in the West the more
freedom the Russians will have for their
decisions. On the other hand, Belgium
and, in the course of the years, the
United States of junerica as well willjoin our enemies, and the Dominions will
exert all their strength to give effective
assistance to the mother coxmtry."
Thon, in discussing the political repercussions which would
follow from this proposed action, ho said:
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"Any vlolc.tlon of Belgium's
neutrali-^y is "bound to drive that comtry
into t^Q arms of France. Prance and
Belgium-v/ill then have one comirion foo5
Germany, which for the second time within
25 years, assaults neutral Belgium^
Germany, whoso government solemnly
vouched for and promised the preservation
of and respect for this neutrality only
a few wo'eks ago] I have already ela'boratod
under paragraph 1 on the fact that in such
a case it is highly proba"blG that France
will iramediately rush strong forces to the
aid of the Belgians, which means that there
will be heavy fighting already on Belgian
soil.
"If Germany, by forcing the issue,
should violate the neutrality of Holland,
Belgium, and Luxemburg, a neutrality v/hich
has been solemnly recognized and vouched
for by the Gorman government, this action
will necessarily cause oven those neutral
states to reverse their declared policy
towards the Reich, which up till nov/ showed
some measure of sympathy for the Gorman
Cause. The Reich, which cannot count on
Italy's or Russia-s military assistance,
will become increasingly isolated also '
economically.-- Sspoclrlly North /jnorica,
whoso population easily falls for such
propagand-a slogans, will become more
inclined to submit to England's and France's
influence."
Then on 51 October 1939 von Loob wroto von Brauchitsch
a lo"ttor in which he said;
"I consider the military annihilation
of the English, French, and Belgians a
goal which cannot bo attained at present.
For only if they are annihilated would thoy,
if attacked, bo ready for peace.
"To associate the succossgs in the
East v;ith the wishful thinking in" regard
to the West v/ould bo a fatal deviation from
reality.
"In tho political field, wo have
Poland as security in our hands, don't wo?
If that doesn't suit our opponents, then
lot them attack".
"The whole nf^-tion_is f a
de£p_longlng_f^r_p^a^e^ _Tt
th£ iF£ondlyi£ war and ro£ard£ 3^t__w^th no
rG£l3^n£ £f_syrn£aFhy wbat£0£V£r^ If Fho
lia2ort3yi£ an2;tEing_oTso,
Ere now £ookTn£ Forwa^rE £®£^£
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Fu£hror,_ti£C£U£o3thoJ
st_in£ti^vG^lj ^s iinpos£ihl£
5G£tro^ Fr£n£o_and__EngTand ?'.nd__thot
£n^ Eioro_oxt£n£iv0^pTcins njust £h£r£-
foro b£ hold In ab£yance« Ls a £oXiior,
£n£ Js2[^'£^£g5 £o£say__tho~sr.cio. ^ "
the Ji^uehrQr woro now to niakg aii
gn4 tg the presont sitijation, under eons
4ltiof|s ifi^hlc^ Vi^orQ jp gonie nigasupe
accoptablo no one would iritorprot this
as a sign of woalmbss or of yielding but
rather as rocognioing tho true status of
pov/or, Tho granting of an autonomy for
Czechoslovakia and allov/ing the romaindor
of Poland to stand as a nation would
probably moot with tho conpleto under
standing of tho ontiro Gorman poople,
Tho Puohror would then bo honored as a
PrincG of Poaco, not only by tho ontiro
Gorman pooplo, but assuredly also by
largo parts of tho world as woll.
"I an proparod to stand behind you
do£ira^l£ £^"n£C£S£aryT(Smphasis supplTod)
In splto of this, tho plans vi/ont ori for the invasion^
v/hich, howovor, was- dolayod lantil tho following Hay. Von
Boob toatifiod this dolay v/as brought about by tho offorts
of von Bock, Haldor, and hinaolf, in the hopo that tho
additional tino might allow a diplomatic sottlemont, Tho
' ^
roasons givdn for tho dolay woro puroly military, viz,,
that tho roads woro impassable, tho oquipmont dofoctivo,
otc. The moral phaso was not consldorod.
So it is cloar thoro was some opposition cmong tho
I
military loadorship to Hitlor's plans, but tho tragedy of
it is that thoso mon, in spito of their opposition, allowed
thonisolvos to bo used by him. Von Loob was asked by a
monbor of tho Tribunal why it was this loadorship was
impotent and holplosa against Hitler, to which ho replied:
"Hitler was a demon, ho was a
dovil. Gonoral Haldor has toatifiod
horo that you couldn't know what waa-
going on in his mind. That, perhaps,
is how it happonod that thoso wills
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which wore opposing "lihla ono will woro
too viroak to "oe suceossful. Above all
this v/ill was rcprosented in Qun top-
levol loadorship but wo could not got
at hiin. Thoro was no way of convincing
Hltlor. Ho Imow oyorything bottor than
ovorybody olso, and that is how disaster
took its course.
"If novi in rotrospoct you look back
on tho v/holo situation, ono night perhaps
think that v/o, tho high military loadors,
should havo formod a moro united front in
opposition to Kitlor. Lot's perhaps tako
the following caso, Horr von Brauchitsch
and the throe of us, tho thrco army group
comnandors, ono day confrontod Hitler and
toll hin, 'So far and no further.' Bohind
us is tho v/hole of the Gorman Army. I
don't bolievo that that would h'^vo made
a srong iz^iprossion on Hltlor. He would
havo had the four of us arrostod and put
into a concentration camp."
Tho testimony of General Haider, referred to by von Loeb,
was in response to a request that ho give briefly his
impression of Hltlor, and is as follows;
"This is a very difficult task.
A personality which was so unusual, is
difficult to sketch with very few words.
The picture which I gained of Hitler is
as follows : An unusual power of Intellect;
an amazingly quick comprehension; but
not a trained person who could adapt
himself to logical linos of thought; a
person with very strong emotional ton-
doncios; his decisions woro"conditioned
by what ho called intuition, that is his
emotions, but no clear logically thought-
out considerations; his Intollect also
included an amazing povror of imagination
and phantasy which In an astonishing
dcgreo had its roporcusslon in his linos
of thought or events; substantial parts
of his character wore a tremendous
tenacity and energy of wlll-pov/or which
also enabled hli;! to surmount all obstacles,
oven in minor matters. The thing that
nost ImpresEod no about Hitler v/as tho
conpleto absence of any ethical or moral
obligation; a. nan for whom thoro was
no limits which ho could not transcend by
his action or his will; ho know only
his purpose and the advantage that ho
pursued; that for him was the Imperative
call. As far as it seemed to me, ho was
a very lonely nan who lacked tho capacity
to enter into personal contact with other
huizian beings and thus to relax and to
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roloaso his porsonallty. Ho was thus
always torn hy tons ion v/hich nado
cooperation with bin oxtroiiioly difficult.
I was not prepared for your question.
Your Honor. This is a question about
v/hich nany books will yot bo written,
and I shall bo grateful to your Honors
If you would bo-satisfied with this brief
sketch of n^ino."
In tho closing statorjont of General von Loob in behalf
of all tho defendants, ho referred repeatedly to tho
difficulties confronting then, saying;
"However, in tho Third Reich, under
tho dictatorship of Hitler, v;o found
ourselves faced v/ith a devolopnont which .
was in contrast to our principles and
nature. It is not true to say that v/o
as officers changed - the donands reado of
us bocaieo difforont.
"Wo sought to opposo this evolution
under tho Third Reich, but wo lackod tho
moans v/hich might havo boon offoctivo
undor a dictatorship."
hgain ho said;
"In regard to Hitler's Instructions,
which wont against our huieano and soldierly
foollngs, wo wore never moroly his tools
v;ithout a will of our ovm. Wo did
opposo his instru.ctions as far as wo
doomed this to bo possible or advisablo,
and wo havo to.n od thoir wording down
and rondorod thorn ineffoctive or mitigated
then in practice."
To von Loob, Kitlor was a "demon -x- -k- -x- a dovil", and
to Haider ho had "a comploto absence of any othical or
moral obligation", Tho demands ho made of tho defendants
may have boon "In contrast to thoir principles and natures",
and against thoir "hiamano and soldiorly foolings", but
tho inescapable fact ronains that in part at least, if
not to tho whole, thoy pormittod thoir conscioncos and
opinions to bocomo subordinate to his v/ill, and it was
this which has placod such groat and Inoradicablo shano
upon tho Gorman arms.
Wo roalizo tho foolings of professional prido, of
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c-Bbition to succeed in their profession of orns^ of fear
for thoir personal safety or of reprisals against tholr
fanilios, thoir love of country, their soldiers' concept
of ohodicncc, and, indeed, the ingrainod respect of the
Gornan for those in authority ovor hin, wore factors in
their docisions. Wo aro aware of the tendoncy towards
degeneration of "civilized" warfare in the uodorn concept
of "total" war, and of the war rsadnoss that engulfs all
pooplo of belligerent powers.
Those.considerations cannot excuse, but it is propor
to consider and Judge in any case the offenses charged
in the light of thoir historical and psychological
background and in thoir coinoctlons with all surrounding
circiiu-.istoncGs.
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IvTLKEUi VON L5SB
Field Marshal -i/ilhelm von Leeb was born in 1876, entered
service in 1695, and had various promotions until he became a
Field Marshal in 1940. He was Commander-in-Chief of Army
Oroup North in the campaign against Russia until 16 January
1942, when he resigned primarily because of interference in
technical matters by Hitler and was then placed in the Fuehrer
Reserve.
The Cerman Array, prior to the establishment of array
groups, was based on Heeres or ground forces which were com
posed of armies and subordinate units. The armies were both
administrative and operational. When the army group was
established, the staff provided was much smaller than the
staff of the subordinate armies, according to the testimony
of Kuechler, one-third or one-half the size of the staff of
an army. Judicial authority did not extend through the com
mander of the army group. He had no representative of the
Quartermaster (General who directly controlled matters of sup
ply. The Quartermaster General did not operate directly
through the army group but through the armies and army group
rear areas where there were representatives of his depart
ment on the staff.
A commander of the army group in the early stages of
its development had no staff of experts for supervision of
prisoner of war affairs which was directly under the
Quartermaster General and his subordinates. Nor did the
economic agencies of the Reich operate 'through the army
group. The armies and commanders of army group rear areas
had exports on thoir staffs to deal with these matters.
During the period of the defendant von Leeb's command
of Army Group North the duties imposed upon him were almost
exclusively operational and his headquarters and staff were
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strictly oporr.tipnal In their fmctions.
SxocBtivo power r.t tho b.ginnlns of the Rusaiari ccuypaicn
was conferred directly upon tho '^ r^y con.,andors and the ^
cor...andcrs of the arriy group roar areas. It was providodi
howovor, that tho coin.,:.ndor-in-chiof of an arffly group night
issue orders to his subordinates in tho field of executive
power, in other words, his authority in this field was
moro in tho naturo of r-irrh-h •^-r^ • *.
y,,.- • to intorvono that a diroct
rosponsibility.,
irn. po.or to Inlorvooo "olloooa tho goiioi.o.l pr.ttoni ot
M. oooooM outhotit, t„tort,o,oto I.ovortl.oloo,;
authority and rosponsIbilR i--r
....e to many adi-jinistrativo matters
woro directly vostod in Loob's onbnrd-fv.o+-
u-uDordinatos. It v;as common for
tho OKH and staff offlcorc of th- mcR "njj. Miw udl to issuo ordorc directly
to those subordinates \7ith.-'ntn.uit such ordors always being submittod
to army group hoadquarters for informntion xr, • .
-i-L uimaLion. In other inctancos,
orders- addressed to subord-tnnf.so.suDOxdinato units v/oro sent though
the army group. In such o-.oos tno army group headquarters
acted as a for^.-varding rponn.r ,.,•? 4-i •
•b nc^. , with, implomontation of ordors
resulting from their boxng put into command channels, and
not from action on the part of the defendant.
Tho defendant .s army group had moved frora East frussia
to Leningrad. Ho had under his command from five to six .
hundred thousand soldiers. His oporati-ens were of groat
nagnitudo. Thoy started with the opening of the Russian
campaign on 21 Juno 1941 and his activities terminated ' •
oj,iici'-lly on 16 J,,nu r^ 1942. In this coriparativoly brief
period of txmo ho had moved a great amy over a vast ter
ritory tindor tho arduous conditions of combat. Ls str.tod'
his function was operational. Hany administrative duties
had boon loft to his subordinate art;ilos and his army groavo
roar aroa. Ho and his staff alike would have the right to
assumo that tho conmandoi-s ontrustod with such actdnistrativo
i f
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%functions would see to their proper execution. Under such
conditions it must be accepted that certain details of ac- •
tivities x^ithin the sphere of hie subordinates would not be
brought to his attention.
The evidence ^establishes that criminal orders were ex
ecuted by units subordinate to the defendant and criminal
acts were carried out by agencies within his command. But
it is not considered under the situation outlined that
criminal responsibility attaches to him merely on the theory
of subordination and over-all command. He must be shown
both to have had knowledge and to have been connected with
such criminal acts either by way of participation or criminal
acquiescence.
Aside from the charge of Crimes against Peace hereto
fore disposed of in this opinion, the charges against him
relate to tZie period he was Commander-in-Chief of Army Group
North, think these changes may be broken down into the
following general headings; (l) The Commissar Order; (2) Crimes
against Prisoners of War; (3) The Barbarossa Jurisdiction
Order; (4) Crimes against Civilians; (5) Pillage of Public
and Private Property; (6) Criminal Conduct Pertaining to the
Siege of Leningrad. We shall discuss these serlrtlm.
1. The Commissar Order.
We have discussed the criminality of the Commissar Order
Von Leeb was present at the meeting held by Hitler in harch
1941 when the proposed extermination of the OommlssarB was
siinounced. He considered this to be in violation of inter
national law and, as well, to be stupid in that it tended
to defeat its own purpose. He discussed the matter with von
Brauchitsch and lodged a protest with him. Von Brauchitsoh
assured him he would do all he could to prevent the issuance
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\Of tiie order but notwithstanding this, it was later Issued
by the OKH. Von heeb as Commander of Army Crroup North and
von Bock of Army Group Center and von Kundstedt of Array
Group South were opposed to it. Von Leeb made further pro
test to von Brauchitsch on the occasion of the letter's
visits in July and September 1941 and likewise protested
to Keitel on two occasions. Keitel replied he v/ould do his
best to obtain a cancellation of the order. Later, pursuant
to the objection made by the commanders of the army groups,
General hueller, Genercal for Special Assignments under Com
mander-in-Chief of the Array, von Brauchitsch, wrote the OKN
on 23 September 1941 as follows:
"It is requested to check on the neces
sity of the carrying out of the 'Commissar'
decree in its present form, considering the
development of the situation. Coramranders,
Commanding Officers and the troops them
selves report that the will to fight on
port of the Russians could be weakened if
the Commissars, who no doubt are the pil
lars of the embittered and stubborn re
sistance would find it easier to give up the
fight, to surrender or to desert.
"At present the prevailing situation is
such that every Commissar faces his death in
any case; that is why a large number of them
is fighting to the last and also forces the
Red Army soldiers to resist stubbornly by
the most brutal means.
"The comb-^t situction being what it is
at present, when here and there the Russian
side shows ? slight weakening due to the
large losses, the diminishing supply of per
sonnel and material, the mixing of units and
the indecisiveness of the leadership, a pa
ralysis of the will to fight generally by
breaking the resistance of the Commissars
might have a not inconsiderable success and,
under circumstances may Srive much blood.
"The achievement of the goal should be
attempted in proper form by all kinds of
propaganda by varied means.
—'^ ^6„Commande.r-in-Ch_ie£ £f„the__Army _p1_80
beli^v^s_thay jth^ ab^v^ vi^w^ H^lch hrye_Jbeen
report^d_to him personally by all ^my Grouos
deperve consideration frpm3_milltary poInV*"'
and a ye consideration £f the"
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_tr^r_tm_en^ _of_the_Commi_ss_^r_B ac_cord£d_to_
w-to-now ^eeins expedient to_h.lm^"
(Emph.nsis suppliedT
It will be noted this rGcoiiiraend'"'.tion Is based, wholly upon
military considerations without pjiy discussion of the moral
ph^^se which of course would not have interested Hitler.
This recommendation was submitted to Hitler and a notation
was thereupon made In Jodl's writing, as follows: "The
Fuehrer has refused any change In the decree concerning
treatment of Russian Coramlss-rs Issued up to now."
It is apparent that Mueller's letter corrobcr'^tes von
Leeb's testimony reg-'rding the opposition to this order by
the Commanders-ln-Chlef of these Army Groups.
V;hen this order was issued, it w-s directed by OKH to
the armies In these three groups, who however received copies
for informational purposes. In other words, the Army Group
had nothing to do with the passing on of this order to sub-
ordln:\tc units beyond the administrative functions of for
warding it to them.
However, in addition to his protests to his superiors,
von Leeb discussed this order with subordln:-te ccmm'^nders
rnd let tlicra know of his opposition to it. He also mention
ed the Maintenance of Disolpline Order Issued by von
Brauchltsch in an effort to thw rt as f^r a.s he could the
enforcement of the Coramlssrr Order.
As a practical purpose, what other action was open to
him? could not revoke this order coming as it did from
superiors, even from the head of the st-^te. Had he
undert-.ken to do so, this would have been a fla-.r-^nt dis-
obedionoe of orders. In discussing the resignation, he sa.ld:
"* * *In addition, as r Commander, I knew
that -^11 Commanders I t-lkeci to were 'gainst
this order ^nd therefore I hoped that at
fv.
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least it would not be carried out in its
full measure ynd if I had resigned at that
time then I would have saved myself in the
oneapest manner possible but at the same
time I would have given up the struggle
against Hitler and for the rest such an ap
plication for resignation would probably
not have made the slightest impression on
hitler. In addition it would probably have
become known why I resigned because I
couldn't suddenly say, 'I am ill- I can't
go on any longer.' "
He was then asked as to his present Impressions /about
this question, to which he replied;
^ have had ample time and opportunity
about this order and about what wedid at that time under the pressure of re
sponsibility and here I must admit I don'tI Imow even today any better way. At that
^ time as far as it was possible at all, we
^ tacitly sabotaged the order and all de
pended on our doing it tacitly. I really
don t know how we could do it differently
^ today."
This order had been passed down to his subordinate
units, tne 18th Army under Kuechler, the 16th Army under
Bush, and the 4th Panzer Group under Hoeppner. And in
spite of von Leeb's attitude, the reports of units in
these subordinate commands indicate the murder of many of
these functionaries. It may be that in some Incidents
the figures were fictitious or exaggerated but in spite
of this, we find there were many cases of these atrocities.
But we cannot find von Leeb guilty in this particular. He
did not disseminate the order. He protested against it
and opposed it in every way short of open and defiant
refusal to obey it. If his subordinate commanders dis
seminated it and permitted its enforcement, that is their
responsibility and not his.
2. Crimes against Prisoners of War.
During the period of von Leeb's command of Army Group
North, prisoners of war in his area were under the general
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supervision of the Quartermaster &enerol. He in turn was sub
ject to the supervision of the commander-in-ohief of the OKH,
at that time von Brauchitsch, who in turn was subject to tiie
over-all command of Hitler through the OKW. The Quartermaster
General carried out his functions through subordinates in the
armies and the army group rear areas. In both there were of
ficers subordinated in part to him but primarily subordinated
to the commander of the armies :nd the army group rear rneas
to whose staffs they belonged. Eesponsibility for prisoner
of w^r affairs w.s therefore directly vested in the comm.anders
of the armies and of the army group rear areas. Direct re-
sponsibilioy in these matters by-passed the commander-in-
chief of the army group. While he had the right to issue
orders to his subordinates concerning such matters, he also
had the right to assume that the officers in command of
those units would properly perform the functions which had
been entrusted to them by higher authorities, both as to the
proper care of prisoners of war or the uses to which they
might be put. He also had the right as heretofore pointed
out, to assume that certain uses to wnich they were put were
legal under the conditions existing m the war with Russia. As
we have stated, their use in dangerous occupations or in
dangerous localities was obviously illegal under internation
al law but there is no subst-ntial evidence tha.t such il
legal uses of prisoners of war were ever brought to the at-
tention of the defendant.
The only evidence th.-^t the use of Russian prisoners of
war to clear away mines was ever called to tiie attention of
the defendant is contained in Rebuttal Exhibit 3, NOKW-3337
Book I, page 4. This document states that:
"This morning the C in C of Army drouD
Nortn visited the Panzer Group,
"The essential content of the conference
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ww?s about as follows:"
The pertinent entry reads;
* ^Because of the many mines laid in the
houses they are not yet being entered (a
• It ^^i^oners are used toclear away the mines.
This document was signed by Golling, iSajor, GSC, Liaison
Officer OKIij with Panzer G-roup 4,
It IS considered that this entry is too vague and sub
ject to too many interpretations to establish that the defen
dant von Leeb was advised of this use of prisoners of war and
consented thereto.
To prove von Leeb's knowledge of the neglect of prisoners
^ of war It is urged that his Chief of Staff, Brennecke, at
tended a conference at Orscha on 13 November 1941 where the
* question of food supplies of prisoners of war was broached
by the Cnief of Staff of the Army Group Center. It is to
be noted that the record of this conference is found in the
files of the 18th Army, one of the units subordinate to von
Leeb and directly responsible for prisoner of wr,r affairs.
The feport in auestion on this meeting, however, merely
states that Army Group Center "points out in particular that
the prisoners of war actually constitute necess.ry addition
al labor, were, however, unable to work in their present
condition, but fell to a large extent into a state of ex-
haustion".
Nothing appears in this document as to the condition of
prisoners of war within the area of the Army Group North,
nor does it appear that any report was made to the defendant
von Leeb concerning the matter.
It IS also urged that the defendant must have known of
the neglect of prisoners of war from seeing them upon the
roads. This is a broad assumption. . The condition of these
prisoners on the road as heretofore pointed out might well
Im
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have been due to tbeir condition when captured and not to
any neglect of their captors at that time,
A Careful examination of all the evidence on this sub
ject does not establish either that the defendant von Leeb
was guilty of neglect of prisoners of Wer or responsible
for their improper use within the abed of his command.
There is proof in the record that Red Army soldiers
were illegally executed within the area of the defendant
von Leeb and to show his connection therewith and responsi
bility therefor, our attention has been invited to certain
exhibits.
The first of these is an order of 13 September 1241.
An examination of this exhibit shows an ordei" issued by the
(3-eneral for Special Assignments with the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army, to the 6th Army which was not under von Leeb's
command. ThL^a order was sent to army groups for information,
' From these facts neither transmittal via. the defendant von
Leeb nor enforcement of this order can be inferreo.,
A further order of the OKH, signed von Erauchitech,
dated 25 O^Jtober 1941 is also called to our attention, and
^ it is stated that this was obviously distributed by the Army
Oroup North in view of the divisional'order of the 12th Infan-
f try Division of the 16th Army which was part of the Army
Crroup North, and a somewhat similar order of the 281st
Security Division T^hich was under the command of the Rear
Area of Army G-roup North. However, examination of these ex
hibits shows neither the actual order which was suppo'sed to
1
jiave been distributed by the defendant von Leeb nor that such
an order was ever transmitted by him to the channels of com
mand. The order itself does not in fact show the distribu
tion made of the order or that it was in fact ever distri
buted. ,/
.»- •
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We are therefore unable to find from the evidence that
the defendant von Leeb was criminally connected with, knew
of, or participated in the illegal execution of Red Army
soldiers within his area.
3. The Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.
This was a Fuehrer Order received by the Array Group
under Leeb's command. There is nothing to show that it
was ever directed to subordinate units under him. It has
been contended that this was an order pertaining to judicial
authority and would not concern an army group and therefore
would have been transmitted direct to those commanders who
had judicial authority. Examination of the order itself
however shows that only In part did it pertain particularly
to judicial authority. Basically, it was an order pertain
ing to the conduct and discipline of troops and of such a
nature to be of the highest significance to any officer in
command of troops, including the army group commanders. The
order itself charges troop officers with the responsibility
of informing subordinate officers.
An entry in the war diary of the Army Group North
shows that it was transmitted with the OKH order of 1 June
1941 to subordinate units. There is no evidence in the record
to show that the defendant von Leeb expressed more than a
disapproval of the order and that was on the basis that it
threatened the discipline of the army. We must conclude
from the evidence that this order was put into the chain of .
command by von Leeb'e action.
It was a criminal order, at least in part. It was
further an order that was at best ambiguous in respect to
the authority conferred upon a Junior officer to shoot in
dividuals who were merely suspected of certain acts. Tnere
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Is nothing to show that in the transmittal of this order, it
ws.s in any way clarified or that instructions were given in
any way to prevent its illegal application. The evidence
establishes that von Leeb implemented this order by passing
it into the chain of command. Coming directly through him' ,
in the chain of command, it carried the weight of hie
authority as well as that of his superiors. The record in
this case shows that it was criminally applied by units sub
ordinate to him. Having set this instrument in motion, he
must assume a measure of responsibility for its illegal
application.
4, Crimes against Civilians.
This charge derives from the activities of Einsatzgrup-
pe A which was assigned to and operated within the area of
the Army Group North.
With regard to Field Marshal von Leeb's responsibility
for crimes committed by the Elnsatzgruppen within his area of
command, as we have stated, it would be immaterial whether
he knew that his government was carrying out a program of
mass murder and cooperated with it, or whether he was una-
T^ore that there was such a program entrusted to the police
by the authority of the state but still pormlttod acts of
mass murdor to bo oarriod out.
It is urged, that von Leeb knew of the extermination
program of the German government entrusted to the Elnsatz
gruppen. To prove this three documents have been called to
our attention. The first of these is an OKH order of
28 April 1941; the second is an OKH order of 9 ^ug, 1941. Roth of
these orders were shown to have been received by the Army
Group North and it can be presumed that communications from
this source would be brought to the attention of the commLinder
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Vof an army group. However, neither of these documents shows
that extermination program of the Third Reich. The third
document upon which his knowledge of such a program is al
leged to have "been based is prosecution exhibit 367, The
significant pert of the document is found on page 214 of
Document Book 6-0. This was an Indosure to an operational
order from the SIPO and SD concerning the use of the Sin-
sat zkommandos. This indosure, dated 7 October 1941, is
referred to on page 209 where it is said that directives
were completed in agreement with the High Command of the
Army. However, there is nothing to show that the indosure
was ever transmitted to the Array-Group North or that it was
not in fact a draft of a contemplated order. It Is a fixed
rule of Interpretation that an ambiguous document must be con
strued most favorably to the defendant. While this document
definitely shows illegal activities of the Security Police,
the proof does not establish that it was ever received by
the defendant von Leeb,
The proof relied upon to show his knovjledge of these
criminal acts of the Elnsptzgruppen against the civilian
population within the area of his command is in part con
tained in reports of various officers of Einsatzgruppe . A
to their superiors in Berlin. These reports were not sent
to von Leeb nor through his headquarters. They are evi
dence to establish that certain extermination activities
were carried out by this organization. However, they are of
a nature which must be viewed with careful scrutiny. In
many respects as to time and place they are extremely vague.
A report asserts that 135,000 people had been liquidated by
the Einsatzgruppe A but where these liquidations occurred
is subject to oonsiderable doubt. We know from other proof
that some 40,000 Jews were liquidated in Riga, apparently by
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Einsatzrjruppo A, but this liquidation occurrod in tho ter
ritory imder the Reichs Co;:iroissar, Ostland, and outside
the territory of tho defendant♦
Other than the mass liquidation which occurred at
Kowno, the evidence does not establish any liquidations
v/ithin his area v/hich wore brought to tho attention of
tho defendant. This action, apparently inspired by^the
Einsatzgruppen, was however carried out as a pogrom,
credited to a'local self-defense orranisation of Latvians,
Hearing of this action, von Locb took action to prevent
any rocurronco of a similar nature within tho area of
^ the 16th Army whore Kowno was locatod.
Reports containing incidents of illegal o:^ecutions by
tho SIRO in connection v/ith soc^urity operations were r.iade
from subordinate units in von Loob*s command to tho Arny
Group Roar Areas, Armies, and Corps Headquarters. But
it is not established that those reports wore transraittod
to tho headquarters of the Army Group North or roportod
to von Leob by his stajif.
V/o are thcroforo unable to find from tho ovidonco sub-
mlttod that tho defendant von Loeb had Imowlodgo of tho
murder of civilians within his area by tho Einsat2G2:'^ ''-Ppon
or a.cquicccod in such actiyitios.
ITor is it ostablishod from the ovidonco that the
dofondant participated in the rocruitmont of slave labor
for the Roich. The document relied on in this connection
is a report to tho offoct that In a given period, a
number of civilians wore sent from tho Army Group North
to the Roich for labor. Locb was in command for only a
pnrt of the period covered by tho report. Furthormoro,
the docuu-nont does not establish tho invol^jntary nature
of tho recruitment.
JT
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5, Pillage of Public and Private Property.
The prosecution relies upon two orders to sustain this
charge. The first of these orders is from the 12th Panzer
Division on 11 November 1941, directing an operation against
certain villages "used by the partisans as a base of opera
tions" , with instructions to seize the cattle, horses, and
chickens and most of the food, but further directing a small
amount of food be left for the population at-the direction
of the Commander of the operations. vJe cannot say this order •
was illegal.
Likewise an order of 39th Corps issued on 7 December 1941,
regarding a forced retreat, called for the destruction of
food and fodder that could not be taken along in the retreat.
The destruction of these foodstuffs would tend to hamper the
advancing enemy and we cannot find it wss not justified under
the exigency of the situation.
V7e do not find any criminality under this ph^^se of the
case.
6. Criminal Conduct Pertaining to the Siege of Leningrad,
Leningrad was encircled and besieged. Its defenders
end the civilian population were in great straits and it w^„.s
feared the population would undertake to flee through the
G-erman lines. Orders were issued to use artillery to prevent
any such attempt at the greatest possible distance from our
own lines by opening fire as early as possible, so tnat tne
infantry, if possible, is spared shooting on civiliana". We
find this was known to and approved by von Leeb. Was it an
unlawful order?
"A belligerent commander may lawfully
lay siege to a. place controlled by the
enemy and endeavor by a. process of isola
tion to cause its surrender. The propriety
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of attempting to reduce It "by starvation
is not questioned. Hence the cutting off
of every source of sustenance from with
out is deemed legitimate. It is said
that if the commander of a besieged place
expels the non-combatants, in order to
lessen the number of those who consume
his stock of provisions, it is lawful,
though an extreme measure, to drive them
back, so as to hasten the surrender."(Hyde, Vol. 3, Sec. 656, pp. 1802-1803)
r- f
We might wish the law were otherwise but we must administer
it as we find it. Consequently, we hold no criminality at
taches on this charge.
For the reasons above stated we find this defendant
guilty under Count Three of the Indictment for criminal re
sponsibility in connection with the transmittal and apolica-
tion of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order. Under Control
Council Law Ho. 10 it is provided that superior orders do
not constitute a defense but may be considered in mitiga
tion of an offense.
vJe believe that there is much to be said for the defen
dant von Leeb by way of mitigation. He was not a friend or
follower of the Nazi Party or its ideology. He was a soldier
and engaged in a stupendous campaign with responsibility for
hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and a large indigenous
population spread over a vast area. It is not without signif
icance that no criminal order has been introduced in evi
dence which bears his signature or the stamp of his approval.
We find on the evidence in the record, and for the
reasons above stated, the defendant is guilty under Count
Three of the Indictment, and not guilty under Count Two
thereof.
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The defendant Reinhardt v/as horn 1 March 1887 at
Bautzen in Saxonlao Pie served as a jonior officer in World
War I and after the war, remained v/ith the Reichswehrc As
a Major General he participated in the invasion of Polniid
as Commander of the 4th Panaer Division and of Belgium and
the Netherlands as Commanding General of the 41st Panzer
Corps, V/ith this corps he took part in the invasion of
Yugoslavia, Still coitmianding the 41st Panzer Corps, he
entered the campaign against Russia, the corps "being sub
ordinated to Army Group North. On 5 October 1941, he was
appointed Commander of Panzer Group 3, In March 1942 he
was appointed Comrnander-ln-Chief of the 5rd Panzer Army which
position he retained lontil appointed Commander-in-Chief of
Army Group Center on 16 August 1944. Duo to difforencos with
Hitler concerning his conduct of nporations, ho was relieved
of this command on 26 January 1045. In 1940 he was promoted
to Lieutenant General of Panzer Troops and in 1942 to Full
General# The dofondant Reinhardt is charged under all
tour Counts of the Indictment, Counts I and IV having
been disposed of, there remains to bo considered the question
of his guilt under Counts II and III which charge res-
poctivolys V/ar Crimes and Crimes against Ilumanityj Crimes
against onemy belligoronts and prisoners of war, and War
Crimos and Crimes against Humanity; Griraos against Civilians,
The Commissar Ordor
The Commissar Order v/ns transmitted to Reinhardt by
Gonoral Hoeppnor, the Commander of Panzer Group 4, and
Rolnhardt thoroaftor communicated It orally to his Divisional
ndors# lie testified that when ho transmitted it toCormna
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^ his divisions^ ho dir-octod orally that it was not to ho
carriod out. Ho tostifi-jd furthor that Goncral Hooppnor
was opposod to the ordor and that ho, Roinhardt, protostod
it to Gonoral Hoeppnorj that Gonoral Hooppnor protostod to
tho Array Group under von Loob and prosuraably, the protest
was carriod back frora the Array Group to the Co^vr.andGr-in-
Ohiof of tho Arraioa. Notwithstanding this allogod rcslstanco
and repudiation of tho order, it appears frora tho docuraonts
that reports of exocutod corariiissars shortly began to bo
sent in frora subordinate divisions and that thoy wero sort
on by tho corps«
Tho Russian carfpaign began 22 Juno 1941. The 269th
Infantry Division reported on 9 July to tho :iXXXI Corps
that 34- PolltrLilcs wore liquidatod. On the sarao day tho
XXXXI Gorjjs reportod to Panzer Group 4 a total of 97
Politrul<:s had been executed in the Corps area up to 8 July,
The balance of 63 liquidatod coraraissars doubtless fire
chargeable to tho tiiroo roraaining divisions of tho Corps,
tho 1st and 6th Panzor Divisions and tho 36th Motorized
Division. On 10 July 1941, Paiizor Group 4 reported to
Array Group North that up to 8 July 1941, 101 corar.iissars
I had boon liquidatod. Out of a total of IQi oxecutod
^ Politruks, 97 woro liquidatod by Hoinhardt*s XXXXI Corps,
and tho balance of 4 by the LVI AK of Panzer Group 4.
At tho tino of. tho report, Panzor Group 4 consisted only
of XXXXI ilK and tho LVI Thereafter, 71 coraralssars
wore executed by the 19th of July by Panzor Group 4,
Wo havo nontioned that Roinhardt testified that ho orally
directod that this order bo not carried out, A second
defense, which is supported by tho tostinony of tv/o
witnesses, Bruns, the Intelllgonce Officer of Hoeppnor*s
Panzer Group 4, and Mueller, an ,ID0 of Bruns, is to the
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— • (Effect that all of theso reports wore fictitious. The
testimony might ho noro credihlo if they had not drawn such
fantastic conclusions as that Ilooppnor clearly expressod
his repudiation of the Commissar Ordor hy having Bruns
road it to tho Corps Commandora and later that ho expressod
it by gesticulation, Muollor was more definite as to
Hoeppnor's rejection of the ordor but it is not possible
for tho Tribunal to beliove Iri the face of theso reports
that commissars wero not shot pursuant to this ordor within
tho area of Heinn^rdt's coiomand, Tho order was a criminal
order on its face, and ono v/hich under the Gorman military
regulations and certainly under Intornational law should
^ not havo boon passed down by oithor Hooppner or Roinhardt,
If intornational law is to heve any offoctlvonoss, high
commanding officers whon thoy are directed to violate it
by comi-aitting murder, must havo the courage to act, in
definite and unriistakablo terms, so as to indicate thoir
repudio-tlon of such an oro.or, Tho proper report to havo
boon mado from division to army group level v/hen a request
was ma.do from tho top level to report tho number of copmlssars
Icillcd, would ha.vo boon that this unit does not murder
I onomy prisoners of war.
Counsel for tho defendant, in his brief, makes tho
following statomonts
"War has its own laws, ovon more than
poacotimo, Ono of tho most inoomprohonsiblo
laws of war is that certain nows spreads
through mysterious channels and with un—
beliovablo rapidity over entire fronts,
entire iirLiios and whole countries, that
it even spreads from one's own front
line to that of the oneiey, and It can
nevor bo found out how this was possible.
Of course, this also happynod with such
an extraordinary order as tho Commissar
Ordor, Several witnesses testified that
it was known among the Russians oven at
an oarllor date than among our soldiers
in tho front lino,"
&-•
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mUnless the order had been-coniiaunicated ratiher- extenslFely^
at.d. as a pcliey down to low levels and even to the troops ^
it is difficult to understand how it would sweep the entire
Russian front♦ Tl^e obvious explanation for this is that it
became kno^/n because of its inplonentatron.
That the dv^fense of fictitious reports may itself be
fictitiaus is sug^^estod by the activity report of one of
Reinhardt*s divisions. The 36th infantry Division on 3
July 19UI before thxe need for any fictitious reports ivas
created by a top level inquiry^ notes the capture of Latvian
and Russian soldiers and that tv/o political commissars were
eliminated during the advance. On U July, a political
commissar who protended to bo a sergeant was eliminated# On
6 July, three commissars v/ere eliip.inated and on I6 September,
a captured Politruk of a Russian Rifle Regiment was eliriiinated.
It is not quite comprehensible why the shooting of these
five commissars on three different days is reported unless
the executions actually occurred.
In January 19U2 an activity report of the 35th Infantry
Division, subordinate to Roinhardt, contains the follo'wings
I
"... The reason for the will to fight
may be found primarily in the fact that
well in advance the enemy learns how the
Kommissars and political leadors are
treated when captured by the Germans.
The mistake of drawing attention to
this has been made even in German
propaganda leaflets. It woulb have
been better to keep the treatment of
the Kommissars a secret. It would
have sufficed to transport them sep
arately to the rear, to a camo specially
established for this purpose by th^
Corps, and to take them 00 task only then
and there,"
The Tribunal finds that Reinliardt passed on this criminal order
and bears responsibility for its execution in his area.
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Tho Commando Order ^ A-
Wo havo discussod this criminal order gonerally in a
precoding part of this opinion. A copy of this ordor was
sont to the 3rd Pa.nsor Amy, Tho War Diary of this Amy
for 27 Octobor 1942 shows it was roceivod, Roinhardt, at
this time, v;as in command of tho 3rd Po.nzer Army, On 28
OctohGr, the 9th Corps, subordinato to tho 3rd Panzer Army,
notes the ordor roceivod in its War Diary, . 'Wo tako no
stock in tho dofonse' that this ordor was not to bo effoctivo
In tho cast. That the 3rd Panzer Army was of tho opinion
that it \Yas applicable in tho oast, appears from tho War
Diary of this army for 18 November 1942, which is several
v/eoks after tho rocolpt of the .order. In that V/ar Diary
it is stated:
"Variohs difficulties havo arisen conoorning
tho GXQQutl.m of tho Fuehrer ordor of 21
October relative to the sheeting of terrorists
and groups of bandits. The Pz, army, asks
tho Group to clarify above all, whothor
this order Vol. lib, 30a., moi'oly concerns
British terror groups or whothor it also
a.ppllos to tho bands in tho occuplod area,
£bo ht"tltudej;__thot 5_until_a_now__0KW_docre£
_io_publl_3h£dj^ whTch ls__ln £^£S£Q£''^ „^-
Handlt^ £^£ £'^ £'^ _'^ £ £"^£^^_^£
i^^£y£'h9'^£ Bandits who voluntarily
surrondor v;lthout being forced to do so by
their situation, will be treated as PW*s,
iUi order will bo issued to the troops on
this subject. (unph-asis supplied)
That tho army coneidorod the Counando Order of general
application is shov^n by the emphasized portion of tho
abovo quotation, that until otherv/lse advised, tho order
was to bo carried out against mon In uniform. Another entry
In the V/ar Diary of tho 3rd Panzer Army referring to this
same situation roads as follov/ss
"Until new regulations of OKW are pub
lished, bandits who surrender voluntarily
without being forced by circunstanoGS,
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v/111 bo troatoO. as PW's, All other
bandits, also tho unifornod onos, will
bo shot.
"This order will be dostroyed after
reading, this ordor will not bo passed
on in writings"
It v;'as a crininal order, Roinhardt passed it down in tho
chain of co/njand.
It nay bo stated as a natter soraov/hat in nitigation and
as shov/ing the personal attitiicie of tho defendant Heinhardt,
that in hovoubor 1943 he issued an ordor that parachutists
are lawful conbatants and are to bo treatod as prisoners
of war» That v/as at a time whon tho Gorman Army was not so
flushed with succoss and v/hon it was a littlo noro inclined
to soften tho troatnont noted out to tho Russians. The
Tribimal has noted it as being a rnattor proper, at least
for considoration, on tho question of mitigation. It should
further bo noted in this connection that 'it does not appear
that Reinhardt, though ho rocoivod it, over passed on
literally cr in substance tho notorious Roichonau Order.
Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of War
ordor from tho CoLr.iandQr-ln-Chief of tho Arnios,
providing that ninoa wore to bo dotoctod and cloarod by
Russian priaonors of war in ordor to spare Gonoan blood, v/as
issued on 29 October 1941, This ordor was tro-nsnittod In
tho aroa of Army Group North and v/as inplomontod in
Roinhardt*s area. His LIX Corps issued an ordor providing;
"If It is suspected that roads or places
are mined; priaonors of war or tho local
population aro to walk in front or clear
tho mines,"
The activity report of tho 3rd Panzor Army, dated 15
Leconbor 1943, notos that there were five prisoners In
Lula'-;" 230 who were requostod for mine cloarlng and that
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Dulag 230 was inforrned accordingly, A report sent by tho
LIX Corps to tho 3rd Panzor Army covering tho months of
Jarmary, Pobruary, March-, and May 1943, relative to tho
usG of prisoners of war, for thoso months rospoctlvoly
shov/s tho following I 246 in supply units, 104 for billot
and field fortification construction; 193 in supply units, ^
25 for billot and fiold fortifications; 196 in troop supply
units and 183 for billot and fiold fortifications; 175 in
ti^oop supply services and 11 for billet and field fortifi
cations, On 6 January 1944, the 3rd Panzor Army furnished
40 prisonors of war to an SS unit for fiold fortification
work at the front, A report of tho 83rd Infantry Division
in tho 5rd Panzor Amy shov;;3 25 prisonors of war put to
work by tho Second Riflo Battalion wero killed while
working. An activity report of the 3rd Panzor Army states
that on 4 Octobor 1943, 200 prisonors of- v/ar wore used
on field fortifications. Nu-ierous other documents show
tho uso uf prisonors of v^'ar on field fortifications and
at tho front, their uso being so general that v/o conclude
it was tho policy of tho 3rd Panzer Army under Roinhardt
to uso prisonors of war for that purpose.
An order signed by Roinhardt as Commandor-in-Chiof
of the 3rd Panzer Army, bated 18 October 1942, confirms
✓
this conclusion in every respect. Under the heading.
Labor Allocation of Prisoners of War and Civilians, he
states s
"The urgent need for Prisoners of war
in the zone of operations and for tho
economy and armamcjnt industry at home
requires a thorough raid planned organi
zation of the labor allocation of
prisoners of War,"
We do not find all of the above uses of prisonors of
v/ar criminal. To uso tiiori for field fortifications., loading
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amimition, for mlno clearing, and any othor v/ork that is
dangorous was clearly prohibited by international law and
conatitutos a v/ar crime •
Murder and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War
Reports of subordinate units show the hanging of two
former Russian Soldiers for being friendly to partisans;
and the shooting of four Russian prisoners for planning to
escape, and six prisoners of war who had stolon arms and
ammunition and tried to escape. On 15 December 1942 a
report shuv/s the shooting of a liussian prisoner of ?/ar
since he could not be removed under the eye of the enemy
and within the rango of enemy machine guns, Pcur days
later the same unit reported that two other prisoners of
war had to bo shot.
Turning Over of_^ Prisoners of Vfar to the SD
On 24 July 1941 the High Comiaand of tho VVehrmacht
issued an order for tho screening and soparauion of Russian
prisoners of war in the camps in tho zone of operation by
which x:)olitically untonable and suspicious olenonts ,
commissars, and agitators were to bo segregated^ i\n
activity report shows tliat the connandor of the Rear Army
Korucck 590, subordinate to Roinh^rdt, issued an order of
29 DGcembor 1942 containing the followings
"6.) Tho fetching of prisoners from tho
prisoner coilecting point for tho
purpose f interrogation, transfer
to a trcansiont canp, 'si:)Ocial treat
ment* or discharge can take place
only through the Poldgondaruorie
Battalion (motorized) 695 and the
Security Police and SD Dorogobush
in mutual agroemont. In tho event
that no officer of the Peldgondarmorie
Battalion (motorized) 695 knowTi to
tho camp commandant of the prisoner
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eclloctiriG point, nor the Chiof of tho SD
unit Dorogobush, should bo supervising tho
tr.king ciway of tho prisonors, a written
authorization issued by those offices nust
be handed to the Caiop Corxiandante Tho
turning-over of a pris':^ner nay in any event
take place only a, ainst a v/ritten receipts"
This V/ehrriacht report should bo noted for the reason
that the torn "special troatnentl', enclosed v/ith quota.tion
narks, is used with apparent understanding. The next para
graph to that above quoted is of interest a.s relating to
labor allocation. It is stated therein thatj
".hi allocation nay take place only in
keeping v/ith tho stock available of able-
bodied prisoners# Onl^" those prisonors
nay bo allocated for labor in whoso case
no special treatnont is to be expected,
and whise interrogation has been concluded,"
Since tho whole report concerns prisoner of vmr natters, it
is to be expected that tho ipris oners who nay not bo allocated
as "special treatnont" are prisoners of war-, .Is an oxanplo
of tho carrying out of the general policy to olininate those
opposed to tho •/ohrnacht, tho following appears in a
report received by the 3rd Panzer ..^.rny;
"On 28 Decenber 1941, the prisoner of
war x.losandjr IV.^SSILJEW, who v/orked in a
snow-shovelling detail and thereby cane
into touch v/ith the Russian civilian
population, was arrested and shot in
Schachov/askajai he continuously had
caused imrest aiiongst the population by
talking to tho peoxole ab ut the ovor-
whelning defeat of the Gernans and
prophesied that tho Russians would soon
appear in Schachowskaja,"
In connents onanating fron one of Roinhardt^s staff
officers relative to the suggestion for the fornation of a
Russie.n Red-Cross, it is indicated that ho v/as opposed to
authorizing the Rod Gross to nako any search for prisoners
nissing in action and the reason which he gives is set
forth v:ith great frankness. It is as follov/s;
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"Ovorwholningly Ir.rge nu:-ibor of POV/*s
c.Gcor.sGcl with-jut docuinGntary clGposition,
G.nc!. of civilians v/h) disapper.rGd duo to
brutal actions,"
.".t this point wo rofor to tho follov/ing finding of
Tribuno.l V in Case 7, and adopt it as a correct statoriont
of tho law. It is as f ollov;s s
"V/ant of hnov;lodge of the contents of
reports iiado to hir.i (i.e. to tho C01.1::anding
General), is not a defense. lieports to
Coriiianding Generals are iiade for their
specia.1 benefit, .jiy failure to acquaint
theiuselves with the contents of such
reports, or a failure to require
additional reports whore inadequacy
appears on their face, constitutes a
dereliction of duty which ho cannot
use in his own behalf."
De_porJ^ation and Ensla.yoioent of Civy^ians
Deportation and enslavement of civilians v/as carried
on within the area of Reinhardt *s arr-y coar^ands on a scale
of great e::tent. dt the cutset of )ur consideration of
this subject, it should be said that there is no inter
national law that pori'jits the deportation ^r the use of
civilians against their v/ill for other than on reasonable
reoyaisitions for tho needs of the army, either within the
area of the army or after deportation to rear areas or
to tho homeland of tho occupying power. This is the holding
of the II.iT Judgment and this c msistently has been the
holding of all of the iTurnberg Tribunals. It is necessary
then only to determine factually v'hether v/ith the knowledge,
consent, or approval of the defendant the deportation a.nd
enslavemont occurred. There is no military necessity to
just5.fy the use of civilians in such manner by an oocuoyinr^
✓
force, "th-sy woro forced to labor against their will,
it latters not whether they v^ero given extra rations or
extra privileges, for such matters could bo considered, if
at all, only in nitiga.tion of punishment and not as a
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clefonsG to the crime. VJhile v/o do not, in referring first
to 0. report to the 3rd Pan.^er ^^rr.y, dated 6 I.Iarch 194d,
follovf the chronological ord-or, v/e set it forth first
•because it deals v^ith the manner of conscription and the
r.ttitud.e of the army long after the beginning of the war.
In this report the f ollov/ing appears s
"partly the workers are being seized
in the streets and. under the pretext that
they are to v/ork for 2-5 days, they are
being brought to work without any v/inter
clothing, shoes, mess kit and blankets.,,
The indigen:)us auxiliary police fetched, the
Russians ov.t of their houses at night, but
partially these people could, buy themselves
out of it b^r giving £ome__^al.coh£l__tjD ^h£
indiaenous_aT^^lir.r^:r_poli
"This manner £f_cojn£crintion did no^
£n£r£a£o3the~Rus£ian£ ' _'^ 2. '
.Apparently d.uo to an error, some terribly diseased, and
afflicted, persons were sent out on a v/ork assignment. The
oxplo.n: tion contained in the document which is offered.,
in Iloinhardt *s d.efense, shows,probadoly, a mistake hut d.oes
not otherwise groo.tly improve his situation. It shows
hov/ labor recruiting was ca.rriodc on and that the a.rmy v/as
cooperating. .j:iong other things, it states;
✓
"Army h.LI,. order to the General Commands,
that in case of drives for the recruitment
of labor forces, a labor allocation official
has to participate right from the start.
The -^rmy EconoLiy Official - Group Labor could,
supply officials from his ov/n ra.nks; but
whether this employment could be achieved
speed.!ly enough in each case, is a mo.tter
still open to doubt.
"2.) The criticized, cond.itions .in the
recruitment o' labor forces (kidnaeping on
the street, cornp.tnoss of the O.D. men
(indi: onoMs aius a lie ry police) etc.) can
never be entiroV' oliminotod, especially
in eases of sud nn demand. It is possible
that the criticized events concern the
ICaminski drive, in v/hich mce 750 workers
wore supolied. But such abuses are a.lso
net entirely avoidable v/ithin the area of
the Divis.lons. In the case of the '78 year
olds, the blind and the cripples etc.' it
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is, c.ocordiiiQ "'^ o a statouont by tho
Fortification Fn^rinoor Staff 7, a case
in which a group of 15 - 20 pooplo once
happonoc'. to get nixed up with a transport
in tho beginning of Fobruary. Hosponsibility
can not be fixed any more, .as nothing is
kiiovm about this in Vito'osk,"
Tho Corr/aandor of Korueck 590 in a report to tho 3rd
Panzor JaTiy reported tho following o.ssigmricnts s wouon for
tho Poioh, lOOj field fortification constructions mon,
956; v;or.]en, 2199, His ropcrt also contains tho followings
*'500 nalo and 500 fonalo workers were
conscripted at the tine, as ordorod in
paragraph 18 of the Procurenont Order, This
conscription, howevor, was suporscdod by the
subsoci_uont ordors concorning tho formation
of transports of labor dctachi:]Gnt3. Tho
following must be said abovxt tho organizing
of those tr.ansports ;
ITowhoro v/as thoro any desiro or inclination
for this labor assigni'iont; indeed, sonotimos
it ovon occurred that non wopt when they
wore being shipped away, ^".Imost all of tho
workers had literally to bo dragged away.
This causod ver^- grave difficulties for tho
local i.iilitary administrative offices,
because all of the tiwansperts had to be
assQubled at very short notice and almost
simultaneously. There were not always
sufficient forces (lillitary Police, hilitra-y
Police Service) to bring the workers fron
reiaote villages. Those who were brought,
howevor, sometinos proved to be unfit for
work. There was no suitable place to
accomuodate those who v/ere fit to bo sent
a ol-.co which would have i'lade guarding
easy until they could bo shipped av/ay. The
v/orkors, howevor, had to be" closely guarded
at all times, for otherwise, they wou.ld
have run away,"
Tho foregoing shov/s clearly that these pooplo who wore
used for work v/oro not volunteers but wore romidod up and.
Ir.r^ressod into service as slaves.
Tho huartleri:]els tor for the 3rd Panzer hrmy on 3
pocember 19i2 made a report to ..rry Group Center in which
was contained tho followings
"The applic.-.tion of force, unavoidable
in putting tho population to work
and^oentioned already in one of the
regular rejorta as causing a great
^ 2.00 -
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is beginning to saov; effects-. In
Cifficnlt oy_lnad0£uato fooci_rations_
which - according to consistent reports
fron all districts - are not sufficient
to satisfy the hunger of the population
"Notovvorthy is the generally established
fact that the nurebor of persons staying
away fron v;or!: or of those v;ho nust"
forcefully be driven to work! is on the
increase.
"The extent of difficulties to bo sixmountod
co.n bo realised v;hon bearing in nind that
nearly_all__W2rkorsJnave to_be pressed into
service and E^l"'^Zoit^i^_indivldually-be_
2r_lV2n__to work_by £old_lorSj_ ^Co^acks ,„and_
nenbor^ of_tho_—ux_iliar;*_Pol_iceJonphasis
suppliodT ~
letter signed by Roinhardt undeh date of 28 I.'arch
1943 to the Gonnanding General of the 43rd Corps shov/s
conclusively his knowledge and attitude toward the labor
progran. ..nong other thinas in the letter he said
"Tine and again, I have, v;hen touring
the area, noticed squrds of civilian v/orkdrs
practically idling, Furthornore, the
nU!..ibor of inhabitants assigned to a job
coea not correspond to the task which
cor Id, wijbh^prop or
The supervisory
personnel Xfu.rnished by the troops, by
Organization lODT etc.) is just standing
by and does not shov; any military bearing;
foronen and supervisors do not tako any
steps to urge i.^.oro working speed. This
intolGra';-)lo state of affairs will irn-'lodlatoly
ccaso once and for all. V/e must keep in
mind that in the homeland oven Gonaan v/ornen
and girls arc ^/orking hard, readily fulfilling
what they considor their elonontary duty,
T: is being the case, v/o ought to be
ashamed of ourselves, if v/e did not request
the civilian inhabitants of the occupied
territory, called upon to work on our
behalf, to utilij.e the working day fully.
In this respect, I rather prefor a daily
loininum of ei
the fullest use
ht vvorking h.m.rs, of v;hich
is jiac.G' and which include
brealcs, t^^lon^or hour2,_iialf of__which Is
3po_nt in__dawdlin£, Tiie population - which
is being subjected to a much greater strain
on the Russian sice - must be compelled to
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fulfill oy roquircnents, if nocessr.ry
through rotGntion of v/cigos^ doprlvG.tion
of food and restraint of personal liborty;
just as I shall call to accoimt any super
visory personnel of any description and
ranlc, if rny donands are not enforced^
Supervision of v/orlcers is a military duty
like any other and requires the full efforts
of the porsomiel assirxiod.
"It is roqiiested that all military
superiors and all organs in charge of tra-ffic
control and of the naintonance of discipline
cooporato v;ith ne in the full exploitation
of labor of any kind."
The Goioi.:andor of the XXXXIII Corps, to whom this letter
wa.s a.ddrossod, on 2 Jvino 1S43, issued a directive to dro.ft by
force nalo and female labor power from the rural cormounities
of the corjmunica.tion zones. Ho then specified five rural
coriTjunities in which coercive measures v/ere to be carried
out. Ho directed that the policy bo announood as ponoanent
so the population v;ill cone forth from its hideouts and
bo soizod. The effect on the people is indicated by his
statement that the drafted forces will attempt to dodge
the labor allocation with evory moans at their disposo.1.
The ruthlessness intended is shown by the direction that
''11 liGii and women -are to bo instructed tnat they be
shot at v/hon attempting to floe and the reason given ^
"...only partisan adherents flee; they
undor.ao corresponding treatment."
How many so flooinr v/oro shot and d-eiiominatod as partisans
in the reports, tho record does not show. The report states
that for several ViToeks tho population of the rural commmlties
"docs not Gooperato in fighting against them (the bandits)
in a measure which is to bo ompeoted for tho final liberation
of To remedy this lac'x of cooperation with thoir
gorman conquerors, all male inhabitants of those rurc.l
CO"" junitios, os well as females, botwoon tho ages of 14
and 45, unless the v;omon had one child under eight, wore
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